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ABSTRACT
“OBSCENE FANTASIES”: ELFRIEDE JELINEK’S GENERIC PERVERSIONS
SEPTEMBER 2009
BRENDA L. BETHMAN, B.A., DICKINSON COLLEGE
M.A., TEMPLE UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Sara Lennox
This dissertation examines Elfriede Jelinek’s investigation of Austria’s and
Western Europe’s “obscene fantasies” through her “perversion” of generic forms
in three of her best-known texts (Die Liebhaberinnen, Lust, and Die Klavierspielerin).
It also investigates how these texts, at first glance less overtly political than
Jelinek’s later work, can be seen as laying the groundwork for her later, more
political, analysis of Austrian fascism and racism. The dissertation is composed
of three chapters; each investigates a central psychoanalytic concept (alienation,
jouissance, perversion and sublimation) and reads a Jelinek text in relation to the
genre that it is perverting, exposing the “obscene fantasies” that lie at its heart.
Chapter One examines how Jelinek depicts alienation (in the Marxist,
socialist feminist, and Lacanian senses) in her 1975 novel Die Liebhaberinnen, and
explores how Jelinek’s depiction of alienation functions to make Die
vii

Liebhaberinnen an anti-romance. Chapter Two addresses whether Jelinek’s novel
Lust (1989) is a pornographic or anti-pornographic text. I investigate the complex
relationship between aesthetics and pornography, arguing that many other
Jelinek scholars collapse the distinction between mass-cultural forms of
pornography and the high-cultural pornography of Bataille and Sade, and thus
fail to understand how her text is simultaneously pornographic and antipornographic. Chapter Three focuses on Jelinek’s novel Die Klavierspielerin (1983),
examining the development of its protagonist as a (perverse) sexual subject, and
her ultimate failure to achieve a stable sexual position and how Jelinek’s text
perverts the genre of the Künstlerroman. It also discusses Erika’s training as a
pianist as a possible causal factor of her perversions and lack of sexual identity,
concluding that her inability to sublimate demonstrates the similarities (and
differences) between the artist and the pervert, illustrating how Jelinek’s novel
deviates from the traditional Künstlerroman.
The dissertation argues that the disruption of genres is one of Jelinek’s
most significant literary contributions, her works functioning to create a
“negative aesthetics” as opposed to a positive reworking of generic forms.
Jelinek rejects an identificatory mode of writing and refuses to create “positive”
subjects, preferring instead to produce art that is a “critique of praxis as the rule
viii

of brutal self-preservation at the heart of the status quo” (Adorno, Aesthetic
Theory, 12).

ix

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................................................... iv
ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................................... vii
CHAPTER
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................1
1. HOUSEWIFE OR SHOP GIRL? ALIENATION AND (ANTI-) ROMANCE IN
DIE LIEBHABERINNEN.................................................................................................18
Introduction .........................................................................................................18
“Sexuality is to Feminism What Work is to Marxism”: Alienated Sexuality
and/as Labor in Die Liebhaberinnen .......................................................22
Problems with the Marxist/Socialist Feminist Analysis of Jelinek ..............48
Lacanian Alienation and Metonymy in Die Liebhaberinnen ..........................52
“Reading the (Anti-)Romance”: Die Liebhaberinnen and the
Romance Novel .......................................................................................63
2. A JOUISSANCE BEYOND THE PHALLUS? LUST AND PORNOGRAPHY ...77
Introduction: An Artistic (Anti-) Pornography? ............................................77
The Misfortunes of Justine and Gerti: Reading Jelinek with Sade...............89
Female Sexuality and Jouissances ..................................................................114
Conclusion: A Pessimistic Pornography Without Pleasure........................128
3. PORTRAIT OF THE ARTIST AS A (NOT-SO-)YOUNG PERVERT: PIANOS,
PERVERSION, SUBLIMATION, AND THE KÜNSTERLERROMAN IN DIE
KLAVIERSPIELERIN ....................................................................................................133
Introduction .......................................................................................................133
The Androgynous Piano: Women’s Piano Playing as Feminine and
Masculine ...............................................................................................137
Excursus: Clara S. ..............................................................................................149
The Piano and Erika’s Sexual Position in Die Klavierspielerin .....................155
Sublimation and Perversion: Die Klavierspielerin as Anti-Künstlerroman...166
x

CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................182
APPENDIX: LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ..................................................................185
WORKS CITED..............................................................................................................187

xi

INTRODUCTION
Der Fall Fritzl
In April 2008, world news was dominated by headlines concerning the
Fritzl Case. It emerged that Josef Fritzl of Amstetten in the Austrian province of
Lower Austria had been holding his daughter captive in their basement for 24
years (beginning in 1984) and had fathered seven children with her (for more
details on the Fritzl case, see Jüttner). In the wake of the scandal, speculation also
centered around Fritzl’s wife, whose claim of having known nothing many
related to the Austrians’ collective failure to “know nothing” about what the
Nazis were doing in the 1930s and 1940s. As Austrian novelist Josef Haslinger
pointed out to The Australian: “There is this pretty, shiny surface that Austrians
like to show, but it hides a monstrosity . . . On the surface we have moral
standards and enlightened policies, but in the background we have this perverse
world that nobody wants to talk about” (Campbell).
It is precisely this “perverse world,” or what Slavoj Žižek identifies as
Austria’s “obscene fantasies,” that the work of Elfriede Jelinek investigates. As
Žižek puts it:
For decades, Jelinek was uncompromisingly describing the
violence of men against women in all its modalities, including
women’s own libidinal complicity in their victimization.
Without mercy, she was bringing to light obscene fantasies
1

that underlie the Middle European respectability, fantasies
which crawled into public space in the Fritzl affair which
effectively has the unreality of a ‘bad’ fairy tale (Žižek; see
also Robertson, for a discussion of the ways in which “Fritzl
existed in literature before he existed in life”).
In this dissertation, I examine Jelinek’s investigation of Austria’s and Western
Europe’s “obscene fantasies” through her “perversion” of generic forms. In this
introduction, I will first give a brief overview of Jelinek’s biography and the
reception of her work in order to place my work in context.
Elfriede Jelinek: A Brief Introduction
Elfriede Jelinek was born on October 20, 1946 in Mürzzuschlag, Styria in
Austria. Her father was a working-class Czechoslovakian Jewish socialist and her
mother was a bourgeois Austrian Catholic. Jelinek grew up mostly in Vienna,
where she attended kindergarten, grade school, and high school. While at high
school, she also studied organ, piano and flute at the Vienna Conservatory, and
in 1971 she completed examinations as an organist at the Conservatory. After
high school she studied dramatics and art history at the University of Vienna, but
she gave up her studies after six terms. Since 1966 Jelinek has lived and worked
as a freelance author in Vienna, Munich and Paris, marrying Gottfried
Hüngsberg in 1974. Until 1991 Jelinek was a member of the Communist Party

2

(for further biographical information on Jelinek, see: Fiddler, Rewriting, 1-8 & 1011).
As an author Jelinek is not only productive, but also versatile. Her
writings encompass almost all literary genres. She has written poetry, novels,
radio plays, dramas, essays, television and film scripts, and also a libretto, Robert,
der Teufel (Robert the Devil). She has also translated novels by Thomas Pynchon
and dramas by George Feydeau and Eugène Labiche. She is the recipient of
many prizes, including the 2004 Nobel Prize for Literature, which was awarded
in recognition of her “musical flow of voices and counter-voices in novels and
plays that, with extraordinary linguistic zeal, reveal the absurdity of society’s
clichés and their subjugating power” (“Nobel Prize”).
Jelinek’s Reception: Jelinek as a “Political” Writer
Jelinek is often read as a “political” writer thanks to her self-proclaimed
Marxism and feminism. At the same time, however, others view her as a
“postmodern” author, thus leading Allyson Fiddler to pose in her 1994 essay,
“There Goes That Word Again, or Elfriede Jelinek and Postmodernism,” what
she considered to be “something of a ‘Gretchenfrage’ of our time, namely, where
does Elfriede Jelinek stand on the question of postmodernism, or rather . . . what
position, if any, do her texts occupy within the postmodern debate on literature?
3

Can Jelinek’s writing be called postmodernist?” (“There Goes. . .” 129). Part of
my intention in this dissertation is to expand this discussion beyond the either/or
dichotomy that categorizes much of the discussion regarding Jelinek’s politics.
A survey of the critical literature leaves no doubt that many scholars view
Jelinek as either a Marxist or socialist feminist. 1 Fiddler, for example, describes
Jelinek as a “Marxist-feminist” (Rewriting, 12), and in the article cited above,
answers her “Gretchenfrage” in the negative, maintaining instead that Jelinek is
located “firmly within the older, Modernist tradition,” 2 due to her “adherence to
certain ‘metanarratives’—such as Marxism and feminism” (“There Goes. . .” 144).

For the purposes of this dissertation, I will use the terms “Marxist feminism” and
“socialist feminism” interchangeably, for as Rosemarie Tong points out, it is difficult to
distinguish between Marxist and socialist feminism. Tong goes on to state that she has come to
view the differences between them as “more a matter of emphasis than of substance” (94). For
example, Marxist feminists often “identify classism rather than sexism as the ultimate cause of
women’s oppression,” while socialist feminists “insist the fundamental cause of women’s
oppression is neither ‘classism’ nor ‘sexism’ but an intricate interplay between capitalism and
patriarchy” (Tong, 94). Both Marxist and socialist feminists, however, share the conviction that
“women’s oppression is not the result of individuals’ intentional actions but is the product of the
political, social, and economic structures within which individuals live” (Tong, 94).
1

For a definition of an “older, Modernist tradition,” see Callari and Ruccio, who explain:
“As a modernist discourse, classical Marxism was characterized by two mutually supporting
forces: the protocols of scientism and a nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century notion of
progress . . . Marxism tended to deny the ‘constitutive’ (as opposed to a ‘supportive’) role it
played in the shaping of history and to believe that it was merely ‘revealing’ a predetermined
historical trajectory. Its belief in notions of progress . . . certified the inevitability of social change,
and this, in turn, supported the notion that the laws of history could be discovered scientifically”
(11). As I shall make clear in this dissertation, Jelinek’s texts cannot be exclusively located within
a classical, Modernist tradition of Marxism, as her work clearly posits neither the “inevitability of
social change” nor a “belief in notions of progress.”
2
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In the same collection in which Fiddler’s essay appeared, Linda DeMeritt also
argues for a view of Jelinek as a Marxist feminist, citing Jelinek as an example of
a writer whose “main theme is the submission of everyone, regardless of sex, to
the accumulation of capital and their resultant alienation,” (115) and who
“effectively advances both the marxist and feminist battle” (125). Other examples
of scholars who position Jelinek within a Marxist/socialist feminist framework
are: Rudolf Burger (21), Jacqueline Vansant (5), Dagmar Lorenz (111), and
Marlies Janz, who uses the term materialist, rather than Marxist or socialist,
feminist, but who nonetheless believes that Jelinek’s materialist feminist
orientation has been falsely assessed in Jelinek criticism (vii). 3

In Janz’s view, the reason for the lack of convincing interpretations of Jelinek’s work lies
“nicht nur in der Schwierigkeit des Werks, sondern auch in der anhaltenden Verkennung Jelineks
als politischer Autorin. So wird wohl ihr Feminismus als auch ihre Situierung im Kontext von
Poststrukturalismus und Postmoderne zumeist falsch eingeschätzt, weil ihre marxistischen
Orientierungen ausgeblendet werden. Diesen aber ist Jelinek bei allen scheinbaren bzw.
partiellen Annäherungen an Verfahrensweisen von Poststrukturalismus und Postmoderne bis
heute verpflichtet. Die satirischen Mythendestruktionen, die ihr Werk mit wechselnden
Gegenständen und sich ausdifferenzierdenden ästhetischen Verfahrensweisen leistet, sind stets
bezogen auf ihre materialistischen Gesellschaftsanalysen und verstehen sich als aufklärerische
Ideologiekritik” (vii) [“not just in the difficulty of the work, but also in the continual failure to
recognize Jelinek as a political author. For this reason her feminism, as well as her location in the
context of postmodernism and poststructuralism, is for most part falsely assessed, because her
Marxist orientation is not taken into account. Jelinek, however, continues to be indebted to
Marxism, despite all of her partial approaches to postmodern or poststructuralist methods. The
satirical destruction of myth, which her work achieves with varying objects and sophisticated
aesthetic methods, is always related to her material analysis of society, and can be understood as
an Enlightenment ideology critique” (my translation)]. While I find Janz’s work to be a refreshing
change from the either/or dichotomy (that is, a forced choice between Marxism and
poststructuralism) that often characterizes the reception of Jelinek, her dependence on Barthes’
3
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Lorenz’s article cited above is a good example of how a reliance on solely
Marxist feminist categories can produce a one-sided reading of Jelinek, as her
focus on Jelinek’s Marxist feminism leads her to declare that Jelinek’s “works
focus on sexual politics, the socioeconomic plight of women to which she
subordinates the theme of the female body and sexuality” (111). It should be
clear to anyone who has read Die Liebhaberinnen, Die Klavierspielerin, Lust or Clara
S. (to name just a few) that Jelinek deals with the theme of the female body and
sexuality in her work. Indeed, the novel that Lorenz is analyzing (Die
Ausgesperrten) also treats of female sexuality in the figure of Anna and her
attempt to define herself as both an intellectual and a woman, something
Jelinek’s text makes explicit, when, during a sexual encounter with Hans, Anna
realizes that her intellectual skills are of no interest to Hans and also that her
identity as an intellectual woman is separate from her sexuality:
Dafür hab ich jetzt den ganzen Sartre in meiner Freizeit
gelesen, das ganze Sein und das ganze Nichts, schießt es ihr
durch den Kopf, während sie aus der Unterhose steigt. Und
jetzt kann ich gar nichts damit anfangen. Ich könnte
genausogut eine sein, die niemals irgendetwas gelesen hat
außer Bravo. Mehr ist hier nicht vonnöten. Daß sie das
durchschaut, unterscheidet sie schon wieder von den

work on myth to read Jelinek limits, in my opinion, her otherwise insightful interpretations of
Jelinek’s work.

6

Millionen anderer Mädchen, äußerlich sieht Hans aber leider
nur eine wie eine Million andere auch (A, 89). 4
Another problem with the classifying of Jelinek as either a Marxist or
socialist feminist is that her interpreters often simply “take her word for it” by
quoting one of her many interviews (see for example Jelinek, “Wut,” 89; and
Sauter, 110), or citing her membership in the Communist Party (which she left in
1991), as “proof” of her Marxism and/or feminism. But, as Imke Meyer has
pointed out:
It is not methodologically sound, in the majority of instances,
to ascribe, while concerned with the interpretation of literary
texts, the same significance to the elements that comprise the
texts as to the facts that comprise the author’s life. Rather, a
distinction between, for instance, a narrative voice created in
prose fiction on the one hand and the voice of the author of
that fictitious text on the other seems appropriate. If such
distinctions are not made, potential pitfalls occur. For
instance, a creative intention that an author expresses in an
interview, might, without further investigation, be
understood as having become fully realized in a given literary
text. However, this need not necessarily be the case, and it
seems, therefore, that if one wants to avoid potentially
reductive readings of literary texts, one should not let one’s
analysis be guided by an author’s expressed intentions (123).

“is this why I read the whole of Sartre in my spare time, all about Being and about
Nothingness? What use is it to me now? I might just as well be a girl who’s never read anything
but Bravo. You don’t need any more for this. The fact that she perceives this distinguishes her
from millions of other girls, but on the outside Hans, alas, only sees a girl the same as a million
others” (Wonderful, 85).
4
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Following Meyer’s advice, what I will demonstrate in this dissertation is that,
despite Jelinek’s personal political commitment to Marxism, there is something
in her work that goes beyond Marxism and that we need to add psychoanalysis
to our interpretative “tool kit” in order to read femininity in these texts. To assist
in this effort, I draw on the work of those scholars to attempt to forge a middle
ground in this debate, such as Brigid Haines and Margaret Littler, who view
Jelinek’s work as exemplified by a “complexity” that “arise[s] from a basic threeway tension between the Marxist, feminist, and post-structuralist aspects” of her
work, and who see that tension as “continu[ing] to trouble and enrich Jelinek
research” (40).
Thus my position on this “debate” is similar to that of Haines and Littler,
but has also been influenced by Verena Mayer’s and Roland Koberg’s argument
that because Jelinek as a private citizen is politically engaged, Jelinek the writer
does not necessarily feel the need to write unambiguously engaged literature,
but instead reserves for herself the “right to art,” (Mayer and Koberg, 9), as well
as by Matthias Konzett’s contention that the political import of Jelinek’s work lies
in its investigation of Austria as symptom. He views that as taking place in two
ways:
1) as a case study of symptomatic expression of crisis in
postwar affluent Western societies informed by legacies of
8

colonialism, racism, and Eurocentric claims to cultural
supremacy; and 2) as a site of jouissance and perverse pleasure
won from this symptomatic site of corruption and decadence .
. . In this latter version, hyperbole rules and brings comic
relief to the forces of repression that sustain the symptom as a
camouflage of illness. The illness is finally allowed to
resurface as illness (Konzett, 8-9).
Konzett further views Jelinek’s work after 1991 (beginning with her play about
Heidigger and Hannah Arendt, Totenauberg) as becoming more directly political
in its engagement with the Holocaust, xenophobia, sport, the Iraq war, etc.
(Konzett, 13-14). 5
Agreeing with this position, I would argue that the works I read in this
dissertation (written between 1975 and 1989) are political in Konzett’s second
sense insofar as they investigate Austria as a “site of jouissance and perverse
pleasure,” and that depict the symptom and the illness of Austria society. They
do so in ways that seem less clearly political at first glance, first through their
insistent focus on male-female relations. If Ingeborg Bachmann was correct when
she claimed that “Der Faschismus ist der erste in der Beziehung zwischen einem

Here it is interesting to note that 1991 was the year that Jelinek left the Communist
Party. Perhaps she felt the need to be more political in her work once she was no longer publicly
affiliated with the Party.
5
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Mann und einer Frau,” (Bachmann, 144) 6 then these works, while at first glance
less overtly political than Jelinek’s later work, could be seen as laying the
groundwork for her later, more political, analysis of fascism and racism in
Austria.
The second way in which these texts can be viewed as political is through
Jelinek’s “negative aesthetics” (in the form of rewriting or negating familiar lowand high-culture genres). 7 Working with generic forms, she focuses on types
instead of characters with individual identities and this is also where we can
most clearly see that Konzett is correct when he argues that “Historical
specificity . . . is often hard to detect in Jelinek” (Konzett, 20). Thus, for example,
Brigitte and Paula in Die Liebhaberinnen do not necessarily represent what life
was “really” like for women in provincial Austria in the 1970s, but instead
function as a canvas on which Jelinek paints her version of the romance novel.
In my reading of Jelinek, I have chosen to focus on the feminist corner of
what Sture Packalén, in an article on the Nobel Prize website, calls her “triangle,”

“Fascism is the first thing in the relationship between a man and a woman” (my
translation).
6

I will return to the question of a “negative aesthetics” in the conclusion. For now, I offer
this definition from Hendrik Birus’s reading of Adorno: “Art must be negative in order to ‘bear
witness to the negativity of social existence’ (Adorno, GS, 14:52, Birus’s translation)” (141).
7
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a triangle “whose corners point in three different directions: towards a feminist
perspective, a Nazi past and the contemporary political arena” (“Elfriede Jelinek:
Provocation as the Breath of Life”).
Generic Perversions
The definition of genre that I use in this dissertation comes from Frederic
Jameson, who defines genres in his book The Political Unconscious as “essentially
literary institutions, or social contracts between a writer and a specific public,
whose function is to specify the proper use of a particular cultural artifact” (106,
emphasis in original). Additionally, Anne Cranny-Francis in Feminist Fictions
argues that “feminist generic fiction . . . is a radical revision of conservative genre
texts, which critically evaluates the ideological significance of textual
conventions and of fiction as a discursive practice. At times this interrogation
may transform the feminist text into a virtual parody of the genre” (9-10). The
Jelinek texts that I read in this dissertation are parodies of genres that perform a
materialist critique of the genres being parodied.
Similarly, Jelinek’s “generic perversions” reveal the ways that genres
work to cover up the lack that subjects experience due to the subject’s entry into
the symbolic order. In this dissertation, I examine the ways that both popular
culture generic forms (the romance novel and pornography) and a “high” culture
11

form (the Künstlerroman) work to convince the reader that lack does not exist. In
the case of the Künstlerroman, I draw on the work of Julia Kristeva, who, in her
book on Colette, notes that through sublimation, “a certain subject is constructed,
one who lacks nothing, in fact, except that he lacks a lack” (161). The
Künstlerroman, in its staging of sublimation, thus works to produce a subject who
does not lack. Similarly, romance novels posit that the heroine’s love relationship
will make her whole, while pornography depicts the myth of phallic jouissance
that will allow the sexual relationship to exist.
Popular generic fiction thus functions on the level of the imaginary,
operating “on a metaphysics of wholeness, on the illusory identification of the
subject with a unified body,” as Thomas Beebee notes in The Ideology of Genre
(16), while the Künstlerroman fosters an illusion of wholeness through
sublimation. Jelinek perverts each of these genres by showing us the lacks that do
exist outside of them and exposing as myth that imaginary wholeness.
Introduction to Chapters
The dissertation is composed of three chapters, which are tied together
insofar as each chapter investigates a central psychoanalytic concept (alienation,
jouissance, perversion & sublimation) and reads a Jelinek text in relation to the
genre that it is perverting, thus exposing the “obscene fantasies” that lie at the
12

heart of the genre. In the case of chapter one on Die Liebhaberinnen and alienation,
the concept is investigated in relation to its use in other theories (Marxism,
socialist feminism); that is not the case in the other two chapters.
The chapters do not follow the chronological order of the texts examined.
Instead I start with Die Liebhaberinnen, which is followed by Lust and then Die
Klavierspielerin (Die Liebhaberinnen was written in 1975, Die Klavierspielerin in 1983,
and Lust in 1989). I chose this order for two reasons. First, as Allyson Fiddler has
noted, it makes sense to place the chapter on Lust directly after the chapter on Die
Liebhaberinnen because Lust can be seen a companion piece to Die Liebhaberinnen.
While Die Liebhaberinnen looks at romance and courtship, Lust shows us what
happens after the “happy end” of marriage is achieved (“Reading,” 298-99). They
are also both set in provincial Austria as compared to Vienna in Die
Klavierspielerin
Secondly, the order makes sense in terms of generic groupings: romance
and pornography are both popular culture genres with roots in the eighteenth
century, while the Künstlerroman is a “high” culture genre with roots in the
nineteenth century. It was also during the nineteenth century that the piano
became the “instrument of the century” (Plantinga, 1).

13

Chapter One, “Housewife or Shop Girl? Alienation and (Anti-) Romance
in Die Liebhaberinnen” examines the ways that Jelinek depicts alienation (in the
Marxist, socialist feminist, and Lacanian senses) in her 1975 novel Die
Liebhaberinnen, arguing that while Die Liebhaberinnen can be read as a Marxist
and/or socialist feminist text, depicting both alienation from labor and sexuality
in the Marxist and socialist feminist uses of the term, it also can benefit from a
linguistically-based psychoanalytic reading.
Following a discussion of Marxist and socialist feminist alienation, I then
turn to an analysis of alienation in the Lacanian sense in Jelinek’s novel. I
conclude the chapter by arguing that what Jelinek does in Die Liebhaberinnen is to
construct a materialist feminist version of the romance novel, one that illustrates
the ways in which conventional romance novels work are alienating.
In Chapter Two, “A Jouissance Beyond the Phallus? Lust and
Pornography,” I address the question of whether Jelinek’s novel Lust, published
in 1989, is a pornographic or anti-pornographic text. Are we to understand it as a
repudiation, mockery, and/or parody of (male) pornography and desire, or does
Jelinek simply reproduce that which she is supposedly making fun of? To answer
the above questions, I discuss in the chapter the complex negotiation between
aesthetics and pornography, arguing that many Jelinek scholars have failed to
14

address these questions adequately through their collapsing of the distinction
(complex as it may be) between mass-cultural forms of pornography and the
type of pornography produced by writers such as Bataille and Sade.
In order to frame the discussion, I look at definitions of “artistic
pornography,” Angela Carter’s “moral pornographer,” linking both to the
Marquis de Sade and the notion of a pornographic tradition that demonstrates
Jacques Lacan’s famous declaration that the sexual relationship does not exist. I
then offer a comparison of Lust to both Sade’s “Justine” texts and the film Deep
Throat, as a means of demonstrating how Jelinek’s text can be seen as in dialogue
with the type of pornography exemplified by Sade’s work, as well as engaging
critically with the type of mass cultural pornography represented by Deep Throat
and other filmic pornography, concluding that what Jelinek offers us is a
pessimistic pornography without female pleasure.
Chapter Three, “Portrait of the Artist as a (Not-So-)Young Pervert: Pianos,
Perversion, Sublimation, and the Künstlerroman in Die Klavierspielerin,” focuses on
Jelinek’s most famous and semi-autobiographical novel Die Klavierspielerin.
Published in 1983, the novel relates the story of Erika Kohut, piano teacher at the
Vienna Conservatory, her development as a (perverse) sexual subject, and her
ultimate failure to achieve a stable sexual position.
15

In this chapter I argue that Erika’s training as a pianist, the social history
of the piano, especially as it relates to gender, and the use of pianos to represent
female sexuality in literature are all inseparable from Jelinek’s representation of
Erika’s perverse subjectivity and her unstable sexual position.
My analysis of the relationship between Erika’s perversion and her piano
playing thus also makes it possible to read Die Klavierspielerin’s in generic terms
as an anti-Künstlerroman. After a discussion of the history of pianos, pianists and
Jelinek’s 1982 play Clara S., I then place Die Klavierspielerin in the context of both
the history of pianos and Jelinek’s earlier text, before turning to a discussion of
perversion, sublimation, and the Künstlerroman.
I conclude with the argument that perversion’s similarity to sublimation
allows us to read Die Klavierspielerin as an anti-Künstlerroman. Doing so allows us
to view Erika’s failure to become a concert pianist as simultaneously a failure to
achieve sublimation, a failure which manifests itself in perversion as a means of
obtaining the jouissance denied to her by art. We can thus see that Jelinek offers
us an anti-Künstlerroman that stretches generic boundaries through its portrait of
the artist as pervert rather than genius.
In the conclusion, I argue that the scholarly significance of this dissertation
lies in its sustained reading of these three Jelinek texts in generic terms. I also
16

examine how these works function to create an “negative aesthetics,” as opposed
to a positive reworking of generic forms. Finally, I look at how that lack of
positivity explains the often fraught reception of Jelinek’s work by both Marxists
and feminists.

17

CHAPTER 1
HOUSEWIFE OR SHOP GIRL? ALIENATION AND (ANTI-) ROMANCE IN
DIE LIEBHABERINNEN
[paula] ist 15 jahre alt. sie ist jetzt alt genug, um sich überlegen zu dürfen, was sie
einmal werden möchte: hausfrau oder verkäuferin. verkäuferin oder hausfrau.
Elfriede Jelinek, Die Liebhaberinnen (14) 1
Introduction
In her book, Profit and Pleasure: Sexual Identities in Late Capitalism,
Rosemary Hennessy criticizes what she terms “culture theory in the humanities
[which] has emphasized the language-based construction of consciousness”
(212). In particular, Hennessy takes to task the dismissal of the term “alienation”
by “poststructuralists” from culture theory. As Hennessy’s critique is so
pertinent to my argument in this chapter, I will quote her at some length:
This work has been shaped by the presuppositions of
poststructuralism, which stresses the radical loss of
authenticity (a true or coherent self), not as an effect of
capitalism’s alienating management and commodification of
human capacities but of the subject’s entry into a symbolic
system of representations where the subject of language is
always so to speak “at a loss” because the subject of the
enunciation (“I”) is always split from the “self” it refers to.
This view dismisses a concept like “alienation” because it
connotes either a true “self” somewhere “behind” language,
“[paula] is 15 years old. she is now old enough to be allowed to think about what she
wants to be one day: housewife or sales assistant. sales assistant or housewife” (women, 12).
1
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or suggests a utopian vision for overcoming losses that for the
poststructuralist are irrecuperable. In the postmodern frame
of reference, the subject’s coherence is mitigated by the radical
difference (the loss of self-presence or a splitting of the self)
that is the condition for taking up a position in a symbolic
order where the instability of cultural signifiers will always
undo any provisional or projected self-coherence. It is clear by
now that I see these postmodern formations as extremely
limited and actually quite conservative, because they foreclose
ways of knowing the world that connect the symbolic order
(culture) to material social relations that are not symbolic
(Profit and Pleasure, 212). 2
What I would like to suggest with my reading of Elfriede Jelinek’s Die
Liebhaberinnen (English title: women as lovers, [1975]) in this chapter, however, is
that the choice between “alienation” in the symbolic order and in material social
relations is neither as simple nor as complete as Hennessy would have us
believe. Rather, what we need to do is to develop an approach with which we
can analyze both the alienation of the subject in the symbolic order via language
and the alienation of labor and sexuality in material social relations.

Here it is important to note that Hennessy’s earlier work (her book Materialist Feminism
and the Politics of Discourse, published in 1993), was much more sympathetic to postmodernism
than her later work. In the earlier work she notes that “Materialist feminism is distinguished from
socialist feminism in part because it embraces postmodern conceptions of language and
subjectivity. Materialist feminists have seen in postmodernism a powerful critical force for
exposing the relationship between language, the subject, and the unequal distribution of social
resources” (Hennessy, Materialist Feminism, 5). As the above quote makes clear, this more
sympathetic reading of postmodernism is largely missing from Hennessy’s later book. Jelinek’s
text, I would argue, has more in common with Hennessy’s 1993 views than with her later more
traditionally Marxist work. For a useful overview of materialist feminism, see Sara Lennox’s
essay “Materialistcher Feminismus und Postmoderne.”
2
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In addition, Hennessy’s critique allows me to raise the following question:
what type of “alienation” are we dealing with in Jelinek’s text? Is the alienation
depicted in Die Liebhaberinnen alienation from labor brought on by private
property and capitalism, as Marx posited, and something that would be
transcended in communism? Or is it, as some socialist feminists claim in their
reading of Marx, the alienation of women from both their labor and sexuality,
caused by patriarchal relations between men and women in capitalist society, to
be overcome in a more just society? 3 Or, finally, is it, as in Lacan’s work, “an
inevitable consequence of the process by which the ego is constituted by
identification with the counterpart” (Evans, Dictionary, 9)?
In this chapter I will argue that “alienation,” at least as portrayed by
Jelinek, is all of these things, and that one therefore needs to use various methods
(Marxism, socialist feminism and psychoanalysis) as a means of reading Jelinek’s
depiction of alienation in all of its forms in Die Liebhaberinnen. While Die
Liebhaberinnen can be read as a Marxist and/or socialist feminist text, depicting
both alienation from labor and sexuality in the Marxist and socialist feminist uses
of the term, it also illustrates “how patriarchy exerts its powerful hold through

On Marxist/socialist feminist views of alienation, see: Bartky, A. Ferguson, Foreman,
Jaggar, and MacKinnon.
3
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the symbolic” (Haines, 653), and thus can benefit from a linguistically-based
psychoanalytic reading. My reading of Die Liebhaberinnen will seek to coordinate
Marxist, socialist feminist and psychoanalytic theories at different textual levels:
while Marxist and socialist feminist interpretations are useful at the narrative
level (e.g., the plot level or that of the signified), a psychoanalytic interpretation
can be used to read the text at the level of the writing itself (that is, the level of
the signifier, especially in relation to Jelinek’s use of metonymy as a literary
device). As Patricia Elliot explains in her discussion of Jacqueline Rose’s
psychoanalytic feminism:
the psyche can never be a direct reflection of social reality or of
biology. In other words, psychosexuality is overdetermined.
Biology and ideology come to “figure” in it, but there is no
causal relationship. Rather, . . . psychical life is characterized
by a complex process of mediation, so that femininity cannot
be explained as a natural outcome of female anatomy or as the
direct result of (oppressive) social relations (77, emphasis in
original).
In its neglect of the unconscious elements of sexuality, as they play themselves
out in linguistic representation, the socialist feminist concept of alienation
therefore needs to be supplemented with psychoanalysis in order to read
Jelinek’s texts in all of their complexity.
In this chapter, I also read Die Liebhaberinnen in generic terms as an antiromance, arguing that Jelinek’s novel performs a materialist critique of the
21

traditional romance novel’s generic perversions by exposing the ways such
novels work to construct alienated female subjectivities. Following discussions of
Marxist, socialist feminist, and Lacanian alienation in Die Liebhaberinnen, I then
turn to an overview of the romance genre and the ways that Jelinek’s novel
works both with and against those generic conventions, concluding that her text
can ultimately be read as a materialist feminist romance novel.
“Sexuality is to Feminism What Work is to Marxism”: Alienated Sexuality
and/as Labor in Die Liebhaberinnen
Set in the mountains of Styria, Jelinek’s novel outlines the quest of the two
main characters, Brigitte and Paula, to find husbands. This search is determined
by the lack of choices for women in this part of rural Austria, as is ironically
pointed out by the narrator in regard to Paula: “sie [paula] ist 15 jahre alt. sie ist
jetzt alt genug, um sich überlegen zu dürfen, was sie einmal werden möchte:
hausfrau oder verkäuferin. verkäuferin oder hausfrau” (LH, 14). 4 While both
women are successful in their pursuit of husbands, even accomplishing their
goal in the same manner (they become pregnant, which forces the men to marry

One of the elements of this novel’s style is Jelinek’s use of non-capitalization. I will
follow the text’s use of capitalization, rather than “normal” rules when quoting. “she [paula] is 15
years old. she is now old enough to be allowed to think about what she wants to be one day:
housewife or sales assistant. sales assistant or housewife” (women, 12). There is, also, in Brigitte’s
case, the option of working in the bra factory.
4
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them), the two characters function as opposites as well: “immer abwechselnd mit
dem guten beispiel brigittes schleppt sich das schlechte beispiel paulas dahin”
(LH, 26). 5 Despite the contrast between the story of Brigitte, the “good” example,
with that of Paula, the “bad” example, they share the fate of being alienated from
both their labor and sexuality; the main difference between their stories being
that Brigitte is the “success” story in the text. In her discussion of Die
Liebhaberinnen, Marlies Janz makes clear the relation between women, labor and
capital portrayed in Jelinek’s text, writing:
Der Roman destruiert den Trivialmythos “Liebe,” indem er
das Herrschaftsverhältnis unter den Geschlechtern, aber auch
den Widerspruch zwischen Kapital und Arbeit darstellt, also
ganz marxistisch ausgeht von der doppelten Unterdrückung
der Frau und der einfachen Unterdrückung des Mannes, vom
Haupt- und vom Nebenwiderspruch. Mit der Gestalt der
“höheren Tochter” Susi führt er darüber hinaus das Thema
der
Priorität
von
Klassenhierarchien
über
die
Geschlechterhierarchie ein . . . An Brigitte und Paula
demonstriert der Roman die Chancenlosigkeit von Frauen aus
der Arbeiterklasse, die in ihrem Privatleben nur dasselbe tun
können, was sie in der Fabrik tun: sie vermarkten ihre Körper,
sei es als Arbeitskraft, sei es als Sexualobjekt und
Gebärinstrument (22-23). 6

“always alternating with the good example, brigitte, paula, the bad example, trails
along” (women, 27).
5

“The novel destroys the banal myth of ‘love,’ in that in portrays relations of power
between the sexes. It also, however, portrays the contradiction between capital and work, thus
showing, from a Marxist perspective, the double oppression of women, and the single oppression
of men, that is, the primary and secondary contradiction. With the figure of the ‘high-born
6
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In contrast to Janz, however, I do not think that class necessarily “trumps” sex in
Die Liebhaberinnen; rather, I agree with Brigid Haines that it could be said that it is
instead sex that trumps class, or as Engels put it, “Der erste Klassengegensatz,
der in der Geschichte auftritt, fällt zusammen mit der Entwicklung des
Antagonismus von Mann und Weib in der Einzelehe, und die erste
Klassenunterdrückung

mit

der

des

weiblichen

Geschlechts

durch

das

männliche” (21: 68). 7
In Brigid Haines’s words, what Jelinek gives us in her novel does indeed
agree with Engels’s view of monogamous marriage, consisting of “an
exaggerated Marxist-feminist account of life under capitalism, in which men and
women are exploited and alienated by capitalism, [and] women are further
oppressed by men as a result of capitalism” (649). As she goes on to explain, all

daughter,’ Susi, the novel establishes the theme of the priority of class hierarchies over those of
sex . . . With Brigitte and Paula the novel demonstrates the lack of opportunities for women from
the working class, who are only able to do the same in their private lives as they do in the factory:
they sell their bodies, whether as labor or as sexual object and birthing instrument” (my
translation).
“the first class antagonism that appears in history coincides with the development of the
antagonism between man and woman in monogamous marriage, and the first class oppression
coincides with that of the female sex by the male” (129). All German quotes of Marx and Engels’s
works will be cited from the following edition: Karl Marx, and Friedrich Engels, Werke, Ed.
Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim ZK der SED, 42 vols, (Berlin: Dietz, 1959-1962), and will
be noted parenthetically in the text by volume and page number.
7
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women in Die Liebhaberinnen, including Janz’s “höhere Tochter,” Susi, “will have
to submit to the violence of patriarchy” (651), as Heinz himself realizes:
heinz denkt, daß sich susi bald nichts mehr um den hunger in
den welt scheißen wird, wenn sie zu gänze mit seinem hunger
wird beschäftigt sein müssen. susis alltag wird einmal ein
ausgefüllter werden. susi wird den schwanz fest in die möse
und das familienleben fest in den kopf gepflanzt bekommen
(LH, 83). 8
What Jelinek accomplishes in Die Liebhaberinnen, then, is a depiction of women’s
alienation of their sexuality both in terms of Marx’s use of alienation to describe
alienated labor under capitalism, and of the socialist feminist revision of Marx to
include women and their sexuality within Marx’s original framework.
In Marx’s use of the term, the concept of alienation relates to the labor of
human beings, as practiced in a society defined by private property and the
division of labor, and it “refers not to natural objects as such but to what happens
to the products of labour when (as a result of specific social relationships) they
become commodities or capital” (Colletti, 16). As Marx explains in the 1844
Manuscripts: “Die Arbeit produziert nicht nur Waren; sie produziert sich selbst

“heinz thinks, that susi will soon no longer give a shit about world hunger when she
has to devote herself entirely to his hunger. susi’s day will then be filled up more completely. susi
will get his cock firmly inserted in her snatch and family life firmly inserted in her head” (women,
99, emphasis in original). I am indebted to Brigid Haines’s article for this example.
8
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und den Arbeiter als eine Ware” (40: 511, emphasis in original). 9 He goes on to
clarify:
Dies Faktum drückt weiter nichts aus als: Der Gegenstand,
den die Arbeit produziert, ihr Produkt, tritt ihr als ein fremdes
Wesen, als eine von dem Produzenten unabhängige Macht
gegenüber. Das Produkt der Arbeit ist die Arbeit, die sich in
einem Gegenstand fixiert, sachlich gemacht hat, es ist die
Vergegenständlichung der Arbeit . . . der Arbeiter [verhält sich]
zum Produkt seiner Arbeit als einem fremden Gegenstand . . .
Die Entäußerung des Arbeiters in seinem Produkt hat die
Bedeutung, nicht nur, daß seine Arbeit zu einem Gegenstand,
zu einer äußeren Existenz wird, sondern daß sie außer ihm,
unabhängig, fremd von ihm existiert und eine selbstständige
Macht ihm gegenüber wird, daß das Leben, was er dem
Gegenstand verliehen hat, ihm feindlich und fremd
gegenübertritt (40: 511-12, emphasis in original). 10
One example of the manner in which work is depicted as alienated labor in
Marx’s sense in Jelinek’s novel is the description of Paula’s work as a seamstress
apprentice:

“Labour not only produces commodities; it also produces itself and the workers as a
commodity” (EW, 324, emphasis in original).
9

“This fact simply means that the object that the worker produces, its product, stands
opposed to it as something alien, as a power independent of the producer. The product of labour is
labour embodied and made material in the object, it is the objectification of labour . . . the worker is
related to the product of his labour as to an alien object . . . The externalization [Entäußerung] of the
worker in his product means not only that his labour becomes an object, an external existence, but
that it exists outside him, independently of him and alien to him, and begins to confront him as an
autonomous power; that the life which he has bestowed on the object confronts him as hostile
and alien” (EW, 324, emphasis in original).
10
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zu ihrer schneiderei sagt paula nie: meine arbeit. zu ihrer
arbeit sagt paula nie: meine. auch innerlich nicht. die arbeit,
das ist etwas, das von einem losgelöst ist, die arbeit das ist
doch mehr eine pflicht und geschieht daher dem nebenkörper
. . . die arbeit, selbst wenn man sie gern macht, erleidet man.
paula hat, trotz aller liebe zur schneiderei, gelernt, daß die
arbeit etwas lästiges ist (LH, 32). 11
It is not only the women, however, but also the men who experience
alienation through their labor. In a manner similar to Marx’s description of
alienated labor in Capital “in part, as the actual appearance of people who engage
in such activity” (Ollman, 139), “both Heinz’s father and Erich’s stepfather are ill
as a result of work” (see LH, 25 & 41, and women, 26 & 43) and
both fathers are referred to metonymically by the narrator in
terms relating to their ill health: Heinz’s father is called
‘bandscheibn,’ since his discs have suffered as a result of his
work as a long-distance lorry driver . . . while Erich’s
stepfather is called ‘asthma,’ his condition a result of his work
on the railways (Haines, 647, n. 21).
While labor is experienced as alienating by both men and women in
Jelinek’s novel, it is the women whose relation to work is also related to their
sexuality. This leads to the question of how Marx’s notion of alienated labor can

“about her dressmaking paula never says: my work. about her work paula never says:
mine. not even inwardly. work, that is something, which is detached from a person, work after all
is more like a duty and so it happens to the second body . . . one suffers work, even if one enjoys
doing it. paula, despite all her love of dressmaking, has learned that work is something
burdensome” (women, 33-34).
11
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be related to women’s sexuality, a relation that feminist interpreters of Marx
have attempted to define, or, as Catherine MacKinnon once so (in)famously
declared: “Sexuality is to feminism what work is to marxism: that which is most
one’s own, yet most taken away” (3). In Jelinek’s novel, this relation is shown
through the fact that it is not simply through their work that Brigitte and Paula
resemble Marx’s alienated workers; rather, it is the metamorphosis of love and
sexuality into commodities to be exchanged that most clearly reveals their
alienation, in particular from their sexuality. As Marlies Janz puts it. “Indem für
die Frauen die ‘Liebe’ zum Ebenbild von (entfremdeter) ‘Arbeit’ wird,
instrumentalisieren und verlieren sie ihre Körper” (26). 12 While Janz uses the
term “love,” I am instead arguing that it is sexuality in Die Liebhaberinnen that
functions in much the same manner as work does for Marx, that is, as something
which is alienated by being turned into a commodity, both in its product and its
activity.

“Because ‘love’ for the women becomes the spitting image of (alienated) ‘labor,’ they
instrumentalize and lose their bodies” (my translation). See also Rebecca Thomas who notes that
“The capitalist model as perceived by Jelinek demands that everything be assigned a market
value and reduced to its commodity function” (“(Re)-Production,” 71-72).
12
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For this reason, it is possible to draw a parallel between the ideological
fiction of love 13 in Jelinek’s text and money in Marx’s work.14 This comparison is
less far-fetched than it may seem at first glance. In another context, the parallel
between love and money as “generalized symbolic media of communication”
(Luhmann, 18) has been made by Niklas Luhmann (130-31, see also chapter 11,
“The Incorporation of Sexuality”). Yet unlike Luhmann’s functionalist neutrality,
according to which both love and money are forms of social glue, Jelinek
preserves the alienating moment of the two. As Marx explains in the Grundrisse,
it is the process through which a product becomes a commodity that creates
exchange value, as measured by money:
Das Produkt wird Ware, d.h. bloßes Moment des Austauschs.
Die Ware wird in Tauschwert verwandelt. Um sie sich selbst
als Tauschwert gleichzusetzen, wird sie mit einem Zeichen
vertauscht, das sie als den Tauschwert als solchen
repräsentiert. Als solcher symbolisierter Tauschwert kann sie
dann wieder in bestimmten Verhältnissen mit jeder andren
Ware ausgetauscht werden . . . Die Bestimmung des Produkts
im Tauschwert bringt es also notwendig mit sich, daß der
Tauschwert eine vom Produkt getrennte, losgelöste Existenz
erhält. Der von den Waren selbst losgelöste und selbst als eine
For more on love as an ideological fiction, see the section below in this chapter on the
romance novel.
13

It is important to note here that I am focusing on the parallel between love and money
as that which functions to conceal exchange value. Marx, of course, also attributed many other
qualities to money that are not true of love. For more on Marx’s view of money, see chapter 1 of
Capital (23: 49-98; and C, 125-77).
14
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Ware neben ihnen existierende Tauschwert ist—Geld (42: 7980, emphasis in original). 15
In Die Liebhaberinnen, it is love that takes on the symbolic form under
which sexuality is exchanged, and which conceals the real relations between men
and women, as expressed through the alienation of sexuality, just as, for Marx,
money functions to conceal the real relations between workers and their
products: “in der liebe versteht brigitte keinen spaß. es ist das ernsteste, was sie,
so ganz ohne startkapital, für ihr eigenes geschäft tun kann . . . der körper zählt
für brigitte als mittel zum besseren zweck” (LH, 56). 16
From this, one can see that the fact that love involves labor and capital is
clear to Brigitte. Moreover, she is smart enough to invest her labor where it will
yield the most profit, by cleaning the toilet at Heinz’s family’s house:
brigitte hilft im haushalt, was das einzige ist, womit sie sich
beliebt machen kann, das heißt sie putzt freudig mit dem
“The product becomes a commodity, i.e. a mere element of exchange. The commodity is
transformed into exchange value. In order to equate it with itself as an exchange value, it is
exchanged for a symbol which represents it as exchange value as such. As such a symbolized
exchange value, it can then in turn be exchanged in definite relations for every other commodity .
. . The definition of a product as exchange value thus necessarily implies that exchange value
obtains a separate existence, in isolation from the product. The exchange value which is separated
from commodities and exists alongside them as itself a commodity, this is—money (GR, 145,
emphasis in original).
15

“brigitte won’t stand for any nonsense when it comes to love. it is the most serious
thing which she, entirely without start-up money, can do for her own shop . . . for brigitte her
body counts as a means to a better end” (women, 64-65).
16
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scheißebesen die klomuschel . . . zu hause hilft brigitte nichts,
das hieße kapital und arbeitskraft in ein von vorneherein zum
scheitern
verurteiltes
mit
verlust
arbeitendes
kleinunternehmen zu stecken. aussichtslos. hoffnungslos.
brigitte investiert besser, dort, wo etwas herauskommen kann.
ein ganzes neues leben (LH, 13-14). 17
Brigitte is willing to exchange her labor power when necessary for Heinz’s
family, but not at home, where there would be no reward for it. In this way, she
clearly resembles workers, who expend their labor power only when forced, for
“sobald kein physischer oder sonstiger Zwang existiert, [wird] die Arbeit als Pest
geflohen” (40: 514). 18
As well as portraying love and sexuality in terms of Marx’s alienated
labor, Jelinek’s depiction of women’s sexual alienation can also be read via a
discussion of the socialist feminist reworking of the Marxist term alienation.
Some socialist feminists, such as Alison Jaggar, Sandra Lee Bartky and Ann
Foreman, attempted, in the 1970s and early 80s, to appropriate and rework the
classical Marxist concept of alienation to apply to women, arguing that the sexual

“brigitte is helping around the house, which is the only way she can ingratiate herself,
which means she enthusiastically cleans the lavatory bowl with the shit brush . . . brigitte doesn’t
help at home, that would mean putting capital and labour power into a small business which was
working at a loss and condemned to fail from the outset. pointless. hopeless. better for brigitte to
invest where something can come of it. a completely new life” (women, 10-11).
17

“as soon as no physical or other compulsion exists it [work—BB] is shunned like the
plague” (EW, 326).
18
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alienation of women is structurally similar to the alienation of the worker, as
Jaggar points out:
men rather than women control the expression of women’s
sexuality: women’s sexuality is developed for men’s
enjoyment rather than for women’s. In this respect women’s
sexual situation resembles that of wage workers who are
alienated from the process and product of their labor (309).
According to the socialist feminist theory of alienation, two of the major ways
through which women are alienated from their sexuality, are: 1) sexual
objectification of women “occurs when a woman’s sexual parts or sexual
functions are separated out from her person, reduced to the status of mere
instruments or else regarded as if they were capable of representing her” (Bartky,
35); and 2) the best chance for economic security for many women, marriage to
an economically secure man, requires the “sale” of their sexuality in marriage
(Jaggar, 308). 19

These are not the only two ways in which women, according to socialist feminists, are
alienated as women. Other examples of femininity as alienation include: being “viewed
relentlessly as sexual objects,” being subjected “continually to sexual assaults and harassment,”
the fact that “economic survival requires most women to present themselves in a way that is
sexually pleasing to men: male superiors penalize women who seem to be ‘punishing’ or defying
men through their appearance” and the reality that “much of women’s paid work is sexualized”
(Jaggar, 308). Bartky also adds “the cultural domination of women” to her list of ways in which
women are alienated as women, explaining that “women as women are clearly alienated in
cultural production. Most avenues of cultural expression—high culture, popular culture, even to
some extent language—are instruments of male supremacy. Women have little control over the
cultural apparatus itself and are often entirely absent from its products; to the extent that we are
not excluded from it entirely, the images of ourselves we see reflected in the dominant culture are
often truncated or demeaning” (34-35). For other examples of femininity as alienation see: Jaggar
19
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In the following passages describing the relationship between Brigitte and
Heinz, the sexual objectification of Brigitte is made clear:
brigitte haßt heinz unter vielem andren auch deshalb, weil er
immer dann ein körperliches gefühl für brigitte in sich
hochkommen läßt, wenn gitti gerade von ihren seelischen
problemen, die ein kleines häuschen mit garten nach sich
ziehen, plaudern möchte. immer dann, wenn brigitte ihr
innerstes nach außen stülpen möchte und dabei den ganzen
käse
von
glück,
zukunft,
säuglingspflege
und
waschmaschinen herausspeit, dann verhält sich heinz so, als
ob er kein hirn hätte, sondern nur einen schwanz.
heinz wird doch in brigitte nicht nur einen körper sehen und
nicht die ganze vielfalt, die dahintersteckt? . . . heinz ist froh,
endlich einen menschen zum rammeln gefunden zu haben.
kaum wird heinz des menschen brigitte ansichtig, schon
knöpft er sich auf und geht in startposition. während ihm
brigitte noch erklärt, daß sie ihn liebt und gleichzeitig etwas
wie hochachtung vor seinem beruflichen erfolg empfindet,
während brigitte noch ihre gedanken von liebe und achtung
bis zu hochzeit und hausrenovierung schweifen läßt, ehe sie
sich noch vorsehen kann, schon hat sie den rammler heinz an
ihrem leibe hängen wie einen blutegel (LH, 54). 20

(308), Bartky (34-35), and Foreman, who titled her book Femininity as Alienation, thus implying
that it is simply femininity itself which is alienating. For reasons of length and clarity, I shall
focus only on the two forms of alienation mentioned above.
“brigitte also hates heinz among other things, because he always lets a physical feeling
for brigitte rise, just when gitti would like to talk about her emotional problems, which involve a
little house with a garden. whenever brigitte wants to turn her innermost to the outside and spew
out all the crap about happiness, future, baby care and washing machines, then heinz acts as if he
didn’t have a brain, but only a cock. surely heinz doesn’t just see a body when he looks at brigitte
and not all the variety behind it? . . . heinz is happy at last to have found a person to rut. hardly
has heinz set eyes on the person brigitte, than he’s unbuttoning himself and going into the
starting position. while brigitte is still explaining to him, that she loves him and at the same time
20
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Here the reader can see that, for Heinz, Brigitte is nothing more than her body, a
body to be used by him for his sexual pleasure, while he devalues the rest of her.
As Bartky puts it: “To be dealt with in this way is to have one’s entire being
identified with the body . . . [sexual objectification] involves too the implicit
denial to those who suffer it that they have capacities which transcend the
merely sexual” (35-36).
Jelinek’s depiction of the relationship between Brigitte and Heinz, while
conforming to a socialist feminist definition of sexual objectification, is,
simultaneously, more than just a criticism of this alienation. Her description of
Brigitte’s “feelings,” those feelings which Heinz is devaluing in his appreciation
and use of her body, make this clear. For Brigitte’s feelings for Heinz, like his
desire for her body, are also nothing more than a desire for the commodities he
can provide her, in this case a house, garden, and washing machine. Heinz’s
function for Brigitte is to act as material security and future for her, while
Brigitte’s feelings for Heinz are not based on love (rather, it is specifically pointed
out in the text that she hates him), consequently demonstrating that she too
esteems Heinz solely for the value he can provide. In other words, Brigitte’s
feels something like respect for his professional success, while brigitte is letting her thoughts
wander from love and respect to wedding and house renovation, before she even has time to
watch out, she already has heinz the rutter clinging to her body like a leech” (women, 62).

34

“capacities which transcend the merely sexual” are nothing more than the desire
for the commodities that she can secure from Heinz, and thus related to the
exchange value of her sexuality.
In order to satisfy her desire for these commodities, Brigitte sets her sights
on marrying Heinz, who hopes one day to open an electrical repair shop. Brigitte
detests her work in the bra factory and dreams of escaping it through Heinz:
nicht einmal bei der arbeit hat brigitte ihre ruhe. sogar bei der
arbeit muß sie arbeiten. sie soll bei der arbeit nicht denken,
etwas in ihr denkt jedoch ununterbrochen. brigitte kann aus
ihrem eigenen nichts besseres machen. das bessere soll vom
leben von heinz herkommen, heinz kann brigitte von ihrer
nähmaschine befreien, das kann brigitte von selbst nicht (LH,
11). 21
She knows that the best way to accomplish this is through sex (or, as
Jaggar refers to it, by selling her sexuality in marriage), which she endures in
spite of the fact that she receives no enjoyment from it, other than the knowledge
that sex with Heinz means securing her future: “auch ekelt brigitte vor heinz und
seinem fetten weißen elektrikerkörper, der auch heinz heißt. trotzdem ist sie
auch wieder froh, so froh, todfroh, daß sie ihn hat, weil er ihre zukunft ist” (LH,

“brigitte doesn’t even get any peace at work. even at work she has to work. she’s not
supposed to think while she’s working, yet something inside her thinks uninterruptedly. brigitte
cannot make something better of her own life. something better must come from heinz’s life.
heinz can free brigitte from her sewing machine, brigitte cannot do it on her own” (women, 8).
21
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32). 22 Brigitte nonetheless persists in describing her exchange of sex with Heinz
as motivated by love, despite her reference to his earning power in her
declaration of love:
ja, heinz, es ist die liebe, sagt brigitte . . . du wirst für mich
sorgen und mich für meine liebe belohnen und entschädigen,
nicht wahr, heinz? . . . ich liebe dich doch gerade deswegen,
weil du ein mann bist, sagt brigitte. du bist ein mann, der
einen beruf lernt, ich bin eine frau, die keinen beruf gelernt
hat. dein beruf muß für uns beide reichen. das tut er auch
spielend, weil er so ein großer schöner beruf ist. du darfst
mich niemals verlassen, sonst würde ich sterben, sagt brigitte .
. . ich liebe dich doch gerade deswegen, weil du mehr
verdienst als einer, der weniger verdient (LH, 23 & 26). 23
To put it another way: what Jelinek does with the figure of Brigitte is to
expose the relation between love and economic survival for women, a relation
that, in traditional romance novels, is obscured, as Tania Modleski illustrates in
her discussion of Harlequin romances:
While the novels are always about a poor girl finally marrying
a rich man, preferably of the nobility, they must be careful to
“brigitte also is repelled by heinz and his plump white electrician’s body, which is also
called heinz. despite that she is also happy again, so happy, dead happy, that she has him,
because he is her future” (women, 34).
22

“yes, heinz, it’s love, says brigitte . . . you will take care of me and repay and reward
me for my love, won’t you, heinz? . . . but that’s exactly why i love you, because you are a man,
says brigitte. you are a man, who is learning a trade, i a woman, who has not learned a trade.
your trade must do for both of us. and it will do that easily, because it is such a beautiful trade.
you must never leave me, otherwise i would die, says brigitte . . . but that’s exactly why i love
you, because you earn more than someone, who earns less” (women, 22 & 26).
23
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show that the girl never set out to get him and his goods. This
is of course a simple reflection of the double bind imposed
upon women in real life: their most important achievement is
supposed to be finding a husband; their greatest fault is
attempting to do so. How to get your heroine from loneliness
and penury to romance and riches, without making her
appear to have helped herself or even to have thought about
the matter, is an old problem for novelists (48-49).
This “double bind” is exactly what Jelinek thematizes through the figure of
Brigitte, subsequently revealing women’s pursuit of marriage for what it truly is,
an attempt on the part of women to obtain economic security for themselves. Or,
as the narrator rather pithily points out: “vorläufig hat b. noch nichts als ihren
namen, im lauf der geschichte wird brigitte den namen von heinz bekommen,
das ist wichtiger als geld und besitz, das kann geld und besitz herbeischaffen”
(LH, 10). 24
Heinz, however, while he enjoys using Brigitte to satisfy his sexual needs,
has his sights set on something better. He would prefer to marry a woman who
can increase his social standing, and possibly provide some start-up capital for
his business, something Brigitte cannot do. Heinz is aware that Brigitte is trying
to “catch” him and ponders her material value, finding her lacking: “heinz fragt

“for the time being b. has nothing but her name yet, in the course of the story brigitte
will receive heinz’s name, that is more important than money and property, that can procure
money and property” (women, 6).
24
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sich oft, was brigitte dann vorzuzeigen hat. heinz spielt oft mit dem gedanken,
jemand anderen zu nehmen, der etwas zu bieten hat, wie etwa bargeld oder die
räumlichkeiten für ein geeignetes geschäftslokal” (LH, 13). 25 This leads to a
competition between Brigitte and the woman Heinz would prefer, the one who
could offer him something other than herself, Susi. The competition takes place
mainly on Brigitte’s side, however, as Susi has no intentions of lowering her
social standing by marrying Heinz. As Brigitte is unaware of this, she believes
that she must compete with Susi (and any other unknown rivals) for Heinz’s
attention. She knows that what she has to offer him is not unique:
brigitte hat einen körper zu bieten. außer brigittes körper
werden zur gleichen zeit noch viele andre körper auf den
markt geworfen. das einzige, was brigitte auf diesem weg
positiv zur seite steht, ist die kosmetische industrie. und die
textilindustrie. brigitte hat brüste, schenkel, beine, hüften und
eine möse. das haben andre auch, manchmal sogar von
besserer qualität (LH, 13). 26
The great number of women’s bodies on the market means that Heinz has
a large selection to choose from, and, as a consequence, helps to reinforce
“heinz often asks himself, what brigitte has to show for herself. heinz often plays with
the idea of taking someone who has something to offer, as for example, cash or suitable premises
for a shop” (women, 9-10).
25

“brigitte has a body to offer. apart from brigitte’s body many other bodies are flooding
the market at the same time. the only thing that positively stands by brigitte on this path, is the
cosmetics industry. and the textile industry. brigitte has breasts, thighs, hips and a snatch. others
have that too, sometimes even of a better quality” (women, 10).
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Brigitte’s status as a body (commodity) to be exchanged. 27 In addition, it shows
that women, as commodities, suffer the same fate as Marx’s workers, as
described in the 1844 Manuscripts: “Als Kapital steigt [der] Wert des Arbeiters
nach Nachfrage und Zufuhr, und auch physisch ward und wird gewußt sein
Dasein, sein Leben [als] eine Zufuhr von Ware wie jeder andren Ware” (40: 523,
emphasis in original). 28
Just like the worker, Brigitte’s value as a commodity also declines in
relation to the supply, or the number of women’s bodies on the market that
Heinz can choose from. Furthermore, Brigitte’s value is continually decreasing,
for “brigitte wird immer älter und immer weniger frau, die konkurrenz wird
immer jünger und immer mehr frau” (LH, 13), 29 and old women are not
particularly valuable, as can be seen through the example of Paula’s
grandmother: “die oma [hat] ihr einziges kapital, eine vielleicht einmal

For an analysis of Die Liebhaberinnen and the exchange of women as commodities, see
Haines’s article, in which she reads Jelinek’s novel through Irigaray’s analysis of women as
objects of male exchange.
27

“As capital, the value of the worker rises or falls in accordance with supply and
demand, and even in a physical sense, his existence, his life, was and is treated as a supply of a
commodity, like any other commodity” (EW, 335, emphasis in original).
28

“brigitte grows ever older and ever less woman, the competition grows ever younger
and ever more woman” (women, 10).
29
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vorhandengewesene schönheit, längst verloren. sie wurde entwertet” (LH, 70).30
It is not just old age that reduces the value of women, but also their lack of
virginity, as exemplified by Paula: “paula geht manchmal auf den tanzboden,
wenn ein fest stattfindet. manchmal wird paula von einem besoffenen
tanzbodenbesucher wieder in den wald weggeführt, was keiner sehen darf, weil
es ihren marktwert gleich ins bodenlose sinken lassen würde” (LH, 30). 31
To further extend the comparison between workers and women, Brigitte’s
precarious status as a commodity of declining value forces her to compete with
others in her quest for Heinz, which in turn kills any feelings of commonality
with other women: “in brigittes kreisen haßt man jede konkurrenz. in brigittes
kreisen wird haß groß geschrieben. brigitte kann keine liebe zu ihresgleichen
aufbringen, das ist alles kaputtgemacht” (LH, 65-66). 32 Solidarity among women
like Brigitte is impossible because she knows that “es gibt so viele frauen, die
sich eine fremde, ihre, brigittes zukunft zu einer eigenen machen möchten” (LH,

“the granny has long ago lost her only capital, a beauty which was perhaps present.
granny was devalued” (women, 82).
30

“paula sometimes goes onto the dance floor, is there’s a party. sometimes paula is led
away into the woods again by a drunk dance floor visitor, which no one must see, because that
would immediately cause her market value to go through the floor” (women, 32).
31

“in brigitte’s circles one hates any competition. in brigitte’s circles hate is writ large.
brigitte cannot summon up any love for her fellow women, it has all been destroyed” (women, 77).
32
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55), 33 thereby illustrating Jaggar’s point that “sexual competition between
women often makes them unable to perceive their underlying shared interests,
just as wage workers are often unable to perceive the interests they share with
their co-workers” (310). Or, as Marx puts it:
Eine unmittelbare Konsequenz davon, daß der Mensch dem
Produkt seiner Arbeit, seiner Lebenstätigkeit, seinem
Gattungswesen entfremdet ist, ist die Entfremdung des
Menschen von dem Menschen . . . Die Entfremdung des
Menschen, überhaupt jedes Verhältnis, in dem der Mensch zu
sich selbst [steht], ist erst verwirklicht, drückt sich aus in dem
Verhältnis, in welchem der Mensch zu d[em] andren
Menschen steht. Also betrachtet in dem Verhältnis der
entfremdeten Arbeit jeder Mensch den andren nach dem
Maßstab und dem Verhältnis, in welchem er selbst als
Arbeiter sich befindet (40: 517-18, emphasis in original). 34
In the competition for the security marriage provides, Brigitte is the
“success story” in the text, and it is her success which more properly reveals the
function of love in Jelinek’s text as referred to above. After she becomes
pregnant, Heinz marries her, they have two children, open an electrical repair

“brigitte knows, there are so many women who would like to turn a stranger’s, her,
brigitte’s future into one of their own” (women, 63).
33

“An immediate consequence of man’s estrangement from the product of his labour, his
life activity, his species-being, is the estrangement of man from man . . . Man’s estrangement like
all other relationships of man to himself, is realized and expressed only in man’s relationship to
other men. In the relationship of estranged labour each man therefore regards the other in
accordance with the standard and the situation in which he as a worker finds himself” (EW, 32930, emphasis in original).
34
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shop and buy a house, giving Brigitte the fate she was seeking, a fate she
managed to achieve solely through the use of her body: “brigittes los war ein
haupttreffer, sie kann sich nicht beklagen, brigitte hat das mit der kraft ihres
unterleibs allein zusammengebracht . . . aber wozu haben wir frauen schließlich
unsren charme?” (LH, 143). 35
Despite having achieved her goal of marrying Heinz and getting out of
the factory, Brigitte is still unhappy: “die ehe schlägt ihr gut an, das sieht man.
sie strahlt mit ihren küchenkästen um die wette. der haß hat sie innerlich schon
ganz aufgegessen. aber die freude am besitz ist ihr geblieben. daran klammert sie
sich mit eiserner faust” (LH, 142). 36 Brigitte’s role as wife and mother has left her
eaten up by hate. The only joy still available to her is the joy of ownership, an
ownership which she procured by turning herself into property, since, as Marx
once wrote, marriage is also “eine Form des exklusiven Privateigentums” (40: 534,
emphasis in original), 37 thus illustrating Marlies Janz’s point that both Brigitte

“brigitte’s fate was the jackpot, she can’t complain, brigitte managed it all with the
strength of her womb alone . . . but then what is our women’s charm for anyway?” (women, 175).
35

“the marriage is filling her out, one can see that. she beams in competition with the
baking tins. hate has quite eaten her up inside. but the pleasure of ownership has remained. she
clings to it with an iron fist” (women, 173).
36

37

“a form of exclusive private property” (EW, 346, emphasis in original).
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and Paula “wollen besitzen, weil sie nichts haben, und beide machen sich zum
Besitz von Männern, um etwas zu haben” (26-27). 38
Brigitte’s continued unhappiness also demonstrates, according to Allyson
Fiddler, that love is the main theme of Die Liebhaberinnen, despite Jelinek’s
seeming emphasis on work:
Work can be seen to function rather as a focal point or subtheme within a wider theme, which is: love, or the
demystification of what the concept of love generally implies.
Love is mistakenly perceived by the girls as that which will
save them from what they think is the source of their misery.
They fail to recognise that the true source of their oppression
lies in the very institutions of marriage and the family and in
the gender-roles which those inscribe. In the world-view
presented in Die Liebhaberinnen, the simple substitution of
marriage and family for employment . . . is a step out of the
frying pan into the fire (Rewriting, 72).
What this shows is that while Brigitte has managed to rid herself of the alienation
of labor in the factory, she has simply exchanged one oppression for another.
What Jelinek depicts, then, in Die Liebhaberinnen is the brutality instituted under
monogamy as a constitutive element of the relations between men and women,

“Both want to possess, because they have nothing, and both turn themselves into
possessions of men, in order to have something” (my translation).
38
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focusing on the way that occurs in the working (Brigitte and Paula) and lowermiddle classes (Heinz and his family). 39
A comparison of the other main figure in Die Liebhaberinnen, Paula, to
Brigitte, may also help to clarify the role of love in Jelinek’s text. Like Brigitte,
Paula succeeds in “catching” her man, although she is not as lucky as Brigitte in
finding one able to support her. Paula, in an attempt to escape the
“Hausfrau/Verkäuferin” choice offered to women, undertakes training as a
seamstress. Once she falls in love with Erich, a forester, she gives up her
apprenticeship and marries him, after giving birth to his child. Erich, however, is
an alcoholic, and spends all of their money on alcohol, finally forcing Paula into
prostitution to support the family. After Erich finds out, he leaves her, and her
children are taken away to live with her parents. To support herself, Paula must
go to work in the same factory from which Brigitte, through her “good”
marriage,

managed

to

escape,

with

the

following

result:

“aus

dem

hoffnungsvollen lehrmädchen der schneiderei im ersten lehrjahr ist eine

Jelinek, of course, is not alone in this particular feminist critique of Engels’s
perspective, as his formulation of working-class marriage has been criticized by many feminist
interpreters. See, for example, Barrett (48-49), Ferguson (25), Hartmann (4-5), Jaggar (63-79), and
Vogel (73-92), who terms Engels’s view a “defective formation.”
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zerbrochene frau mit ungenügenden schneidereikenntnissen geworden” (LH,
154). 40
In opposition to Brigitte, whose notions of “love” are always practical and
related to Heinz’s future earning power and the security he can provide for her,
Paula “is closer to the conventional protagonists in love-stories, as she is swayed
by the sheer power of physical attraction” (Fiddler, Rewriting, 73). For Paula,
Erich’s good looks have the power of blinding her to his shortcomings:
erich ist nämlich der schönste im dorf. erich ist zwar ein
lediges kind mit drei weiteren geschwistern, die alle von
einem andren vatter sind, was schlechte ausgangsposition
schafft, wie man weiß, aber er ist schön. bildschön wie ein
bild mit seinen schwarzen haaren und blauen augen, so recht
zum verlieben . . . wichtig ist nur, daß die liebe endlich
gekommen ist, und daß sie nicht zu einem häßlichen,
abgearbeiteten, versoffenen, ausgemergelten, ordinären,
gemeinen holzarbeiter und ihr, sondern zu einem schönen,
abgearbeiteten, versoffenen, stämmigen, ordinären, gemeinen
holzarbeiter und ihr gekommen ist (LH, 38, emphasis
added). 41

“the girl in the first year of her dressmaking apprenticeship, who was full of hope, has
become a broken woman with inadequate dressmaking skills” (women, 189).
40

“because erich is the handsomest in the village. admittedly erich is an only child with
three other siblings each with a different dada, which makes for a poor starting position, as one
knows, but he is handsome. as handsome as a picture with his black hair and blue eyes, just the
one to fall in love with . . . all that matters is that love has come at last, and that it hasn’t come to
an ugly, worn out, drunken, exhausted, vulgar, common woodcutter and her, but to a handsome,
worn out, drunken, strong, vulgar, common woodcutter and her” (women, 41-42, emphasis
added).
41
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In this passage, Jelinek parodies the calculated self-interest often found in
marriage choices, as if to show that Paula thinks she is smarter than she really is.
For Paula, the important thing is that love came to her via a handsome
and strong woodcutter, rather than one who is ugly and emaciated; the fact that
Erich is, despite his good looks, nothing more than a common and vulgar
drunkard is irrelevant.
Furthermore, it is the experience of love itself that is important, although
Paula, like Brigitte, also realizes that love will free her from work:
über allem ist die liebe, die das beste ist, sagt paula darauf.
paula ist besser [than the housewives on the bus with her—
BB], weil sie eine liebe in sich haben wird, wenn der richtige
augenblick gekommen sein wird. zuerst ist paula wegen der
schneiderei besser, anschließend wird sie von der liebe
veredelt werden. die liebe wird die schneiderei ablösen . . .
daß paula die liebe mit sinnlichkeit verbindet, ist eine folge
der zeitschriften, die sie gerne liest (LH, 27 & 30). 42
Hence it is clear that, in regard to Paula’s views of what “true love” consists, that
she “has no inner core to which she can remain true, her core is the ideology of
love out of which she has been constructed” (Haines, 649, emphasis in original),
an ideology that she learns, as in Madame Bovary, from reading, in this case
“but above everything is love, which is best of all, replies paula. paula is better [than
the housewives on the bus with her—BB] because of dressmaking, subsequently she will be
ennobled by love. love will take the place of dressmaking . . . that paula connects love with
sensuality, is a result of the magazines, which she likes to read” (women, 28 & 31).
42
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women’s magazines, rather than novels. Paula, constructed as she is by the
external mediations of her dressmaking and then by the discourse of love, does
not experience love as anything other than ideology. 43
Once again, this brings us back to a comparison between love and money,
women and workers. In relation to money and its function as mediator, Marx, in
the Excerpts from James Mill’s Elements of Political Economy, writes:
Das Wesen des Geldes ist . . . die vermittelnde Tätigkeit oder
Bewegung, der menschliche, gesellschaftliche Akt, wodurch
sich die Produkte des Menschen wechselseitig ergänzen,
entfremdet und die Eigenschaft eines materiellen Dings außer
dem Menschen, des Geldes wird . . . Durch diesen fremden
Mittler—statt daß der Mensch selbst der Mittler für den
Menschen sein sollte—schaut der Mensch seinen Willen, seine
Tätigkeit, sein Verhältnis zu andren als eine von ihm und
ihnen unabhängige Macht an. Seine Sklaverei erreicht also die
Spitze . . . Sein Kultus wird zum Selbstzweck. Die
Gegenstände, getrennt von diesem Mittler, haben ihren Wert
verloren (40: 445-46, emphasis in original). 44

In this we can see the tension between Jelinek’s views and those of her characters, as
Rebecca Thomas points out in her reading of Die Liebhaberinnen: “In a pure identification with
media images, Paula posits both herself and Erich as possessing a heroic potential for selfhood
and individuality that Jelinek vehemently rejects . . . This tension produces an effect that is
simultaneously ridiculous and potentially tragic. Whereas Jelinek has created Paula as an
example without individuality, the character Paula strains against this negation towards some
assertion of herself as a self” (“(Re)-Production,” 71). That Paula attempts to assert her
individuality through her a view of love constructed by the mass medium of romance novels is,
of course, highly ironic.
43

“the nature of money is . . . the mediating function or movement, human, social activity,
by means of which the products of man mutually complement each other, is estranged and
becomes the property of a material thing external to man, viz. money . . . Through this alien
mediator man gazes at his will, his activity, his relation to others as at a power independent of
44
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For Paula, love operates in much the same way as Marx describes money;
that is, as a “mediating function,” for it is love which is the cult that “becomes an
end to itself” and which mediates the relationship between Paula and Erich. That
it is something external to her is clear through its dissemination via the mass
media, media that Paula eagerly consumes.
Finally, while the situation of women in patriarchal romantic relations
may indeed parallel that of wage workers under capitalism, as I have argued
above, it is not necessarily capitalism alone that is responsible for their plight in
Die Liebhaberinnen. That this is the case means that the Marxist/socialist feminist
analysis of Jelinek outlined above is necessarily incomplete, as I discuss below.
Problems with the Marxist/Socialist Feminist Analysis of Jelinek
One problem, however, with the application of the socialist feminist
appropriation of Marx’s theory of alienation to Jelinek’s texts is that, despite their
claims to the contrary, Jaggar’s and Bartky’s use of the term alienation still seems
to indulge in a continued reliance on the notion of a human essence or the
possibility of a coherent self. As another socialist feminist, Ann Ferguson, has put
it:
them and of himself—instead of man himself being the mediator of man. His slavery thus reaches
a climax . . . His cult becomes an end in itself. Separated from this mediator, objects lose their
worth” (EW, 260, emphasis in original).

48

some socialist feminist perspectives, though they give us
important insights about the reproduction and persistence of
male dominance . . . fail to explain unconscious, irrational and
libidinal forces that keep both the oppressed and oppressors
from re-negotiating gendered, racial and class interaction (33).
Jaggar herself is aware of this problem: “In spite of its promise as a critical tool,
‘alienation’ is a somewhat problematic concept for Marxists because it may be
taken to presuppose a human essence from which people under capitalism are
alienated, and the concept of a human essence seems quite at odds with the
conception of human nature as a product of history” (57, emphasis added). 45
Despite this realization, however, Jaggar never adequately explains how the
socialist feminist use of the term alienation will be able to avoid this possible
pitfall. Rather, in her description of the alienation caused by conformity to
prevailing gender norms, she claims that due to alienation, “both sexes have
been prevented from the full and free development of their productive
capacities. Both sexes are fragmented distortions of human possibility,” (316). 46

One should also note here that critiques of “essentialism” in Marx are not necessarily
correct. I am, however, referring here to socialist feminists and their use of Marx.
45

In addition, Jaggar’s endorsement of feminist standpoint theory at the end of her book
comes close to claiming an essence for women, albeit one based on social conditions: “The
concept of women’s standpoint . . . asserts that women’s social position offers them access to
aspects or areas of reality that are not easily accessible to men . . . Thus the standpoint of women
provides the basis for a more comprehensive representation of reality than the standpoint of men
. . . The standpoint of women reveals more of the universe, human and non-human, than does the
standpoint of men” (384-85). While she does acknowledge that there may, indeed, be problems
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Like Jaggar, Bartky is also unable to resolve this problem as is clear in her
description of alienation:
Alienation in any form causes a rupture within the human
person, and estrangement from self . . . In many ways, psychic
alienation and the alienation of labor are profoundly alike.
Both involve a splitting off of human functions from the
human person, a forbidding of activities thought to be
essential to a fully human existence. Both subject the
individual to fragmentation and impoverishment . . . To be a
victim of alienation is to have a part of one’s being stolen by
another (31-32).
The socialist feminist concept of alienation, as described by Jaggar and Bartky, is
thus one which relies on the notion that there is a whole self that precedes
alienation, and to which one could return if social conditions were changed to
eliminate alienation. 47

with feminist standpoint theory (especially in terms of the subsuming of difference), Jaggar
nonetheless declares that: “In spite of this unavoidable looseness, I think that the concept of
women’s standpoint is sufficiently specific to provide a way of evaluating the real strengths and
weaknesses of the feminist theories presently available. In particular, I think that it provides a
way of justifying the socialist feminist approach to theory and of indicating further directions for
theoretical development . . . socialist feminism offers the best available representation of reality
from the standpoint of women” (387 & 89).
For an example of a socialist feminist, whose use of alienation is not dependent on the
concept of a human essence, see Ann Ferguson’s Blood at the Root: Motherhood, Sexuality & Male
Dominance, in which she outlines alienation as the following: “a mode of sex/affective production
can be described as alienated if 1) there are contradictory values built into the social construction
of its sexual symbolic codes; 2) sexual roles require an either/or choice of sexual values which an
alternative social construction of sex (one which is historically possible to achieve) would make
unnecessary; and 3) social structures in the present social formation make it impossible to achieve
all the aims and objects of sexuality as socially constructed (thus implying the need for radical
changes in the structure in order to achieve values promised by the society)” (153-54).
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That this view (that is, the notion of a whole self preceding alienation) is
not present in Jelinek’s texts can be seen in the passages such as the one quoted
above on page 46 of this chapter (“über allem ist die liebe. . .” LH, 27; women, 28)
and the following:
daß paula die liebe mit sinnlichkeit verbindet, ist eine folge
der zeitschriften, die sie gerne liest (LH, 30). 48
As noted above, these passages demonstrate that Jelinek’s figures “are not
‘rounded’ or autobiographically based characters with whom the reader is asked
to empathize . . . but one-dimensional, unsympathetic figures” (Haines and
Littler, 39). 49
In addition to the lack of unity experienced by Jelinek’s figures, my use of
psychoanalysis to supplement my Marxist/socialist feminist reading of Jelinek
exposes another problem with the application of the theory of alienation as
outlined by Jaggar and Bartky to Jelinek’s texts, for, if as Lacan and Althusser
argue, this notion of an undivided self can be seen to be imaginary, a product of

“that paula connects love with sensuality, is a result of the magazines, which she likes
to read” (women, 31).
48

Haines and Littler also note in their chapter on Die Liebhaberinnen that this type of
character made for “surprisingly uncomfortable reading for its early feminist readers” (39). That
discomfort is, I find, also reflected in the difficulty of applying a purely second wave feminist
analysis to the text.
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language and/or ideology, how are we then to view the alienation of Jelinek’s
figures? Both Lacan and Althusser define the subject’s unity in terms contrary to
those used by Jaggar and Bartky, and this lack of unity caused by the symbolic is
present in Jelinek’s work, as Brigid Haines has noted:
Jelinek thus shows that women’s exploitation, their alienation
from each other, from desire, and from the symbolic order are
not explicable by the mechanics of capitalism alone but can
also be explained in terms of their status as commodities
within a patriarchal economy. That these often overlap . . .
shows that capitalism has taken over and reinforced preexisting practices. This takes us beyond a Marxist analysis and
back into the realm of the symbolic (653, emphasis added).
It is for this reason that I will now turn to an analysis of alienation in the
Lacanian sense in Jelinek’s novel. For if Marx and socialist feminists can help us
to interpret the alienation of labor and sexuality undergone by Brigitte and
Paula, Lacan can help us to read the “realm of the symbolic,” as Haines puts it.
Lacanian Alienation and Metonymy in Die Liebhaberinnen
In what follows, I will return to the reading of Die Liebhaberinnen given
above, this time drawing on Lacanian psychoanalysis and its definitions of
alienation and subjectivity, as a means of teasing out and illuminating the
contradictions and complexity of this text. A Lacanian analysis of alienation will
be deployed in order to demonstrate how Jelinek’s figures experience not just
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their labor or sexuality as alienated, but also suffer from alienation in the
Lacanian sense. 50
As Lacan explains in his article on the mirror stage, alienation results from
the fact that the individual believes her or himself to be the coherent whole
reflected in the mirror:
The mirror stage is a drama . . . which manufactures for the
subject . . . the succession of phantasies that extends from a
fragmented body-image to a form of its totality . . . and lastly,
to the assumption of the armour of an alienating identity,
which will mark with its rigid structure the subject’s entire
mental development (E, 4).
Furthermore, “this Gestalt . . . symbolizes the mental permanence of the I, at the
same time as it prefigures its alienating destination” (E, 2, emphasis in original).
This coherent self reflected in the mirror is, according to John Muller and
William Richardson, “a total unity that replaces [the] earlier experience of
fragmentation,” (30) and, as such

Althusser occupies a complementary position here, in his intent “to forestall the use of
the early, Hegelianizing Marx, the Marx of the theory of alienation, against the later Marx of
Capital” (Jameson, The Ideologies of Theory, 109). He also relates the mirror stage to ideology,
writing: “We observe that the structure of all ideology, interpellating individuals as subjects in
the name of a Unique and Absolute Subject is speculary, i.e. a mirror-structure, and doubly
speculary: this mirror duplication is constitutive of ideology and ensures its functioning. Which
means that all ideology is centered, that the Absolute Subject occupies the unique place of the
Centre, and interpellates around it the infinity of individuals into subjects to the Subject, while
giving in them the Subject in which each subject can contemplate its own image (present and
future) the guarantee that this really concerns them and Him” (180, emphasis in original). The
question of ideology is one I shall return to later in this chapter.
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becomes idealized into a model for all eventual identification .
. . This model, however, although it “fixes” the subject in a
certain permanence . . . does so in a form that initially . . . is
“other” to the subject, exterior to it, hence an “alienation” of it.
The stability of this form, contrasting as it does with the
instability of the initial fragmentation, assumes a tensile
strength that eventually becomes rigid and armorlike (Muller
and Richardson, 30-31, emphasis in original).
As a consequence, this coherent self reflected in the mirror is nothing originally
given since it is found first in the mirror image, which is a méconnaissance
“constitut[ing] the ego” and an “illusion of autonomy” (E, 6) and later through
the same process of misrecognition of oneself as reflected in others. Here it is
important to note that for Lacan, alienation is a necessary step in achieving
subjectivity insofar as it “represents the instituting of the symbolic order . . . and
the subject’s assignation of a place therein” (Fink, Lacanian Subject, 52). It is only
one step, however, and the second step (and not one that all subjects manage to
get to) is separation, in which “the subject attempts to fill the mOther’s lack”
(Fink, Lacanian Subject, 54; see also S11, Chapter 16). In other words, through
separation, the subject becomes aware that the mother also has lack. Alienation
and separation are later terms for what Lacan earlier referred to as metaphor and
metonymy (Laurent, 21).
In the following passage from the novel, the sexual objectification of
Brigitte, which results in the type of sexual alienation discussed above, is made
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clear: “brigitte hat nichts davon [sex with Heinz—BB] außer einer vagen
hoffnung. brigitte hat außerdem eine vagina. gierig schnappt brigittes vagina
nach dem jungen unternehmer” (LH, 56). 51 Here the reader can see that Brigitte,
represented as she is by her vagina, has undergone the fragmentation of her
body that Jaggar and Bartky view as an instance of alienating femininity. It is
also an example of the alienation women undergo in their search for an
economically secure marriage partner; while Brigitte is not yet married to Heinz,
she is “selling” her sexuality to him in the hope that it will lead to a future
marriage between them. (Here we also see a more Marxian or socialist feminist
variant of Jelinek’s alienation at work).
By doing so, Jelinek exposes the relationship that exists between Brigitte’s
hope and her vagina as alienated labor or commodity, showing that, for Brigitte,
her hope (of a secure future) is based on how well she can use her vagina. What
we see in this passage, however, is not only alienation is the Marxist or socialist
feminist sense as discussed above, but also, in Jelinek’s use of the “part for the

“brigitte gets nothing out of it apart from a vague hope. apart from that brigitte has a
vagina. which she makes use of. brigitte’s vagina snaps greedily at the young entrepreneur”
(women, 65).
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whole” a Lacanian metonymy,52 which thus works to undermine alienation. In
terms of metonymy, this passage can also be read, via the Lacanian definition of
metonymy, as a form of displacement.
In Lacan’s definition, metonymy comes to figure as that which Freud
termed displacement. 53 In his discussion of metonymy in Seminar III, Lacan
makes this clear, stating: “One thing is named by another that is its container . . .
In general what Freud . . . calls displacement is metonymy,” also pointing out
that “the signifier is the instrument by which the missing signified expresses
itself” (S3, 221). Lacan’s term is an expanded use of metonymy, meaning both
part for whole and one thing for another. In the case of the quote from Jelinek’s
Anika Lemaire’s definition of metonymy in the Lacanian sense (which differs
somewhat from other uses of the term) is useful here: “[metonymy] substitutes one term for
another on the basis of a link of proximity, of connexion in meaning between the two terms” (42).
For more on metaphor and metonymy in Lacan, see also: Grigg, especially chapter 11; and
Ragland-Sullivan (233-58).
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See, for example, Die Traumdeutung, in which Freud defines displacement as follows:
“Unter den Gedanken, welch die Analyse zutage fördert, finden sich viele, die dem Kern des
Traumes ferner stehen und die sich wie künstliche Einschaltungen zu einem gewissen Zwecke
ausnehmen. Der Zweck derselben ergibt sich leicht: gerade sie stellen eine Verbindung, oft eine
gezwungene und gesuchte Verbindung zwischen Trauminhalt und Traumgedanken her . . . Der
Erfolg dieser Verschiebung ist, daß der Trauminhalt dem Kern der Traumgedanken nicht mehr
gleichsieht, daß der Traum nur eine Entstellung des Traumwunsches im Unbewußten
wiedergibt” (GW, 2: 312-13) [“Among the thoughts that analysis brings to light are many which
are relatively remote from the kernel of the dream and which look like artificial interpolations
made for some particular purpose. That purpose is easy to divine. It is precisely they that
constitute a connection, often a forced and far-fetched one, between the dream-content and the
dream-thoughts . . . The consequence of the displacement is that the dream-content no longer
resembles the core of the dream-thoughts and that the dream gives no more than a distortion of
the dream-wish which exists in the unconscious” (SE, 4: 306-07, emphasis in original)].
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text, the vagina is the signifier, while the missing signified is not just Brigitte, but
also the commodification of her vagina into a “vague hope.” Brigitte thus does
not possess any coherent subjectivity; rather, she comes to figure as a subject
through her (or, more properly, her vagina’s) desire, which, for Lacan, is
metonymic. As John Muller and Paul Richardson explain: “The mode of
metonymy . . . functions through the processes of desire . . . desire . . . seeks its
term by ‘eternally stretching forth towards the desire for something else’ (Lacan, E,
167, emphasis in original), where the ‘something else’ is related to a previous
‘something else’ by means of metonymy” (168-69). What Jelinek does in her
novel is to thus relate this Lacanian metonymy back to Brigitte’s social status as
lower-class woman: in other words, she contextualizes psychoanalytic
metonymy in Marxian and feminist social terms.
Here, Gilbert Chaitin’s gloss on the Lacanian notion of metonymy may be
helpful in clearing up what is a rather abstract position:
if . . . any expression may be used to signify something ‘other
than what it says,’ then clearly meaning does not inhere in
signifiers. It may always be displaced from one set to another.
Metonymy is therefore the equivalent of the primary process
of displacement . . . In short, displacement/metonymy brings
about the detachment of the subject from its attributes—the
loss of meaning. Metonymy is essential to the unconscious,
because . . . the unconscious is precisely that which escapes
expression in language . . . The only way to designate that for
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which the word is lacking is to refer to it by another name, by
allusion (50).
What this means is that, in the writing of the text, the meaning of either
the “vague hope” or Brigitte’s vagina is not an innate quality of the signifiers
used to designate them; rather, it is the juxtaposition of the terms that produces
meaning and exposes the detachment of the subject (in this case, Brigitte) from its
attributes, thus revealing the unconscious dimensions of alienation. If metaphor,
for Lacan, is a paternal signifier of repression tied to the Name-of-the-Father,
metonymy is what tends to slip away from this through desire. As a
consequence, the alienation in the above passage is found not just in Brigitte’s
reduction to a body part or the sale of her sexuality (in the narrative), but is also
revealed by Jelinek’s use of metonymy in the writing, for it is through this use of
metonymy that the instability of the signifier and the fiction of the ego (as the site
of alienation) as whole is exposed, naming as it does by allusion (the “vagina” for
Brigitte or the “vague hope”).
Jelinek’s use of metonymy therefore functions to expose the alienating
fiction of the whole ego by making clear the displacement of meaning that takes
place in the unconscious (a displacement that Brigitte naturally does not
recognize). As Lacan points out in “Agency of the letter in the unconscious,” the
ego’s function is precisely to cover up this displacement: “For this ego, which is
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notable in the first instance for the imaginary inertias that it concentrates against
the message of the unconscious, operates solely with a view to covering the
displacement constituted by the subject with a resistance that is essential to the
discourse as such” (E, 169). The function of the ego, then, is to deny the “message
of the unconscious,” as constituted through metonymy, allowing the subject to
experience imaginary wholeness through others:
heinz tut manchmal direkt so, als ob er und brigitte nicht ein
mensch wären, was sie aber sind. sehen denn diese frauen
nicht, daß wir in wirklichkeit eins sind, eins geworden sind,
untrennbar, fragt brigitte verwundert, wenn andre frauen
heinz als einen eigenen körper mit einem eigenen geist
ansehen (LH, 53-54). 54
The imaginary wholeness of Brigitte’s ego is consequently found through her
identification vis-à-vis Heinz, but is exposed by Jelinek as fictional. Lacan
discusses this romantic myth of wholeness in the Other at length in Seminar VIII,
devoted to Plato’s Symposium (on this, see Z. M. Marks). By contrast, the irony of
Jelinek’s metonymies has a dehumanizing quality, reducing Heinz and Brigitte to
puppets rather than whole Menschen.

“sometimes heinz plainly acts as if he and brigitte were not one person, which they are
however. do these women not see that in reality we are one, have become one, inseparable, asks
brigitte in astonishment when other women look at heinz as a separate body with a separate
spirit” (women, 61).
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Moreover, Jelinek refuses to allow the reader identification with Brigitte
for the same reason: identification is the site of the imaginary, the ego and thus
alienation. This refusal can be found in the following descriptions of Brigitte and
Heinz’s sexual relationship:
auch ekelt brigitte vor heinz und seinem fetten weißen
elektrikerkörper, der auch heinz heißt. trotzdem ist sie auch
wieder froh, so froh, todfroh, daß sie ihn hat, weil er ihre
zukunft ist (LH, 32). 55
zwischen brigitte und heinz ist eine körperliche vereinigung
in gange. brigitte sagt, mir ist es so schön, daß man sterben
möchte . . . mit dir ist es so schön, heinz, daß man sterben
könnte. bei der arbeit jedenfalls möchte ich nicht sterben,
heinz, wenn schon, dann wenigstens vorher (LH, 56). 56
In the second passage, Jelinek is playing with romance novel conventions
(as she does throughout the whole novel; see Fiddler, Rewriting, 72, and above
for a discussion of Brigitte and Paula as “typical” and “atypical” romance
heroines, as well as below for more on the romance novel); the phrase “it’s so
good with you, I could die” is something straight out of a traditional romance

“brigitte also is repelled by heinz and his plump white electrician’s body, which is also
called heinz. despite that she is also happy again, so happy, dead happy, that she has him,
because he is her future” (women, 34).
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“a physical union is in process between brigitte and heinz. brigitte says, it’s so good
with you, that one would like to die . . . it’s so good with you, heinz, that one would like to die. at
any rate i would not like to die at work, heinz, if it has to be, then let it be before that at least”
(women, 65).
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novel. In a traditional romance, however, this phrase would be followed by a
description of spectacular sex, allowing the reader to identify with the character
and her pleasure. Jelinek, however, disallows that pleasure by following this
sentence with a reference to work and death, thereby implying a metonymic
equivalence between death by sex and death by work (and also destroying the
cliché of sex to die for), while the use of the word “todfroh” in the earlier passage
also implies the death of Brigitte, this time by happiness. In doing so, Jelinek
unpacks both the meaning of happiness (Brigitte is happy because she will
escape the factory, not because of love for Heinz), and the traditional metaphor of
sex as “little death” (the most obvious example being la petite mort for orgasm in
French). As Marlies Janz points out, death and dead bodies haunt Die
Liebhaberinnen, with the result that “Die Verdinglichung des weiblichen Körpers
in der Sexualität wie in der Arbeit also ist für die Frauen der Tod” (25). 57 Jelinek’s
linking of sexual death to this reification of women’s bodies shows how Brigitte’s
desire for Heinz is in fact deadly. 58

“The reification of women’s bodies, both through sex and work, results in death for the
women” (my translation).
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Indeed, as Janz points out: “Von Anfang an ist in Die Liebhaberinnen von toten Frauen
die Rede” [“From the very beginning, women as lovers speaks about dead women” (my translation
25)]. She goes on to give several examples from Jelinek’s text.
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To clarify: Brigitte’s desire for Heinz is self-destructive, a desire which will
ultimately lead to a deadly result, since “humans are actually driven by a death
principle” as both Freud and Lacan insisted in their work (Ragland, 84-85). Here
as elsewhere, the ironic brutality of Jelinek’s writing lies in the literalness with
which she exposes this connection. Lacan illustrates this association with the
myth Plato puts into the playwright Aristophanes’ mouth in the Symposium, 59
namely that all lovers seek their ideal and fulfilling complement in the beloved:
Aristophanes’ myth pictures the pursuit of the complement
for us in a moving, and misleading, way, by articulating that
it is the other, one’s sexual other half, that the living being
seeks in love. To this mythical representation of the mystery
of love, analytic experience substitutes the search by the
subject, not of the sexual complement, but of that part of
himself, lost forever, that is constituted by the fact that he is
only a sexed living being, and that he is no longer immortal
(S11, 205). 60
What Lacan means by this is that “the living being, by being subject to sex,
has fallen under the blow of individual death.” In other words, for Lacan (as for
Jelinek) the drive “is profoundly a death drive” (S11, 205). What we see, then, in
See Plato’s Symposium, in which the character of Aristophanes states that “Love is born
into every human being; it calls back the halves of our original nature; it tries to make one out of
two and heal the wound of human nature” (27). According to this myth, the wound had
developed when Zeus had split humans, who were originally composed of two beings, into two
halves.
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This is, of course, the central myth of the Western romance novel – that one can find
one’s complement or “other half” through romantic love.
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Jelinek is a grotesque parody of the romance novel, one that “[undermines] at
every turn the ethos of romantic love by showing the economic reasons for
marriage and the brutal reality of sexual relations” (Haines and Littler, 42), and
that equates love and marriage with death for women (and men [Haines and
Littler, 45]). 61 In the following section, I will read Die Liebhaberinnen in generic
terms as an anti-romance.
“Reading the (Anti-)Romance”: Die Liebhaberinnen and the Romance Novel
First, however, it may be helpful to offer a definition of the genre. Scholars
of the romance novel tend to agree that the romance novel is one that tells a
(often, but not always, heterosexual) love story. This love story is central to the
development of the heroine’s identity, contains barriers that must be overcome in
order for the couple to find true love, and tends to result in upward social and
financial mobility for the heroine. Consider, for example, the following
definitions:
A romance novel is a work of prose fiction that tells the story
of the courtship and betrothal of one or more heroines
(Juhasz, 14).

In this respect, Jelinek’s work also parallels that of Denis de Rougemont, who, in his
book Love in the Western World, put forward the thesis that “Passion has thus only played the part
of a purifying ordeal . . . in the service of transfiguring death” (Rougemont, 46; Qtd. in Pearce, 1516).
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Zwei Partner (Mann und Frau) werden nach Überwindung
von Widerständen gemeinsam glücklich (Peter Nusser qtd. in
Thiel, 7). 62
the most striking characteristic of the ideal romance [is] its
resolute focus on a single, developing relationship between
heroine and hero (Radway, 122).
Harlequin novels . . . [tell] the story of how a modern young
woman succeeds in marrying a handsome, desirable, and
wealthy man . . . Put more polemically, popular romance tells
the story of how the heroine gains access to money – to power
– in patriarchal society . . . romance tells over and over a story
about power deeply encoded within a story about love (Cohn,
3).
Working with the above definitions, it is clear that Jelinek’s text both draws from
and transcends the traditional romance novel, as I shall explore in more detail
below. What she does, I argue, is to construct a materialist feminist 63 version of
the romance novel, one that illustrates the ways in which conventional romance
novels work are alienating.
Viewed in this way, we can see how the contrasting stories of Brigitte and
Paula have the effect of demonstrating Jelinek’s transformation of romance novel

“Two partners (man and woman) will be happy together after overcoming obstacles”
(my translation).
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My definition of materialist feminism is taken from Sara Lennox’s chapter on
Bachmann and materialist feminism in her book Cemetery of the Murdered Daughters: Feminism,
History, and Ingeborg Bachmann, in which she defines materialist feminism as a methodology that
“combined post-Althusserian Marxism with postmodern discourse theories” (Cemetery, 298).
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conventions. While Jelinek plays with the romance form in her text, Die
Liebhaberinnen should, however, in Allyson Fiddler’s words, more properly be
seen as an “anti-romance,” since Jelinek “uses the stories of her two protagonists
to ridicule the myths of ‘true love’ and ‘passion’ propagated by the happy-end
school of popular fiction” (Rewriting, 72). Because Die Liebhaberinnen is an antiromance, the figure of Brigitte “has no potential for fitting the classic heroine’s
role. The value of her own ‘happy end’ is degraded by the motivations which the
reader knows have led to her choice of husband and by the crude and
unromantic reality of her sexual and social interaction” (Fiddler, Rewriting, 73).
Traditional romance heroines are not supposed to be actively looking for
marriage, especially an economically successful one, despite the fact that “it is a
commonplace of romance that the heroine will marry well, a given that the hero
will be rich” (Cohn, 127). 64 Additionally,
the heroine’s accomplishment . . . her success in marrying
well, must seem almost an accident; it is never her purpose.
The idea of a romance heroine setting out to marry
successfully is doubly denied. She never seeks marriage in
any form, and when she finds her hero, she is never drawn to
him by the signs of his economic power. The heroine is
defined by her apparent passivity and disinterestedness; she
See also: (P. Marks) for a discussion of the “good provider” in romance novels; and
Dubino, who claims that “All varieties of the romance contain the pattern of ‘heroine gets rich
through love’ “ (103, emphasis added).
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is a negation of the purposeful, self-interested, mercenary
woman . . . This strategy . . . attempts to disguise both the
heroine’s real goal and the profound association between
sexual and economic power that lies at the heart of the
romance (Cohn, 127).
In this respect, we can see that Paula truly is a romance heroine, albeit a
failed one, as she, unlike Brigitte, who deliberately “trapped” Heinz because she
knew he was the best she could get, is a far more passive participant in the
process of finding love:
paula wartet darauf, daß sie ausgewählt wird, worauf es
ankommt. es kommt darauf an, vom richtigen ausgewählt zu
werden. paula hat niemals gelernt, selber auszuwählen und
zu bestimmen. paula erlebt alles in der leideform, nicht in der
tätigskeitform (LH, 30). 65
Precisely by having Paula fail where Brigitte succeeds, Jelinek undoes romance
conventions, with the result that the relation of sexual and economic power that
traditional romance novels suppress is brought to the fore in Jelinek’s text.
Jelinek’s transformation of the romance novel form does not, however,
take place simply at the formal or plot level, but also at the level of the writing
itself, that is, in the text’s signifying practice. In terms of the writing, traditional
romance novels tend use a mode of writing that fosters readers’ identification
“paula is waiting to be chosen, which is what really matters. what matters is to be
chosen by the right man. paula herself has never learned to choose and to decide. paula
experiences everything in the passive voice, not the active voice” (women, 31).
65

66

with the romance heroine (or hero, as the case may be). 66 In her study of
romances and their readers, Janice Radway discusses the identification that
readers experience through “reading the romance”:
all of the women I spoke to . . . admitted that they wanted to
identify with the heroine . . . What they [romance readers]
enjoy most about romance reading is the opportunity to
project themselves into the story, to become the heroine . . .
readers project themselves into the story by identifying with
the heroine as she responds to the hero with all of her
“strongly passionate nature” (64, 67 & 69).
Radway’s observations raise the question of precisely how this identification
between reader and romance heroine comes about, a question Radway addresses
in her chapter on language and narrative discourse in the romance novel.
As she explains, the “contemporary romance’s prose is dominated by
cliché, simple vocabulary, standard syntax, and the most common techniques
associated with the nineteenth-century realist novel” (Radway, 189). The effect of
these techniques is that the contemporary romance is able to maintain the
“illusion that language is a transparent window opening out onto an already
existing world” (Radway, 189); with the result that romance readers “come to the
romantic text, then, with the understanding that language is there to describe, in

For a discussion of romance readers’ ability to identify with both the heroine and the
hero, see (Kinsdale).
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simple and unambiguous terms, events that for all intents and purposes, were
‘completed’ just before the fictional narrator described them” (Radway, 190).
Moreover, because romance novelists also share this belief with their readers,
they write texts designed to be read in this straightforward
manner. The characteristic verbal structure of the
contemporary romance thus conveniently lends itself to this
kind of interpretation by refusing to present the reader with
anything capable of disorienting her or of forcing her to
attend differently to the substance and organization of signs
that cannot be taken so easily as simple, referential gestures
(Radway, 191).
Radway’s position is supported by at least two romance writers, Jayne
Ann Krentz (who writes under the pseudonyms Amanda Quick, Jayne Castle,
and Stephanie James, among others), and Linda Barlow who claim that:
The author of a romance novel and her audience enter into a
pact with one another. The reader trusts the writer to create
and recreate for her a vision of a fictional world . . . The
romance writer gives form and substance to this vision by
locking it in language, and the romance reader yields herself
to this alternative world in the act of reading, allowing the
narrative to engage her mind and her emotions and to
provide her with a certain intensity of experience. She knows
that certain expectations will be met and that certain
conventions will not be violated (15-16).
The type of language used to create this “intensity of experience” is, in their
view, a “figurative language . . . rich, evocative diction that is heavy-laden with
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familiar symbols, images, metaphors, paradoxes, and allusions to the great
mythical traditions” (16).
Barlow and Krentz go on to add that “the language of romance is more
lushly symbolic and metaphorical than ordinary discourse” (22) because “lush
use of symbols, metaphors, and allusion is emotionally powerful as well as
mythologically evocative” (24). As an example of such lushly allusive and
metaphorical language, consider the following:
He returned his gaze to his wife’s face and lost himself in the
soft liquid eyes that beheld him. He was barely conscious of
his actions as he leaned forward, almost mesmerized by the
deep pools of blue. His free hand slipped through her hair to
the nape of her neck and still she stared, and then his mouth
found hers and eyelids lowered. He felt her lips slacken and
begin to tremble and then open as his mouth moved upon
hers. He tasted response, sweet, warm and clinging and was
aware of the rapid beat of her heart beneath the fingers resting
on her breast (Woodiwiss, 351).
In particular, I wish to draw attention to the use of the phrase “sweet, warm and
clinging” to describe Heather’s response to the kisses bestowed upon her, as this
description is actually a replacement for Heather herself, one that allows the
“reader [to] actively [insert] herself in the relations of signification and the
subject positions ideology articulates in the text,” to borrow from Teresa Ebert
(“Romance,” 38).
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For while Heather’s response could indeed be “sweet, warm and
clinging,” the phrase also functions in a manner similar to that of Hugo’s line
(“His sheaf was neither miserly nor spiteful” [Qtd. in: E, 156]) cited by Lacan as
an example of an identificatory metaphor.67 As Lacan explains, “If . . . his sheaf
does refer us to Booz, and this is indeed the case, it is because it has replaced him
in the signifying chain at the very place where he was to be exalted” (E, 157).
Similarly, Heather, is replaced in the signifying chain above by her response.
This, then, allows the reader to identify with Heather through the
metaphor/identification of her response, for it is “the structure of the signifier
[e.g., the replacement of the signifier Heather with the signifier of her response—
BB] which makes possible the transfer of meaning, and thereby the identification,
understood in the psychoanalytic sense of the creation of the new identity of the
subject” (Chaitin, 45), in this case the romance reader. Since identification, as
defined by Lacan, consists of “the transformation that takes place in the subject
when he assumes an image” (E, 2), we can presume that the assumption of this
image on the part of the reader will also lead to the creation of an identification
It should be noted here that Lacan is using the term metaphor in a way that is similar to
how others have used metonymy. What is important for my purposes is that when Lacan says
“metaphor,” he means identification and alienation as well. As Dylan Evans notes, “Metaphor is
also the structure of identification, since the latter consists in substituting oneself for another”
(Dictionary, 113; see also S3, 218). For more on metaphor and metonymy in Lacan, see also:
(Grigg, especially chapter 11, and Ragland-Sullivan, 233-58).
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as “sweet, warm and clinging.” We can thus see how the traditional romance
functions to produce “gendered subjects, especially female ones, in maledominated heterosexual couples” (Ebert, “Romance,” 19). Working in opposition
to the traditional romance, Jelinek’s text instead functions to disrupt the
production of gendered subjects through caricaturing and overdoing the
identificatory metaphors of the romance novel and she creates a text that exposes
the ways in which the romance novel is ideological in the sense that Teresa Ebert
uses the term. As Ebert defines it
ideology is the organization of material signifying practices
that constitute subjectivities . . . Subjectivity is thus the effect of
a set of ideologically organized signifying practices through
which the individual is situated in the world and in terms of
which the world and one’s self are made intelligible
(“Romance,” 23-24, emphasis in original).
As a result, ideology functions as the “agency of the symbolic order,” using the
forms and representations of the imaginary on behalf of the injunctions of the
symbolic. Ideology harnesses the unconscious—the impetus of desire—in order
to engender subjects and secure them in the relations of power and subjugation
generated by the symbolic order (Ebert, “Romance,” 25, emphasis in original).
As we have seen, the chief literary agent of this subjugation is
identification, which would secure the subject in an alienating fiction of
imaginary ego wholeness and identification (Brigitte’s “vage Hoffnung” or the
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used metaphor of sex-as-death); and it is precisely such metaphors which
Jelinek’s writing practice refuses to confirm, relying instead on the metonymic
unpacking of such metaphoric meaning.
Jelinek’s “textual politics,” therefore, are more clearly located in her
writing practice than at the plot level. In contrast to a writer like Brecht, whose
comments [of the narrator—BB] show the false consciousness
depicted to be correctable, Jelinek’s narrator speaks from a
position much closer to her protagonists and deliberately
refrains from stating the essence of what is being depicted,
thus making the reader work harder and denying him/her the
catharsis resulting from a clear analysis . . . the narrative voice
shifts, sometimes appearing complicit in patriarchal ideology,
thus turning the reader into a voyeur . . ., sometimes directly
mimicking it in order to open it up to scrutiny . . ., and
occasionally drawing an unambiguous moral, as in the key
passages above concerning Paula (Haines, 654). 68
It is, then, Jelinek’s literary technique that makes the reader work for the insight.
One example of Jelinek’s use of varying narrative techniques in Die
Liebhaberinnen can be found in the following passage, a passage that once again

Haines’s examples of these passages concerning Paula, include, among others: “dieser
roman handelt vom gegenstand paula” (LH, 130) [“the subject of this novel is paula” (women,
158)]; and “über den gegenstand paula bestimmt erich, über dessen körperkräfte wieder andre
bestimmen, bis sich seine eingeweide einem frühen tod entgegenzersetzen, bei dem der alkohol
das seine leistet” (LH, 130) [“erich makes the decisions for the subject paula, and yet others make
decisions about his physical strength, till his innards decompose towards an early death, in
which alcohol does its bit” (women, 158)], thus clearly demonstrating, as Haines points out, the
“hierarchical structure of domination” (651).
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makes evident how Jelinek’s transformation of romance novel conventions
serves to prohibit the reader an identification with the heroine:
kaum schießt heinz zur türe herein, schon zielt er auf das sofa,
noch ehe er den pullover ausgezogen hat, schon hechtet er
blindlings los, brigitte fängt den ansturm mit ihrem leibe auf.
vielleicht hat heinz einmal schon soviel schwung, daß er
durch brigitte einfach hindurch und auf der andren seite
durch die mauer rast. heute hat heinz gerade nur soviel
schwung, daß er ihn in brigitte gekonnt hineinplaciert. es ist
eine meisterleistung an präzision. es ist eine qual für brigitte
(LH, 55). 69
That Jelinek is mimicking what Haines refers to as “patriarchal ideology” can be
seen if one compares her text to an excerpt from a traditional romance novel:
‘Ring was on top of her in a second. All two hundred pounds
of him hit her and knocked her to the floor—and his aim was
perfect. His mouth hit hers precisely, and all his maleness
entered her femaleness in one smooth move. Out of instinct
her legs went around his waist as he began to move within
her . . . “Yes,” she said, and took his earlobe in her teeth.
“Yes.” She stuck her tongue in his ear and he slammed into
her with such blinding force, that for a second she couldn’t
see as she saw bright white light and her body rocked in
tremors (Deveraux, 272).

“hardly has heinz shot through the door, than he’s already aiming at the settee, even
before he’s taken off his pullover, he’s already taking a blind leap, brigitte cushions the onslaught
with her body. perhaps one day heinz will have so much momentum that he simply tears
through brigitte and through the wall on the other side. today heinz has only just enough
momentum, so that he skillfully positions it in brigitte. it is a masterpiece of precision. it is torture
for brigitte” (women, 63).
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These examples make clear that Jelinek must have been familiar with the writing
techniques of romance novelists while working on Die Liebhaberinnen, for her text
precisely parallels that of Deveraux’s, but with one major difference: rather than
following up her description of Heinz’s grand achievement in managing to place
himself precisely in Brigitte with a description of the exquisite pleasure Brigitte
receives from this act as Deveraux does, she describes it as torture for Brigitte.
While what Jelinek does here is a mimicry of the language of romance, she also
states the moral clearly in this case. That she does not always make the moral of
her text this clear has been shown above in the discussion of Brigitte’s “vage
Hoffnung”, thus showing that what she accomplishes in her text is a deft
combination of narrative and didactic techniques to make the reader (sometimes)
work for the insight.
To conclude, I would like to return to the discussion of Hennessy’s
critique outlined at the beginning of this chapter. This analysis of Jelinek’s text is
not meant to demonstrate that she is what Hennessy refers to as a
poststructuralist who “denies that the differences out of which meaning is made
have any referent outside these unstable relations among signifiers” (Profit and
Pleasure, 19), for it is clear the differences which produce meaning in Jelinek’s text
do indeed have outside referents, for example in the relation of Brigitte’s and
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Paula’s desire for love and marriage to the alienated form their labor takes in the
bra factory, or to what they read in the mass media. Rather, what I have shown is
that we do not have to (indeed, must not) choose between the symbolic and the
material, and that Jelinek participates in what Teresa Ebert has termed
“materialist critique,” that is, a critique which she defines as:
a mode of knowing that inquires into what is not said, into the
silence and the suppressed or missing, in order to uncover the
concealed operations of power and the socioeconomic
relations connecting the myriad details and representations of
our lives . . . In sum, materialist critique disrupts “what is” to
explain how social differences . . . have been systemically
produced and continue to operate within regimes of
exploitation (Ludic, 7).
It is just such an operation that Jelinek’s use of metonymy performs; by linking
Brigitte, her vagina and her hope together through metonymy, Jelinek exposes
the “suppressed or missing,” that is, the connection between these things which
usually goes unsaid.
Moreover, since “patriarchy acts on individuals to reproduce gendered
subjectivities through the consumption of commodities, notably texts,” as Ebert
notes, and these texts are an important site for “reproducing gender distinctions”
(“Romance,” 21), the choice that Hennessy offers us can be viewed as a false one.
For while the material relations of labor and sexuality, and the alienation
produced by those relations under capitalism, are indeed oppressive to women
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(and men) and must be changed, it is also true that the “subject’s entry into a
symbolic system of representations” (Hennessy, Profit and Pleasure, 212) plays a
role in producing female subjectivities that are equally repressive. Or, as Luce
Irigaray once put it: women “must go through a complex and painful process, a
real conversion to the female gender” (Je, tu, nous, 21). In order to change this
process, a focus on economics is not enough, for culture, too, plays its role, as
Irigaray maintains:
Social injustice is due not only to economic inequalities in the
strict sense . . . Social justice, and especially sexual justice,
cannot be achieved without changing the laws of language
and the conceptions of truths and values structuring the social
order. Changing the instruments of culture is just as important
in the medium to long term as a redistribution of goods in the
strict sense. You can’t have one without the other (Je, tu, nous, 2122, emphasis added).
It is for this reason that I see my use of both socialist feminist and psychoanalytic
theory as a means of furthering Sandra Bartky’s contention that a socialist
feminist theory of alienation will not only have to “[uncover] all the modes of
alienation [and examine them] in both their relationships to one another and to
the modes of estrangement described by Marx” but will also have to reveal “the
structuring of the unconscious both in men and women which facilitates the
reproduction of alienated modes of existence” (36).
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CHAPTER 2
A JOUISSANCE BEYOND THE PHALLUS? LUST AND PORNOGRAPHY
There is a jouissance . . . a jouissance of the body that is . . . a jouissance beyond
the phallus. . .
Jacques Lacan, Encore, Seminar XX (74)
Introduction: An Artistic (Anti-) Pornography?
It has become something of a “Gretchenfrage” 1 in Jelinek criticism to ask if
Lust is a pornographic or anti-pornographic text. Are we to understand it as a
repudiation, mockery, and/or parody of (male) pornography and desire, or does
Jelinek simply reproduce that which she is supposedly making fun of? In their
eagerness to defend Jelinek from charges of pornography, many scholars have
claimed that Lust is a repudiation of male pornography, and have failed to take
seriously just how indebted Jelinek is to the Western tradition of literary

I have borrowed this phrase from Allyson Fiddler, who uses it to refer to the question of
“what position, if any . . . [Jelinek’s] texts occupy within the postmodern debate on literature”
(“There Goes. . .” 129). A quick glance at Jelinek criticism, however, shows that the question of
pornography has become just as germane a “Gretchenfrage” as that of her Marxist versus
postmodernist positions. Indeed, Jelinek’s oeuvre as a whole is often categorized by her
detractors as pornography, and many of her works other than Lust do contain pornographic
elements I will focus my discussion of Jelinek’s appropriation and subversion of the genre of
pornography in this chapter on Lust as a paradigmatic text because it does not contain other
generic elements, but is rather almost exclusively “pornographic.” For discussions on the relation
of pornography to Jelinek’s work as a whole and/or other texts, see (among many others) Fiddler,
Rewriting, Finney, Hanssen, Levin, and Lücke.
1
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pornography, in particular that of the Marquis de Sade. 2 Although many
commentators have pointed out that Jelinek takes over and transforms the
conventions of “traditional” pornography, they use as their point of reference
“low” culture, or mass-market pornography, rather than “high” culture or
literary pornography. 3 To my knowledge, no one has yet discussed Jelinek’s
affinity with Sade, other than in passing; there have been several comparisons
drawn between Lust and Bataille’s Story of the Eye, but several critics have made
the mistake of assimilating Bataille’s work to “pornography” as an undefined

In this chapter, I will focus on Jelinek’s relationship to a male history of literary
pornography, as those are the works on which Lust draws. It is important to note, however, that
despite Jelinek’s (and other’s) dismissal of women’s pornography as “kaum literarisch
interessant” (“Sinn des Obzönen,” 102-03) [“hardly interesting as literature” (my translation)],
women were important to the development of the pornographic novel, which in the “mid- to late
eighteenth century grew directly out of women’s fiction” (Mudge, 29).
2

For readings of Lust that do take seriously Jelinek’s relationship to literary pornography,
see Baackmann, Hartwig, Höfler (“Sexualität”), Janz, and Luserke. Ultimately, however, most of
these scholars conclude that Lust is anti-pornographic, with the exceptions of Hartwig and
Luserke, who concludes that Lust is neither pornography nor anti-pornography, but rather a “bis
an die Grenzen des Möglichen und Machbaren reichende Ästhetik des Obszönen, zu dem die
Macht, der Kapitalismus, die Sprache und der Sex, eben das Patriarchat, gehören” (98)
[“aesthetics of obscenity that extends to the limits of the possible and feasible, and to which
power, capitalism, language, sex, precisely patriarchy belong” (my translation)]. In this chapter, I
argue that Jelinek’s text forces us to expand our definition of pornography to include precisely
this “aesthetics of obscenity.” Also, none of these scholars read Jelinek with Sade, other than in
passing.
3
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whole, neglecting the differences between Bataille’s work and mass-market
pornography.4
The distinction I draw here (and elaborate in more detail below) between
mass cultural and high art forms of pornography is not meant to imply that there
is no relation between the two, nor that the distinction can always be clearly
delineated. Indeed, as Allison Pease has noted in respect to Joyce, Beardsley, and
D.H. Lawrence, modernist writers were “not everywhere in opposition to mass
culture, but in specific ways they appropriated it, incorporating the images and
representational techniques of one very significant mass-cultural product:
pornography” (xiii). She goes on to further note, however, that these artists were
nonetheless successful at “courting high-art status” despite the introduction of
“explicit pornographic tropes into their works” (xiv). In some ways, Pease views
the modernist appropriation of pornography as that which enabled the later
academic discussion of pornography as a genre to be taken seriously: “This book

A mistake that Jelinek herself makes (at least when writing about pornography,
although not in Lust as I shall show), when she claims that “Der männliche Blick auf die Frau . . .
ist immer verachtend. Pornografie ist nicht die Darstellung einer Handlung sondern der
Erniedrigung. Eine pornografische Darstellung ist immer auch eine geschichtslose Darstellung”
(“Sinn des Obzönen,” 102) [“The male gaze at the woman is always one of disdain. Pornography
is not the representation of an act, but of humiliation. A pornographic representation is also
always an ahistorical representation” (my translation)]. In the same essay she designates her own
work as “Anti-Pornografie,” a designation which sscholars have uncritically accepted and
repeated. See also Fiddler, “Porn,” Höfler, “Vergrößerungsspiegel,” and Janz.
4
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serves as proof . . . of the continued impact of modernism’s complex negotiation
between aesthetics and pornography. If pornography has gained a place in
serious academic discourse in the last ten years, it has done so because
modernism first demanded that it be taken seriously, and showed us how” (xv).
Pease does not, however, maintain that one can collapse the distinction between
the mass cultural and high art forms of pornography, since pornography
“remained quite distinct from the aesthetic in that it elided the reflective or
contemplative distance invoked by [the aesthetic]” (3).
It is precisely this complex negotiation between aesthetics and
pornography, as outlined by Pease, that I address in this chapter and that, I
argue, many Jelinek scholars have failed to address through their collapsing of
the distinction (complicated as it may be) between mass-cultural forms of
pornography and the type of pornography produced by writers such as Bataille
and Sade. Thus, for example, Allyson Fiddler concludes that Lust is an antipornographic work because compared “to Bataille’s or other pornographers [it]
in fact tries to say something about sex not with sex but with language, and often
in particular with the language of sex” (“Porn,” 411, emphasis in original). She
argues further that in the case of Lust,
the characteristics of pornography are only vestigial. At first
sight they appear to conform to a standard erotic scenario, but
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it becomes clear that Jelinek uses them in order to subvert and
frustrate the reader’s expectations. Jelinek’s text is therefore
not pornographic. What Lust does become is a parody of
pornography, a work of anti-pornography (“Porn,” 413,
emphasis in original).
While I agree in general with Fiddler’s conclusions that Lust subverts and
frustrates its reader’s expectations regarding pornography, I quarrel with her
claim that the texts of the “other pornographers” to whom she refers (and in
whose group she presumably includes Sade as well as Bataille) are “narrated
quite economically and are largely uncluttered by the feelings and opinions of
the characters” (“Porn,” 411). I disagree as well as with Fiddler’s assertion that
Jelinek’s text, in its attempt to “say something about sex not with sex but with
language” (“Porn,” 411, emphasis in original) thus differs from the texts of those
“other pornographers.” In making these claims, Fiddler draws on the authority
of Susan Sontag, who points out in her essay “The Pornographic Imagination”
that one of the distinctions made between pornographic writing and “literature”
is that “pornography . . . possesses only one ‘intention’ [to sexually arouse the
reader—BB], while any genuinely valuable work of literature has many” (39).
There are two problems with Fiddler’s conclusions regarding what she
views as the difference between Lust and “other pornography.” The first problem
is that Fiddler fails to note that Sontag, in fact, goes on to posit both Bataille and
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Sade as writers whose works do not fit into the category of mass-market, easily
consumable pornography, the very same distinction that Fiddler claims for
Jelinek’s text. Fiddler’s second problem is that by arguing that Lust differentiates
itself from pornography through its attempt to “say something about sex with
language,” she overlooks the complex history of literary pornography, and the
ways in which it, too,
works to write the body in as many minute variations as
possible, to evoke its materiality and palpability for the sexual
imagination of its readers. While Steven Marcus contends that
pornography constantly tries to escape language, such an
assertion seems counter to the entire project of written
pornography which, by writing the body and sexual acts,
extends, proliferates and continues the body and the sexual
acts in a never-ending stream of words (Pease, 6). 5
In other words, based on Fiddler’s arguments, we can just as easily also
claim Sade as an anti-pornographer, since he, like Jelinek, is a writer whose texts
“refuse mimesis as a principle of imitation and identification that guides the
reader’s relation to the text” (Judovitz, 173), and it is precisely this refusal of
mimesis that Fiddler claims disrupts the pornographic narrative of Lust, thus
resulting in an anti-pornographic novel. Given that there is a general consensus
In this respect, we could also borrow Deleuze’s term “pornology” to describe Jelinek’s
text. “Pornology” is his term for the works of Sade, Sacher-Masoch, Bataille, and others; its
applicability of Jelinek’s work lies in Deleuze’s definition of “pornological literature” as that
which “is aimed above all at confronting language with its own limits” (22).
5
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that Sade’s works constitute “pornography,” his work can also be seen as
anticipating the same dilemma regarding Jelinek’s text posited at the beginning
of this chapter: is it or is it not pornography? My answer is that Lust, like Sade,
requires us to expand our definition of pornography, precisely in the way
Jelinek’s novel works with and through different aspects of pornographic
traditions. Certainly Lust is anti-pornographic if we take the goal of pornography
to be solely the “sexual excitement of the reader” (Goulemot, “Sadean Novels,”
71), because it is clear that Lust refuses to participate in such a project. However,
Lust is simultaneously a pornographic text in the tradition of Sade (whose texts
also make difficult, if not impossible, the sexual excitement of the reader), and
his modernist successors. What this means is that we need to talk about two
distinct pornographic traditions when we talk about Jelinek’s relationship to
pornography: a mass cultural tradition, including film, that exists for the
“specific purpose of sexually stimulating [its] readers” (Pease, 5), and a high
culture literary pornographic tradition.
Peter Michelson offers further clarification of the latter, a high culture
literary pornographic tradition, defining it as “artistic pornography,” a
pornography, that “may and frequently does represent explicit genital sex but
integrates sexuality as a theme or rhetoric into an aesthetic context for an
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aesthetic purpose” (xii), and one which incorporates what he terms an “aesthetics
of obscenity” (xii). This type of aesthetic
implies a perceptual alteration whereby the obscene, a species
of the ugly, is reconstituted to a function akin to that of the
beautiful. In that sense it is a contemplation of the unspeakable
and counterpoints traditional aesthetic assumptions . . . A
poetics of obscenity, then, describes speaking the unspeakable
and is defined by the artistic strategies used to change
assumptions and perceptions. These will vary according to
artist, but what they will have in common is the disposition to
make the obscene function aesthetically (xi-xii, emphasis in
original). 6
This tradition of artistic pornography could perhaps also be viewed as including
that “anti-pornography” for which so many Jelinek scholars seem to be
searching. Sade serves as a paradigmatic example of this (anti-)pornographic
tradition, for as Jean Goulemot has noted, “there exists in Sade a frank recourse
to the most classical type of pornography, whose literary methods he uses and
whose objectives he apparently espouses. But Sade rather quickly diverts this
pornography from its objective of sexual excitement” (“Sadean Novels,” 64). It is
within this second tradition of literary or artistic pornography that I situate

See also Pease, who describes the “aesthetic of the obscene” as “a mode of sexual
representation that, while potentially affecting the sensual interests of its readers, does not, as
opposed to pornography, seek sexual arousal as its main purpose . . . In contrast to the
pornographic, the aesthetic of the obscene seeks to be accepted into the cultural mainstream, and
it does so by mediating its own materialist interests with idealist artistic techniques that promote
the kind of consumptive practices associated with the aesthetic” (34-35).
6
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Jelinek’s Lust. That this tradition also has a political history (one in which both
Jelinek and Sade participate) has been made clear by Lynn Hunt, who has
observed:
If we take pornography to be the explicit depiction of sexual
organs and sexual practices with the aim of arousing sexual
feelings, then pornography was almost always an adjunct to
something else until the middle or end of the eighteenth
century . . . between 1500 and 1800, pornography was most
often a vehicle for using the shock of sex to criticize religious
and political authorities (10).
In terms of sexual politics, the major similarity that I find in the work of
Sade and Jelinek, and that I would claim as a characteristic of the type of literary
pornography I have been speaking of, is their depiction of sexuality as based on
inequality and as inherently violent (in this respect, Sade has more in common
with his critic, Andrea Dworkin, than Dworkin would perhaps care to admit). 7
As Frances Ferguson has made clear,
Sadean pornography . . . may make sexual explicitness look
like a symbolic weapon . . . sexuality, from this position . . .
establishes inequality as a necessary, rather than incidental,
element of pleasure. The sexual exchange that seems to
narrow the sexual contract to its most basic units does not . . .

See, for example, Dworkin’s chapter on Sade in her Pornography: Men Possessing Women,
in which she claims: “[Sade] both embodies and defines male sexual values . . . In his work he
relentlessly celebrated brutality as the essence of eroticism; fucking, torture, and killing were
fused; violence and sex, synonymous” (70). Finally, Dworkin’s definition of sex as power implies
an affinity with Sade, albeit one she would reject.
7
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produce loving mutuality in a private encounter that is a
refuge from and counter to a public and unjust world. Rather,
inequality begins in sexuality (4-5).
Ferguson goes on to note that the violence and inequality inherent in sexuality is
precisely what Bataille’s work on Sade elaborates. As Bataille claimed in regard
to Sade:
The kind of sexuality [Sade] has in mind runs counter to the
desires of other people . . . they are to be victims, not partners
. . . if eroticism leads to harmony between the partners its
essential principle of violence and death is invalidated. Sexual
union is fundamentally a compromise, a half-way house
between life and death. Communion between the participants
is a limiting factor and it must be ruptured before the true
violent nature of eroticism can be seen (167). 8
In other words, what Sade demonstrates for us, according to Bataille, is not just
the lack of reciprocity in the sexual relationship, but also that which Lacan once
described as the fact that “sex and its significations are always capable of making
present the presence of death” (S11, 257).
It is precisely this link between the sexual drive and the death drive that
constitutes an important aspect of the sexual politics of Sade’s and Jelinek’s

Bataille, of course, is important not only for Jelinek, given her claim that Lust originated
as a “feminine counterpart” to his Story of the Eye (see Fiddler, Rewriting, 153), but also for the
way Lacan uses the term jouissance in his later work. As Dylan Evans has noted, “the shift
towards the sexual connotations of the term after 1965 may be inspired by the work of Georges
Bataille” (“Jouissance,” 4).
8
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“pornology,” namely, their portrayal of sexuality in terms of jouissance instead of
pleasure. This depiction of jouissance instead of pleasure is where I find both Sade
and Jelinek to be what I am defining as anti-pornographic or pornological rather
than pornographic writers, for pornography is about pleasure (the possibility of
having a sexual relation) whereas what Sade and Jelinek show us is the inherent
impossibility in sexual relations and the link of the sexual drive to the death
drive, or jouissance, which Lacan defines as involving “precisely the acceptance of
death” and as something in which “pleasure and pain are presented as a single
packet to take or leave” (S7, 189, emphasis in original; see also Dean, Beyond
Sexuality, 125). The major difference is that if Sade demonstrates for us what
Lacan once termed the “right to jouissance,” (“Kant with Sade,” 71), a right that
Sade viewed as available to both sexes, provided that they were on the side of
vice rather than virtue, Jelinek’s text makes it clear that in her view of the world,
the “right” to jouissance is a phallic one and thus one which excludes women (see
below for more on jouissance in Jelinek’s novel).
By reading Jelinek and Sade within this tradition of high-culture literary
and political pornography that goes beyond the goal of simply exciting the
reader sexually, both authors can be seen as “moral pornographers,” to borrow
Angela Carter’s term. A moral pornographer, according to Carter, is one who
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“might use pornography as a critique of the current relations between the sexes”
(19). A moral pornographer possesses the power to change the way we think
about relations between the sexes: “Nothing exercises such power over the
imagination as the nature of sexual relationships, and the pornographer has it in
his power to become a terrorist of the imagination, a sexual guerilla whose
purpose is to overturn our most basic notions of these relations” (21).
Carter goes on to claim Sade as precisely this type of pornographer,
maintaining that he “was unusual in his period for claiming rights of free
sexuality for women, and in installing women as beings of power in his
imaginary worlds” (36) and further that she “would like to think that [Sade] put
pornography in the service of women, or, perhaps, allowed it to be invaded by
an ideology not inimical to women” (37). This, of course, is where Jelinek and
Sade part ways; if Carter, as a feminist on the “libertarian” side of the sex wars,
can enthuse over Sade’s libertine women’s right to “fuck as actively as they are
able” (27), Jelinek is much more pessimistic in her view of women’s ability to
determine and control their own sexuality. In regard to women’s power (or lack
thereof) to determine and control their sexuality, Lust sometimes seems to be
closer to the position of the anti-pornography side of the feminist debate on
pornography, as exemplified by Luce Irigaray in her short piece on pornography,
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entitled “‘Frenchwomen,’ Stop Trying.” Irigaray’s title is an obvious reference to
Sade’s pamphlet “Yet Another Effort, Frenchmen, If You Would Become
Republicans,” included in Philosophy in the Bedroom (296-339). In her essay,
Irigaray asserts that “In the pornographic scene, there is nothing for me to say . . .
[Women’s] training is designed to subject them to an exclusively phallocratic
sexual economy” (This Sex, 198-99). This is not to claim that Jelinek vacillates
between the two dichotomous positions of the feminist sex wars of the 1980s;
rather, what she accomplishes with her text is to “significantly [stretch] the limits
of the pornography debate” (101), as Ulrich Struve has rightly claimed. 9
The Misfortunes of Justine and Gerti: Reading Jelinek with Sade
In this section I explore the affinity between Sade and Jelinek, and the
ways in which their works differ from those pornographic texts that exist solely
for the purpose of sexual excitement. Specifically, I undertake a comparison of
one of Sade’s Justine texts (The Misfortunes of Virtue) and Jelinek’s novel Lust. For
if Sade entitled his first version of Justine the “Misfortunes of Virtue,” Jelinek’s
Lust could just as easily be subtitled the “Misfortunes of Love,” as it is in their
blind faith in the bourgeois values of virtue and love that Sade’s heroine most
For more on the sex wars in both the U.S. and Germany, see “PorNo” and “Frauen
gegen Pornographie” (both published in Emma), Assiter and Carol, Duggan and Hunter, Gehrke,
Gibson and Gibson, Rick and Treudl, and Segal and McIntosh.
9
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resembles Jelinek’s Gerti. 10 In each case, the figure’s suffering is directly caused
by her refusal to give up this faith, whether in virtue or in love. Moreover, it is in
the presentation of the character’s misfortune as “an ultimate challenge to any
possible identification on the part of the reader” (Judovitz, 173) where Jelinek’s
resemblance to Sade can best be seen, as a close reading of passages from The
Misfortunes of Virtue and Lust will demonstrate.
However, in order to illustrate the ways in which the artistic pornography
of Sade and Jelinek differs from that of other mass-market pornographers, it is
first necessary to offer a brief description and example of how the pornographic
narrative functions. As a paradigmatic example of a text that works more clearly
than Jelinek’s or Sade’s to fulfill an erotic function, I shall focus on John Cleland’s
Fanny Hill or Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure (1748/49). 11 Fanny Hill contains the

Sade’s character is known alternately by the names Sophie (in Misfortunes), Thérèse (in
Justine) and Justine (in both Misfortunes and Justine). In the interest of clarity, I shall refer to the
character as Justine when writing of her; the names Sophie and Thérèse will appear only in
quotes from Sade’s texts and interpretations of his works.
10

It is useful to bear in mind here Jean Goulemot’s caution that “there are no (or only
very exceptional cases of) strictly pornographic works of fiction. Pure pornography is an extreme
case . . .; a challenge that cannot be met” (“Libertine Fiction,” 134). Given Fanny Hill’s importance
in the development of the novel (see Mudge, 199-213, and Wagner, 237-46) and its curious blend
of “natural sexuality” and an “aesthetic framework incorporating the current of sentimentalism”
(Wagner, 243), it cannot be considered “pure” pornography. It does, however, conform more
noticeably to a standard erotic scenario than Jelinek’s and Sade’s texts do. Fanny Hill is also an
important work to read with Sade and Jelinek as it is considered to be part of the anti-Pamela
wave of the eighteenth century, as are Sade’s “Justine” texts (Mudge, 199 and 232-33); Jelinek’s
11
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three elements that most critics agree are essential to creating a pornographic or
erotic narrative. First, “if any tendency distinguishe[s] this category as a whole, it
[is] voyeurism” (Darnton, 72; see also Goulemot, Forbidden Texts, Goulemot
“Libertine Fiction,” Goulemot, “Sadean Novels,” and Pease). Two other elements
necessary to create what Steven Marcus has termed “pornotopia” are “an
enormous erect penis,” which functions as an “object of worship” (272) and the
solicitation of “confessions of the hidden secrets of female pleasure” (L. Williams,
53). As Linda Williams notes, such confessions of pleasure are often “elicited
involuntarily,” resulting in scenes of rape and ravishment in which the
“unwilling victim’s eventual manifestations of pleasure are offered as the genre’s
proof of a sincerity that under other conditions might seem less sure” (50).
The presence of all three of these elements of the pornographic narrative
can be found in one of Fanny Hill’s early scenes, in which Fanny, hidden in a
closet, watches as Mrs. Brown (the procuress with whom she is living) has sex
with a horse-grenadier. Because this is such an exemplary scene in terms of its
functioning as an erotic narrative, I shall quote it at some length:

novel, in its critical investigation of love and anti-sentimenatlism, could also be viewed as part of
an anti-Pamela tradition.
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I [Fanny—BB] instantly crept softly, and posted myself so
that, seeing everything minutely, I could not myself be seen . .
.
Her sturdy stallion had now unbuttoned, and produced
naked, stiff, and erect, that wonderful machine, which I had
never seen before, and which, for the interest my own seat of
pleasure began to take furiously in it, I stared at with all the
eyes I had. However, my senses were too much flurried, too
much concentered in that now burning spot of mine, to
observe anything more than in general the make and turn of
that instrument, from which the instinct of nature, yet more
than all I had heard of it, now strongly informed me I was to
expect that supreme pleasure which she has placed in the
meeting of those parts so admirably fitted for each other . . .
Whilst they were in the heat of the action, guided by nature
only, I stole my hand up my petticoat, and with fingers all on
fire, seized and yet more inflamed that center of all my senses;
my heart palpitated, as if it would force its way through my
bosom; I breathed with pain; I twisted my thighs, squeezed
and compressed the lips of that virgin slit, and following
mechanically the example of Phoebe’s manual operations on
it, as far as I could find admission, brought on at last the
critical ecstasy, the melting flow, into which nature, spent
with excess of pleasure, dissolves and dies away (61-63).
Here we see all of the elements coming together to create the “mise en scène of the
erotic novel” (Goulemot, Forbidden Texts, 43): the description of the horse
grenadier’s penis as “stiff, and erect, that wonderful machine”; Fanny’s
involuntary, “natural” response to her witnessing of the sexual act, and most
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importantly, Fanny’s positioning as simultaneously voyeur, narrator, and
participant (via masturbation) in the sexual act she is witnessing.
Indeed, it is the positioning of the reader as a voyeur via Fanny that
makes Cleland’s text pornographic, 12 for it is through identification with her that
the reader is enabled to experience the physical desire which the pornographic
narrative exists to elicit, as Allison Pease explains in her commentary on this
scene:
The voyeur figure . . . offers a model for the reader to engage
with, and reproduce for his or her private use, the pleasures
of the seen and heard . . . pornography invites readers to
indulge their own sensations through a mimetic imaginative
practice extended and complemented by the physical act of
masturbation (7-8).
As we shall see, it is precisely in refusing the reader this “mimetic imaginative
practice” that demonstrates the similarity between Sade’s and Jelinek’s texts. In
the following reading of Sade’s and Jelinek’s novels, I will discuss the ways in
which this refusal takes place at two textual levels: at the narrative or plot level,
and at the level of the writing or form.

There are many other instances of Fanny as voyeur in Fanny Hill. For example, she and
Phoebe watch another young woman in the house have sex with her client (66-71); she spies on
her lover, Mr. H., while he dallies with her maid (104-05); and she observes two men engaging in
sex through a peephole in the wall of her room in an inn (193-96).
12
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In terms of both narrative and form, Jelinek in Lust and Sade in The
Misfortunes of Virtue employ “strategies that disrupt identification with both
mimetic and moral referents” (Judovitz, 174). In terms of the narrative, one way
in which they achieve this disruption is by presenting “the reader with an
implausible plot: that of the relentless, exaggerated, and caricature-like
description of the heroine’s misfortunes” (Judovitz, 174). In the same manner as
Gerti, the “heroine” of Lust, Justine is “shown to be suffering from her
unsuccessful attempts to reconcile her own beliefs and her worldly experiences”
(Judovitz, 176). Consequently, Justine’s unwavering belief in virtue and the
possibility of meeting with others endowed with that quality causes her to
continually trust people, despite the substantial accumulation of evidence to the
contrary. Near the end of her tale of woe, Justine is arrested for the accidental
death of an infant she was attempting to save from a fire (this after having
endured a catalogue of insults, ranging from arrest for crimes she did not commit
to rape, and being held captive as a sex slave by a group of perverted monks,
among other horrors).
In spite of all her contradictory experience, Justine nonetheless persists in
believing that her virtue will endear her to someone, and turns, after her final
arrest, for help to Father Antonin, one of the monks who had previously held her
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captive as an unwilling participant in their debauched orgies. As Justine explains
to her sister Juliette, her reason for depending on someone she knows to be on
the side of vice is her stubborn persistence in clinging to and believing in virtue:
Long grown accustomed to slander, injustice, and misfortune,
and used since childhood to the idea that I never could yield
to any virtuous impulse without being certain to find thorns
somewhere in it, my affliction made me feel more bewildered
than anguished . . . However, it being natural for any
suffering creature to grasp at every possible means by which
he might climb out of the abyss into which misfortune has
cast him, I thought of Father Antonin (Sade, Misfortunes, 138).
That Justine’s confidence is misplaced is shown by the friar’s answer:
You see where your notions have brought you, for now you
have adequate leisure to convince yourself that they have
served no purpose but to tip you into one abyss after another.
So if you wish your neck to be saved, abandon them for once
in your life . . . One of the holy Brothers here in Lyons is a
close relative of both the Governor and the King’s Intendant . .
. By promising to pack you off in a convent for the rest of your
life, I am certain that he will prevent matters being taken any
further . . . But during your detention, you will belong to me. I
make no bones of it: you will be a slave and subject to my
whims which you will satisfy without demur (Sade,
Misfortunes, 138-39).
Justine is, of course, properly horrified at such an offer and rejects it out of
hand, preferring death to the surrendering of her virtue, claiming, “you are a
monster to take such cruel advantage of my situation to force me thus to choose
death and dishonour! . . . I shall die innocent, but I shall at least die without
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remorse!” (Sade, Misfortunes, 139). To further illustrate his point that virtue will
get one nowhere, however, Sade then has the monk nearly rape her: “My
resistance excited the villain who thereupon was bold enough to show me just
how inflamed his passions were . . . if he did not quite consummate his crime,
then at least he left me bearing marks so unambiguous that I could have no
possible doubts as to the abhorrent nature of his intentions” (Sade, Misfortunes,
139). He then leaves Justine to her fate and “dumbfounded by his sheer
impudence and licentiousness” (Sade, Misfortunes, 140). By acting in a manner
that invites the reader to consider her stupid (how, after all, could she have
expected Antonin to help her after her experience with him at the monastery?),
Sade thus disrupts a potential identification on the part of the reader with either
Antonin (who wants to be as merciless as he?) or Justine (identifying with her
victimhood would make the reader feel as stupid as she). As Dalia Judovitz puts
it,
The reader is trapped, since s/he cannot identify with either
character without a sense of moral complicity with one or the
other side—vice or virtue . . . By compulsively upholding an
ideal standard of behavior, Justine/Sophie invites
transgression. The desiring structure of the text is constituted
around the adventures of virtue, the narration of its consistent
violation. The reader is thus freed from identification with the
discourse of victimization, and made aware of the complicity
involved in the act of reading (177).
96

Jelinek presents her “heroine,” Gerti, in a similar manner. In Jelinek’s case,
however, it is Gerti’s persistent belief in the power of love that gets her into
trouble, particularly when she goes “looking for love” outside of her marriage, a
marriage that has become nothing other than sexual bondage for her. As readers,
we have no way of knowing whether Gerti’s decision to marry Hermann was
based on love or whether it was pure economic calculation, but her affair with
Michael is clearly posited as a misguided search for love. In either case, Jelinek,
like Sade, “categorically refuses to stylize [Gerti] as an absolute victim”
(Ockenfuss, 75). Instead, Gerti is depicted in a manner similar to Sade’s
presentation of Justine, as complicit in her victimization, at least as far as her
treatment by her husband is concerned:
Diese Frau hat sich erst letzte Woche einen Hosenanzug in
der Boutique gekauft . . . Drei neue Pullover versteckt sie im
Schrank, um keinen Anlaß zum Mißtrauen zu geben, sie wolle
mit ihrer blutigen Furche sich einen neuen Wonnemonat
bereiten. Doch sie pflückt nur die gütige Frucht Geld vom
Baum ihres Mannes . . . Das Wirtschaftsgeld wird der Frau
ausgezahlt und mehr! (L, 45). 13

“Only last week the woman bought herself a trouser suit in the boutique . . . Three new
pullovers she’s purchased she hides away in the cupboard, so that she offers no purchase to
mistrust, no occasion for the suspicion that she’s using her bloody groove as a ticket to a month
of pleasures. The fact is that all she picks from the tree of her Man is that goodly fruit, money . . .
The woman’s housekeeping money is paid out to her and more!” (Lust, 39).
13
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While Gerti may be portrayed as complicit in regard to the bargain struck
with her marriage, the text is more ambiguous about her status as a victim in her
attempt to find “true” love through an adulterous relationship with Michael.
This “relationship” begins when she runs away from home drunk and meets a
young student, who offers to take her home, and then half seduces, half rapes
her. After this event, dreams of romance immediately awaken in her and she
views Michael as the man who will save her from her miserable existence, while
he is thinking only of sex:
Noch ehe der Minutenzeiger des Glücks die beiden streichelt,
ist bereits eine Flüssigkeit aus Michael ausgetreten . . . Nichts
weiter. Doch in der Frau, die das Höchste erleben und
erledigen wollte, sind kernlose Werke in Kraft getreten
worden. Ein Quellgebiet ist erschlossen, von dem sie
jahrzehntelang heimlich träumte . . . Und die Frau gehört der
Liebe (L, 116). 14
Just as Justine mistakenly believes those she meets to be virtuous, Gerti persists
in believing she has found love where she has only found sex.
If, however, the reader may be inclined to feel some sympathy for Gerti in
this first encounter with Michael, this sympathy becomes harder to maintain as

“Even before the minute hand of happiness can stroke the two of them, Michael has
emitted a fluid, and that’s it. But, in the woman, nuclear energy is powering her higher. These are
the headwaters of which she’s secretly dreamed for decades . . . This woman belongs to love”
(Lust, 96-7).
14
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the novel progresses. For Gerti, in the same stubborn and misguided fashion as
Justine, continues to believe in Michael as a “knight in shining armor” despite his
less-than-tender treatment of her, which ultimately culminates in a gang rape of
Gerti by Michael and his friends on the ski slope (see L, 195ff and Lust, 159ff).
Finally, she attempts yet again to run away to Michael, as she is unable to resist
her feelings for him: “Zwanglos verstreut sie sich in ihren Gefühlen. Michael:
jetzt gehen wir ihn wieder holen aus seinem Haus, bevor er erkaltet. Gleich wird
diese Frau, von Sinnen getrieben, vor einem fremden Haus heulen, weil niemand
da ist” (L, 213). 15 Once again, just as with Justine, the reader finds her- or himself
confronted with the suspicion that Gerti is just not all that clever; surely,
interpreting a gang rape as a sign of love is not something a wise person would
do?
It is in this refusal of the text to allow the reader to identify with the
heroine where I locate what I earlier called the anti-pornographic impulse found
in both Sade and Jelinek. The strategies that are used at the narrative or plot level
to hinder an identification on the part of the reader with either Justine or Gerti
are further complemented by the form of the texts. Specifically, both authors use
“Free and easily she indulges her feelings. Michael: now we’ll go and fetch him out of
his house before he goes cold. Presently this woman, impelled by her senses, will be howling
outside a strange house because no one’s at home” (Lust, 173).
15
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narrative intrusions, which function to disrupt the “mimetic imaginative
practice” of voyeurism, which, as discussed above, is one of the traditional and
essential elements of the pornographic text.
The function of these narrative intrusions, as Jean Goulemot in his work
on Sade has pointed out, is to
[disrupt] the already unsteady mechanism of erotic
transference. Rather than being seized, as in the pornographic
narrative, with the desire to have an orgasm, the reader is
doomed to listen, reason and keep a cool head. All of this is
quite foreign to the high pitch of excitement to which,
traditionally, the pornographic narrative tries to lead the
reader (“Sadean Novels,” 73).
That the use of this technique of narrative disruption is apparent in the works of
Sade as well as of Jelinek demonstrates the danger of speaking of “pornography”
rather than pornographies when trying to determine Jelinek’s relationship to
these traditions. A thorough discussion of these narrative devices necessitates a
psychoanalytic reading of the way in which they function to preclude
identification on the part of the reader.
As I argued in my discussion of Die Liebhaberinnen (see chapter one),
identification, according to Lacan, takes place in the loci of the imaginary and the
ego. This identification is produced through the “transformation that takes place
in the subject when he assumes an image” (E, 2). In regard to pornography, the
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assumption of an image takes place through an identification with the
protagonist or voyeur figure, drawing the reader or viewer via this imaginary
identification into the erotic scenario through the voyeuristic nature of the text.
Mark Bracher’s discussion of pornography concludes that the “arousal of desire
and the production of jouissance for heterosexual men” (85) 16 is achieved in the
imaginary register in two forms: “1. The image of a woman’s body functioning as
a sexual object, and 2. The image of the desiring male protagonist, functioning as
either alter ego or rival” (85). These two images serve to establish the desiring
subject position 17 of the male heterosexual reader/viewer of pornography
because the subject assumes those images through the act of reading or viewing.
The use of rape is particularly important in terms of establishing the desiring
subject position of the reader/viewer of pornography in the imaginary register,
for, as Bracher goes on to note
the Imaginary other [with whom the reader/viewer
identifies—BB] can also function as the subject of desire,
through being the object of the audience’s identification. This
While Bracher does not make explicit which type of jouissance he is referring to when
using the term “sexual jouissance,” I presume that he means phallic, or what Lacan refers to as
the “jouissance of the Idiot” (S20, 81). For more on the different types of jouissance and their
relationship to Jelinek’s text, see below.
16

I take the term “subject position” from theories of film spectatorship (see, for example,
Heath, “On Suture” (101-07); that the question of the subject’s position is relevant to Jelinek’s
positioning of the reader via the text shall be made evident through my reading of Lust.
17
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form of the desire of the Imaginary other—the desiring body
of the male protagonist as alter ego of the (male) audience—is
present whenever a heterosexual male protagonist is
represented as desiring . . . rape is a powerful instance, for in
presenting an image of the desire of the male body as
monolithic (only one thing can satisfy it) and irrepressible
(nothing can stop it), the rape provides the male audience
with an Imaginary other in whom they can recognize and
consolidate their own sexual desire—such Imaginary
identification being, as Lacan notes, a fundamental way in
which desire comes to be constituted in the first place
(Bracher, 91, emphasis in original).
In addition, rape scenes, which often result in the woman’s involuntary pleasure
of the sexual act, serve to demonstrate hard core pornography’s desire of
“assurance that it is witnessing not the voluntary performance of feminine
pleasure [which can be faked—BB], but its involuntary confession” (L. Williams,
50).
Thus, for example, Walter, the protagonist in the Victorian pornographic
novel, My Secret Life, repeatedly rapes and ravishes women, allowing the (male
heterosexual) reader to identify with Walter and feel that he, too, has aroused
involuntary desire in the women being raped and is himself desired. One
example of many in the novel is Walter’s encounter with a virginal servant
named Jenny. Approximately three chapters are devoted to Walter’s attempts to
wear down Jenny’s resistance to his seduction attempts. At first, he tries simply
talking to her about his marital problems; when this fails, he resorts to bribery
102

with new garters; and finally he reads Fanny Hill to her, in the hope of exciting
her interest through the reading of a pornographic novel (thus we have
pornography within pornography—Walter is positioned simultaneously as
consumer of pornography and as the desiring subject in his own pornographic
narrative). Finally, Walter manages to lure her into bed, where he commits the
deed, which Jenny, despite her earlier protests, enjoys immensely:
I had got her somehow on to the bed, she was helpless . . . I
shoved . . . A mighty straight thrust; and the virginity was
gone at that one effort.
. . . Then I came to my senses; where was I? had she let me, or
had I forced her violently?
. . . She lay still, in the enjoyment of a lubricated cunt,
distended by a stiff, hot prick. Soon she was sensitive to my
moments, her cunt constricted, a visible pleasure overtook
her, her frame began to quiver, and the soft murmurs of
spermatic effusion came from her lips (Anonymous, 192-93).
Afterwards, they look at the illustrations in Walter’s copy of Fanny Hill
again and Jenny emerges as one contented with her fate as Walter’s lover. While
Walter does evince a twinge of conscience (“had she let me. . .?”), the switch to
the description of Jenny’s reaction as one of pleasure serves to reassure both
Walter and the reader that she did really desire Walter sexually, despite her
protests. As he comments in his diary: “After the first fuck she was like a well-
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broken horse; she obeyed me in everything, blushed, was modest, humbled,
indifferent, conquered, submissive” (Anonymous, 195).
In the case of My Secret Life, Walter is positioned less as a voyeur and
more as the subject of desire (and thus object of identification for the reader) that
Bracher describes. Nonetheless, his role as alter ego or subject of desire fulfills
the same function as the voyeur figure and also serves to make the text
pornographic, for he too acts as a mediator who “digests the sexually exciting
material in advance of a reader/viewer in order to stimulate a similar response in
him or her” (Pease, 93). As we have seen, this voyeur or narrator figure functions
in “classic” pornographic texts such as Fanny Hill and My Secret Life to allow the
reader to identify with the erotic scenario. In the artistic (anti-) pornography of
Sade and Jelinek, however, this identification process is disrupted, resulting
(hopefully) in the production of a different type of reading subject, one who
(presumably) has a more critical distance to the text. 18

I add the qualifiers “hopefully” and “presumably” because one can never be sure that
the distancing effects employed by Sade and Jelinek will work, depending as they do on a critical
reader. As Allison Pease notes in her discussion of the use of pornographic tropes in Joyce and
Beardsley: “If a reader is not complicitous with the parodic attitude, unable to understand the
tropes as deconstructed, such technique may work against the agent of parody, for parody
equally highlights its own artifices in such a way that the parodic text becomes a site of
contestation, despite the mutually constitutive nature of such parody” (81-82).
18
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In what follows, I shall focus on two paradigmatic (non-)voyeuristic
scenes from Sade’s and Jelinek’s texts: Justine’s encounter with the aristocrat
Bressac in The Misfortunes of Virtue and the gang rape of Gerti by Michael and his
friends on the ski slope in Lust. The first, Justine’s encounter with Bressac in The
Misfortunes of Virtue, takes place after she has escaped from Dubois and her gang
of thieves. Previously, Dubois had helped Justine escape from prison (where she
had been imprisoned for refusing to help her employer rob his neighbor) by
setting the prison on fire. While grateful to her benefactress for saving her life,
Justine is horrified at the thought of having to “oblige the four lusty lads” (Sade,
Misfortunes, 26) who make up the rest of Dubois’ gang; while the men quarrel
over who gets to ravish Justine first, she makes her escape. Deep in the woods,
she hides herself in a thicket to sleep, and is later awakened by the arrival of
Bressac and his valet, who have come into the woods so that Bressac can
sodomize his valet away from the watchful eyes of his mother. The sound of
their voices awakens Justine and she finds herself an unwilling voyeur to the sex
scene enacted.
Sade, however, presents neither the sex scene, nor Justine’s consumption
of it in a manner that conforms to the standard pornographic scenario. Instead,
Justine views the scene in a way that disrupts the voyeurism one would expect to
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find in a pornographic narrative, first by having Justine interrupt her description
of the scene and secondly by omitting altogether the description of the sex that
she witnesses. In her recounting of the episode to her sister, she states:
They drew near and halted so exactly opposite to me that
nothing of what they said, nothing of what they did escaped
me and I saw. . .
“Great Heavens, Madame,” said Sophie, breaking off her tale,
“can it be possible that fate has always placed me in such
uniformly parlous situations for it to be as testing to ordinary
decency to hear of them as it is for me to describe them? The
horrible offence which outrages both Nature and established
law, the heinous crime upon which the heavy hand of God
has so often descended, I mean that infamy which was so new
to me that I could scarcely conceive of it, was there, before my
very eyes, consummated with all the impure refinements and
dreadful proceedings which the most considered depravity
could inject into it” (Misfortunes, 29).
Here the disruption of the pornographic narrative is complete—the reader is not
even given a description of the sex that has taken place; rather, what we
experience is Justine’s condemnation of it without the use of erotic vocabulary
that we would normally expect to encounter. 19

In his later version of this novel, Justine, or Good Conduct Well Chastised, this scene
becomes more explicit. In her description of the sex act to Juliette, Justine states: “the young
master seemed prepared unhesitatingly to brave the shaft that was presented to him . . . the
infamous creature writhed and struggled under the iron” (Justine, 504). As Goulemot notes,
however, the description of the act in Justine, while specific, “does not satisfy our curiosity
because of a decidedly unrealistic vocabulary; there is nothing but spears, iron shafts. These are
terms that divert or suspend the pornographic effect” (“Sadean Novels,” 68).
19
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Justine, while positioned as voyeur, thus refuses the reader the possibility
of identifying with her voyeurism, resulting in a lack of the two elements
described by Bracher as the means by which the consumer of pornography is
able to obtain an imaginary identification with the pornographic protagonist. For
indeed, here we find neither a woman’s body as sexual object nor an image of a
desiring male protagonist; Justine functions as the subject of the scene, not its
object; and Bressac, while desiring, is excluded from the text by the ellipse that
takes the place of the pornographic narrative one would expect to find in
Justine’s description of the event she witnessed. Instead, the reader is invited to
identify with Justine as a victim of the violence depicted in the text. As Dalia
Judovitz notes:
Sade demonstrates that there can be no exterior or privileged
position for Sophie or, for that matter, the reader as a voyeur
to the scene . . . By identifying with the heroine, the reader
becomes a victim as well, since the act of reading, governed
by the mimetic relation of reader and text, implies the risk of
being marked by the punitive logic of the text. The physical
violence unleashed by the text is thus directed not merely
towards the heroine, but rather at the traditional conventions
that govern the classical novel (177-78).
Finally, Sade’s use of disruptive techniques reveals the complicity of Justine and
the reader in the violence she both observes and experiences:
As an unconscious exponent of popular ideology, Justine
persists in refusing either to reflect or learn from her
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misadventures, or to admit to being marked by competing
negative ideologies . . . Passing from the position of spectator
to that of unsuspecting actor, Justine is shown to be playing
the role of the victim whose innocence becomes the stage for a
trial of complicity (Judovitz, 178).
In identifying with Justine, then, the reader is also forced to become aware
of her/his own complicity in the act of the consumption of pornography. We are
a long way from the uncritical voyeuristic consumption of an erotic scenario
produced for the reader/viewer of “pure” pornography.
Justine’s death at the end of The Misfortunes of Virtue completes the process
of depicting her (and the reader’s) complicitous relationship to the violence of
sexuality. Again, Dalia Judovitz’ reading of Misfortunes is useful:
Justine/Sophie’s death by a thunderbolt . . . reflects her
complicitous relation to popular ideology: her identification
with the order of representation based on conventional moral
principles. She represents the bad reader, the reader who
mistakes the material and signifying levels of the text . . .
Insofar as the heroine herself is a representation of the reader,
it is her bad faith as a reader and good faith as a character that
constitute the plot of the text and the texture of her
misfortunes (181).
This complicity of the heroine and the reader is portrayed even more strongly by
Jelinek in Lust. In comparison with The Misfortunes of Virtue, which alternates in a
fairly stable fashion between Justine’s first-person narration and a third-person
omniscient narrator, the narrative voice in Lust is, as Gertrud Koch has noted, a
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“fragiles literarisches Geschöpf” (135), 20 one that is constantly vacillating
between different narrative positions. This vacillation has the effect, as in Sade
(albeit in a different way), of interrupting the pornographic narrative and
making the reader aware of her/his complicity in the act of reading. To achieve
this effect, Jelinek doubles the voyeuristic gaze of the pornographic text, thereby
deconstructing the traditional voyeuristic position of the reader of pornography:
“Die Dekonstruktion der Vorlagen geschieht mittels Verdoppelung des
männlichgeilen Blickes: wo immer die Sicht auf die nackte Frau frei ist, merkt der
Leser, daß jemand mitschaut, der unbestechlich, meist satirisch das Geschehene
übersieht” (Höfler, “Sexualität,” 106). 21
The description of the gang rape of Gerti by Michael and his friends on the
ski slope shows the vacillating narrative positions and the doubling effect of the
voyeuristic gaze described by Höfler. As it is such an exemplary scene, I shall
quote it at some length before returning to my reading:
Die Buben halten [Gerti] die lebendigen Hände oben über
dem Kopf zusammen. Niemand könnte in dieser Stellung

20

“fragile literary creation” (my translation).

“The deconstruction of the models [of pornography] occurs through the means of
doubling the lecherous male gaze: whenever the gaze is openly turned on the naked woman, the
reader notices that there is someone who watches with him or her, someone who
uncompromisingly, mostly satirically, views the proceedings” (my translation).
21
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seiner Familie über den Bildschirm hinweg zuwinken . . . Das
Seidenkleid wird bis zur Taille hinaufgeschoben und das
Hoserl, mit dem sie zufrieden war, hinunter. Und jetzt kitzeln
wir die Dunkelheit, bis sie krachend über uns
zusammenbricht . . . Jetzt werden also diese Fußlappen, diese
Abtreter, die alle vier unser sind, auseinandergezogen, bis
Gerti aufheult . . . Es ist unglaublich, was man mit den
dehnbaren Schamlippen alles anfangen kann, um sie, als
wär’s ihr Schicksal, in der Form zu verzerren. Man kann sie
z.B. zusammendrehen wie eine spitzige Tüte, und vom
Oberland biegt sich das Gebirge aus Gertis Kleid. Das tut
doch weh, denkt keiner daran? . . .
Haben Sie eben den Donner gehört? Na also, warum treten
Sie dann nicht zurück und lassen mich auch einmal im Video
zornig ihre Geschlechter aufplusternde Menschen anschauen?
...
Tun wir so, als erblickten wir, einander schauend, einen Film,
der einfach einschlägt (einen einschlägigen Film) . . . Und in
Gerti prasselt noch immer ein hübsches Feuer, das durch das
Gestalt einer Meterwurst in ihrem Mund dargestellt wird. Na,
meine Herren und Helden, lassen Sie mich einmal durch den
Sucher schauen, Sie haben doch selber jeder ein spannendes
Glied! (L, 196-97,98 & 202-03). 22

“The lads hold her living hands together above her head. In that position, nobody
could wave to her family via the TV screen . . . The silk dress is shoved up to the waist and the
panties, which she was perfectly satisfied with, are shoved down. And now we’ll tickle the
darkness till it collapses upon us with a crash . . . So now these footcloths, these doormats, all four
of them ours, are parted. Making Gerti howl . . . It’s unbelievable how you can stretch and flex
the labia to change their shape, as if that were what fate intended for them. For instance, you can
pout them into a pointed pouch. And from the higher ground the hills are bowing down from
Gerti’s dress. That hurts, doesn’t that occur to anyone? . . .
22

Did you hear the thunder just now? So why not get out of the way and let me have a look
at the video people wrathfully plumping up their genitals? . . .
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Just in these few pages, the narrative voice fluctuates several times: what
starts out as a seemingly typical voyeuristic narration in the third-person
singular (“Die Buben halten. . .”) changes to the second-person plural (“jetzt
kitzeln wir. . .”), back to the third-person singular, but now with a direct address
to the reader (“Das tut doch weh. . .”), before fluctuating again between the “we”
(“Tun wir so. . .”) and the third-person direct address (“lassen Sie mich einmal. .
.”). The first direct address to the reader is a critical commentary on the
happenings, and disrupts the potential erotic transfer. Rather than describing
Gerti’s pleasure in the sex scene that is taking place, Jelinek points out that the
roughness of the others’ treatment of her causes pain, not pleasure, thus forcing
the reader to reflect on the narrator’s commentary as opposed to simply
consuming an erotic scenario. In addition, the end of this passage demonstrates
the accuracy of Höfler’s claim regarding the doubling of the voyeuristic gaze, as
the narrator turns her (his?) gaze on the consumers of this scene, for they are
now the ones being looked at, rather than simply looking themselves. The
narrator, instead of functioning as a model for the reader to identify with,

Let’s pretend, as we watch each other, that we’re looking at a movie. Really moving . . .
And meanwhile in Gerti a fine fire is still crackling, a whole metre of pork sausage like a fire hose
in her mouth. Well now, gentlemen, heroes all: let me take a look down my sights, and see if you
haven’t all got a cock of your own, cocked and ready to fire!” (Lust, 160-61, 62 & 64-65).
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assumes a critical position, forcing the reader to reflect critically on her or his
own voyeuristic pleasure.
Finally, the references to television and film make it even more clear that
Jelinek is undermining the traditional voyeuristic nature of pornography (in both
its written and visual forms). As Susanne Baackmann has pointed out in her
reading of Lust, the text itself is organized like a pornographic videoclip (180); in
many ways, the structure of Jelinek’s text resembles that of the early “stag films,”
which tended to consist of a “haphazard stringing together of explicit hard-core
scenes” (L. Williams, 63). This technique results in a “radical narrative
discontinuity” as Linda Williams has termed it (63). In the case of Lust, however,
the narrative discontinuity produced by the narrator’s direct address to the
reader about the “film” that she/he is participating in, serves to disrupt the
pleasure involved in forming a “gender-based bond with other male spectators”
(L. Williams, 73), one of the functions of the stag film. Indeed, given that the sex
of the narrator cannot be firmly established (see Baackmann, 182), the genderbased male bonding described by Williams is definitively broken, resulting
instead in a narrative voice, which “schießt ebenfalls über die Immanenz der
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‘traditionellen’ pornographischen Phantasie hinaus. Anstatt den Leser sexuell zu
stimulieren, distanziert sie ihn von der erzählten Handlung” (Baackmann, 181). 23
What we see, then, in Lust is how Jelinek, similarly to Sade in Misfortunes
of Virtue, also disrupts the imaginary identification between the reader and
protagonist that Bracher describes as an important element of pornographic
writing. While Jelinek takes over many of the other elements of the pornographic
narrative, such as the language of obscenity, the endless repetition of the sexual
act, and the permanent erection of the man, her transformation of two of the
most important pornographic conventions, the voyeur figure and insatiable
female desire, 24 does indeed result in Carter’s “moral pornography.” 25 Through
her simultaneous use and transformation of pornographic techniques, Jelinek
becomes precisely the type of moral pornographer as terrorist or sexual guerilla
that Carter describes, especially in her depiction of female sexuality, to which I
now turn.

“goes beyond the immanence of the ‘traditional’ pornographic fantasy. Instead of
sexually stimulating the reader, it [the narrative voice] distances the reader from the action
depicted” (my translation).
23

See Hartwig (249-51) for an analysis of Jelinek’s refusal of the pornographic portrayal
of female desire.
24

25

See above in this chapter for a definition of Carter’s term.
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Female Sexuality and Jouissances
In her discussion of Lust, Ina Hartwig describes the way in which Jelinek’s
text “erzähl[t] höhnisch die Verwechslung des Penis mit dem Phallus” (256, see
also 51-59). 26 While Hartwig discusses this misrecognition in the context of
Jelinek’s critical engagement with Freudian psychoanalysis, referring to Jelinek’s
use of psychoanalytic theory in Lust as “ein psychoanalytisches Theorem après la
lettre” (251), 27 in this section I will discuss the confusion of the penis for the
phallus in relation to pornography, especially filmic pornography (as
exemplified by a “classic” feature-length narrative pornographic film, Deep
Throat [1972], directed by Gerard Damiano). I will also demonstrate how Lacan’s
views of female sexuality and jouissance can be used to illuminate Jelinek’s
critical investigation of the mass cultural form of pornography.
Indeed, it is possible to read Jelinek’s text as an extended meditation on
Lacan’s statement that “the sexual relationship cannot be written” (Lacan, S20,
35), with one important difference, however: while the view of female sexuality
offered in Lust has clear affinities with Lacanian definitions of female sexuality,
26

“mockingly portrays the misrecognition of the penis for the phallus” (my translation).

“a psychoanalytic theory après la lettre” (my translation). Interestingly, Hartwig does
not refer to Lacan in her discussion of Jelinek’s relationship to psychoanalysis, other than in
passing (see 255-56).
27
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Jelinek’s depiction of female sexuality could perhaps best be described as “Lacan
without feminine jouissance.” In other words, whereas Lacan allows some space
for female pleasure and in fact claims that women may have access to a nonphallic jouissance that men do not have, Jelinek’s text repudiates Lacan’s notion of
a “supplementary” jouissance “beyond” the phallus available to women (S20, 7374). Lacan’s use of the term jouissance, like most other Lacanian concepts, shifts
over the years and can be difficult to pin down (See: Evans, “Jouissance,” LevyStokes, “Jouissance,” and Macey, 200-06). It is, however, possible to outline some
basic parameters for my use of the term to illuminate Jelinek’s work.
Translating from the French, jouissance can be rendered literally as
“enjoyment,” “both in the sense of deriving pleasure from something, and in the
legal sense of exercising property rights” (Evans, “Jouissance,” 1). The term has
sexual connotations as well, as it can mean orgasm in French. Lacan’s first use of
the term jouissance can be found in the seminar of 1953-54, where it appears just
twice (S1, 205 & 23) and is used only in relation to Hegel’s dialectic of the master
and the slave. Here Lacan equates jouissance with pleasure, noting the “relation
between pleasure [jouissance] and labour” and notes that “a law is imposed upon
the slave, that he should satisfy the desire and pleasure [jouissance] of the other”
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(S1, 223). Until Seminar IV (1956-57), jouissance meaning simply “pleasure” is
Lacan’s only and infrequent use of the term.
In his early work, Lacan’s notion of jouissance, while not a Freudian term,
has parallels to Freud’s concept of the drive (see Levy-Stokes, “Jouissance,” 102).
After 1957, the sexual connotations of the word move to the forefront, and in
1958, he first uses jouissance to refer explicitly to orgasm (see Evans, Dictionary,
91). Thus, in 1958, Lacan speaks of “masturbatory jouissance,” which he attributes
to the phallic stage and the “imaginary dominance of the phallic attribute” (E,
282).
After 1958, Lacan begins to distinguish between jouissance and pleasure.
This can be found in Seminar VII (1960-61), where Lacan discusses jouissance as
an ethical stance in relation to Kant and Sade. In this phase of his work, jouissance
comes to figure as that which Freud referred to as “beyond” the pleasure
principle or, as Lacan puts it, “jouissance . . . is suffering” (S7, 184). In relation to
Kant’s example of the man who refuses a night of pleasure with a woman if the
price to be paid is death, Lacan remarks that, while that may be true for the man
in pursuit of pleasure, the man in pursuit of jouissance (as Sade’s figures are) will
accept death as the price to be paid for jouissance: “one only has to make a
conceptual shift and move the night spent with the lady from the category of
116

pleasure to that of jouissance . . . for the example to be ruined” (S7, 189). In the
acceptance of death as the price, the subject experiences jouissance, in which
“pleasure and pain are presented as a single packet to take or leave” (S7, 189).
Despite these earlier references, it is not until 1960 that Lacan gives his
first structural account of jouissance. In “Subversion of the Subject,” he posits
pleasure as that which “sets the limits on jouissance” (E, 319). The sacrificing of
jouissance also becomes here, for the first time, a necessary condition for
subjectivity—the subject, by submitting her- or himself to the symbolic order
must sacrifice some jouissance since “jouissance is forbidden to him who speaks”
(E, 319). In this, Lacan rewrites Freud’s theory of the castration complex:
“Castration means that jouissance must be refused” (E, 324). The sacrificed (or
“alienated”) jouissance becomes the object a, that which is the cause of desire but
never attainable.
Finally, in the 1970s, especially in Seminar XX (1972-73), Lacan brings to
the forefront his distinction between masculine and feminine jouissance. While he
had discussed jouissance in conjunction with femininity as early as 1958, it is only
in Encore that Lacan first comes to speak of a qualitatively different type of
feminine jouissance. He posits feminine jouissance against that of the phallic,
termed the “jouissance of the Idiot” (S20, 81). In Encore, Lacan defines phallic
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jouissance (which he sometimes refers to as sexual jouissance) as that which “is
marked and dominated by the impossibility of establishing as such . . . the One of
the relation ‘sexual relationship’” (S20, 6-7). Lacan’s use of the term “One” refers
to mathematical logic (Frege), to the Platonic myth of the lovers’ unity in the
Symposium, 28 and also to the (presumed) unity of the (male) subject in a
philosophical sense. Phallic jouissance is thus seen as a barrier to these forms of
unity. Or, to put it another way, “Phallic jouissance is the obstacle owing to
which man does not come . . . to enjoy woman’s body, precisely because what he
enjoys is the jouissance of the organ . . . Jouissance, qua sexual, is phallic—in
other words, it is not related to the Other as such” (S20, 7 & 9). The term “Other”
here refers both to the linguistic Other (see Dean, “Two Kinds,” 919-20, for more
on the linguistic Other) and to the Other sex, e.g., woman. It is precisely man’s
experience of phallic or sexual jouissance that “covers or poses an obstacle to the
supposed sexual relationship” (S20, 9), because in phallic jouissance, it is man’s
organ and not he as subject who “enjoys.” The phallus thus gets in between the

See chapter one of this dissertation for a discussion of Lacan’s use of Plato’s myth of the
lovers’ unity, as well as Lacan’s Seminar XI, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis (S11,
205).
28
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two sexes presumed to have a relation. 29 This phallic or sexual jouissance ends up
being displaced onto the penis (as a poor substitute for the phallus) and is
dependent on the phallic signifier:
phallic or sexual jouissance . . . being dependent on the phallic
signifier, is completely determined by language . . . This kind
of jouissance . . . is located outside the body; it is attached to
the body only by the slender thread of the sexual organ or the
phallicized image of the bodily form . . . The relation of the
speaking being to jouissance is, therefore, fundamentally
insecure. For the jouissance he can derive from the sexual
relation is never the kind he needs, in the sense that it always
bears witness to the disjunction of the body and the genitals
and constantly poses an obstacle to the establishment of a true
sexual relation between one sex and the other (André, 236-37).
While women have, according to Lacan, access to a jouissance that is
beyond the phallus, men, by virtue of the fact that it is “through the phallic
function that man as whole acquires his inscription” (S20, 79), have to make do
with inadequate phallic or sexual jouissance, one which causes him to be unable
to “attain his sexual partner . . . except inasmuch as his partner is the cause of his
desire” (S20, 80). A further cause of the inadequacy of phallic jouissance is its
It is important to point out here that the terms “male”/”masculine” and
“female”/”feminine” do not, in Lacan, refer to anatomy, but rather to subject positions: “It is a
difference in the relation of the speaking being to jouissance which determines his being man or
woman, not anatomical difference”(Levy-Stokes, “Jouissance,” 105). Or, as Lacan puts it: “One
ultimately situates oneself there [under the sign of the phallic function—BB] by choice—women
are free to situate themselves there if it gives them pleasure to do so. Everyone knows there are
phallic women . . . It is, nevertheless, the phallic function that helps [men] situate themselves as
men and approach women” (S20, 71).
29
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incompatibility with feminine jouissance, thus posing an obstacle to the sexual
relationship.
Feminine jouissance differs from masculine or phallic jouissance through its
relation to the Other, especially the Other sex, which for Lacan means woman.
While in his earlier work, Lacan attributed to women a jouissance associated with
the phallic stage and the clitoris (E, 282), his work of the 1970s moved away from
that position. In particular, Lacan posits for women a specifically feminine
jouissance which is “beyond the phallus” (S20, 74). Women have access to both
phallic, or sexual, jouissance, and also to a supplementary form of jouissance by
virtue of being not wholly subsumed by the phallic function as men are: “being
not-whole, she has a supplementary jouissance compared to what the phallic
function designates by way of jouissance” (S20, 73). It is, however, impossible to
know anything about this other jouissance other than that some women (and
men) experience it. Lacan’s paradigmatic example of feminine jouissance is that of
mystics such as Hadewijch d’Anvers, Saint John of the Cross, and Saint Teresa,
thus relating feminine jouissance to God. As he asks in relation to mysticism:
“Doesn’t this jouissance that one experiences and knows nothing about put us on
the path of ex-sistence? And why not interpret one face of the Other, the God
face, as based on feminine jouissance?” (S20, 77). This specifically feminine
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jouissance (including that of the mystics) is almost always equated with feminine
sexuality in Lacan’s work. More importantly for my discussion of Jelinek’s work
and pornography, “jouissance [in the context of femininity—BB] is to be
understood as the achievement of some form of sexual satisfaction, often (but not
always) equated with orgasm. The distinction between male and female
jouissance thus depends on the assumption that there are distinct forms of sexual
satisfaction for men and women” (Evans, “Jouissance,” 9).
It is these distinct forms of sexual satisfaction that contribute to the
incompatibility of phallic and feminine jouissances, which in turn leads to the
inadequacy of phallic jouissance discussed above. The inadequacy of phallic
jouissance and the incompatibility of phallic and feminine jouissances are,
however, precisely what pornography functions to hide and what Jelinek’s text
exposes. In this respect, Deep Throat is a paradigmatic example of pornography in
that it attempts to portray phallic and feminine jouissances as complementary and
capable of unity.
This is not to claim, as other feminists have, that Deep Throat and other
pornographic films of the 1970s are nothing more than exercises in misogyny
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that have no interest in the question of female pleasure. 30 Indeed, it is possible, as
Laurence O’Toole and others have pointed out, to read Deep Throat’s narrative as
predominantly organized around the question of “female pleasure: the getting of
it, the enjoying of it” (74). At the time of its release (1972), the sexual revolution
was in full swing and many hard core films began to problematize the question
of how to attain better sex. Deep Throat, as a typical film of its era (and the first to
show the “money shot” on a big screen), thus participates in the discourse
around the obtaining of better sex, specifically engaging with the question of
female sexual pleasure: “The ‘problem’ of female sexual pleasure is central to
Deep Throat and many other porn movies of its era. A problem in terms of the
dramatic structure that is in need of fixing, but also a problem in terms of the
search for some kind of visible sign of a solution” (O’Toole, 74). The visible
solution that Deep Throat was the first feature-length pornographic film to offer is
the “money shot” or the displaying of male ejaculation as the narrative
conclusion to a sex number. Further, Deep Throat and other hard core films of the
1970s also insist “that this visual confession of a solitary male ‘truth’ coincides

See, for example: Dworkin, Dworkin and MacKinnon, MacKinnon and Dworkin, and
the essays in Lederer.
30
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with the orgasmic bliss of the female” (L. Williams, 101), thus reinforcing the
notion of male and female sexual pleasure as complementary.
It is the money shot as “solution” to the question of sexual pleasure that
leads to Deep Throat’s central (and for many feminists problematic) plot motive:
the locating of the central female protagonist’s (played by Linda Lovelace)
clitoris in her throat. The plot proper begins with Linda’s complaining to a friend
that she doesn’t enjoy sex, experiencing only a “tingling” when what she had
expected from sex was “bombs bursting in air.” In an attempt to help her,
Linda’s friend invites a number of men to their apartment and a long number 31 of
Linda’s having sex with several men follows. 32 None, however, are able to help
her achieve the orgasm she is seeking, so she finally visits a doctor (played by
Harry Reems). The doctor discovers that Linda’s inability to achieve sexual
satisfaction results from the fact that her clitoris is located in her throat. The

For a discussion of sexual “numbers” in porn films as similar to numbers in a musical
and the way sexual numbers function generically, see Linda Williams (130-34).
31

It is also significant to note here that this scene contains no “money” shot, but focuses
rather on the “meat” shot of early stag films. A “meat” shot is a “close-up of penetration that
shows that hard-core sexual activity is taking place” (L. Williams, 72) and constituted the
narrative closure of a sex number in the stag film. Feature-length hard core films of the seventies,
however, shifted to using the “money” shot instead of the “meat” shot to signify the end to a sex
number and to signify that satisfaction had occurred (for more on the difference between “meat”
and “money” shots, see L. Williams, 72-74). Deep Throat does not contain any “money” shots until
Linda has achieved her goal of sexual satisfaction.
32
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solution? Linda must learn how to perform “deep throat,” a certain technique in
performing fellatio, which the doctor teaches her. Overwhelmed with the feeling
of being satisfied for the first time in her life, Linda proclaims that she wants
nothing more than to marry the doctor and become his “slave.” Instead,
however, he makes a sex therapist of her and sends her out to “treat” a series of
men with various sex problems. The film ends with Linda’s planning to marry
Wilbur, who has a thirteen-inch penis, thus making him the man of her dreams.
While Deep Throat, through its concern with the location of Linda’s clitoris,
does attempt to argue for a notion of women’s pleasure as distinct from that of
men’s, it ultimately fails in its quest as the film is unable to imagine a pleasure
located outside phallic jouissance. Indeed, it is precisely Deep Throat’s obsession
with the clitoris and its assumption that the act of fellatio will be what it takes to
satisfy Linda (solely through clitoral contact) that demonstrates the assimilation
of Linda’s pleasure into a phallic sexual economy, since, as Lacan has noted, the
locating of “jouissance for the woman in the clitoris [thus raises] it to the function
of the phallus” (E, 282). Following Lacan, we can see that Deep Throat’s obsessive
focus on the clitoral pleasures of Linda causes her to remain trapped in the
phallic stage and thus demonstrates the film’s inability to resolve “the
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contradiction between clitoral pleasure and the male inability to imagine female
pleasure outside a phallic regime” (McClintock, 120-21).
In other words, it is the positing of fellatio as the solution to the
incompatibility of masculine and feminine jouissances that most clearly
demonstrates the failure of the sexual relationship, despite the film’s attempt to
convince us that the sexual relationship does exist. Again, I turn to Lacan, who
notes in Encore: “what is known as sexual jouissance is marked and dominated
by the impossibility of establishing as such, anywhere in the enunciable, the sole
One that interests us, the One of the relation ‘sexual relationship’ “ (S20, 6-7). By
relying solely on the money shot, “the most blatantly phallic of all hard-core film
representations” (L. Williams, 95), to depict the jouissance of both Linda and her
partners, Deep Throat thus attempts to establish the “One” that Lacan claims is
impossible. The establishment of the sexual relationship fails through its reliance
on phallic jouissance because “Phallic jouissance is the obstacle owing to which
man does not come . . . to enjoy woman’s body, precisely because what he enjoys
is the jouissance of the organ” (S20, 7). The money shot can thus be seen as
reinforcing Lacan’s claim that phallic jouissance causes the man to enjoy only the
jouissance of the organ and not the woman’s body as the man must withdraw
from the woman in order for the audience to see his ejaculation take place. In this
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way, the money shot, rather than establishing a sexual relationship between the
performers, instead “substitutes for the relation between the actors the more
solitary (and literally disconnected) visual pleasure of the male performer and
the male viewer” (L. Williams, 101).
To conclude my discussion of Deep Throat, I return to the question of the
confusion of the penis for the phallus, which is also demonstrated through the
film’s reliance on the money shot. This reliance on the money shot leads the film,
despite all of its talk about the clitoris to “visually fetishize the penis” (L.
Williams, 112), and to imply that the penis is the phallus. Even Linda’s first
orgasm, during her session with the doctor, is portrayed as a montage of phallic
symbols (bombs bursting, fireworks, and firing missiles). Nonetheless, the film is
not without its anxieties regarding male potency, as is shown through the
doctor’s predicament: near the end of the film, the doctor, who has been
providing “therapy” to both Linda and his nurse throughout the film, ends up in
bed with a bandage around his flaccid penis, unable to keep up with Linda’s
demands for more “deep throat.” As Linda Williams points out, this incident
invokes the “specter of the insatiable woman” (111), whose jouissance cannot be
satisfied by a mere penis.
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In this way, the film acknowledges Lacan’s notion of the incompatibility
of men and women in sexual relations. In Encore, he turns to the story of Achilles
and the tortoise to demonstrate this claim:
Achilles and the tortoise, such is the schema of coming for one
pole of sexed beings. When Achilles has taken his step, gotten
it on with Briseis, the latter, like the tortoise, has advanced a
bit, because she is “not whole,” not wholly his. Some remains.
And Achilles must take a second step, and so on and so forth .
. . It is quite clear that Achilles can only pass the tortoise—he
cannot catch up with it (S20, 8).
Harry Reems, lying in bed with a bandage around his penis, can thus be seen as
Achilles, who is unable to catch up with the tortoise of female desire, as depicted
through Linda’s insatiable need for more and more “deep throat.” The paradox
of Deep Throat thus lies in the manner in which it acknowledges the inadequacy
of phallic jouissance for women, while simultaneously disavowing this
inadequacy through its final solution to Linda’s problem. As pointed out earlier,
the film ends with Linda’s planning to marry Wilbur, the man of her dreams
with a thirteen-inch penis. It is thus the introduction of a “bigger, better penis”
(L. Williams, 111) that solves the problem of Linda’s insatiable desire, thereby
reinforcing the conflation of the penis with the phallus. Wilbur, it seems, unlike
Achilles, is able to catch up to the tortoise with the help of his superior member.
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The problem with Deep Throat, then, lies less with the questions the film
poses, but with the solution it offers insofar as the film is ultimately unable to
imagine female sexual pleasure outside of Freud’s “economy of the one” (see L.
Williams, 133). It is precisely this phallic economy and the confusion of the penis
for the phallus that Lust exposes as incapable of fulfilling or depicting female
sexuality, and her text consistently works to undermine such notions in its
portrayal of female sexuality.
Conclusion: A Pessimistic Pornography Without Pleasure
Just as Jelinek’s text can be seen as in dialogue with the type of
pornography exemplified by Sade’s work, so too can it be viewed as engaging
critically with the type of mass cultural pornography represented by Deep Throat
and other filmic pornography. As Günter Höfler has noted, “Sinnliches Begehren
wird nämlich . . . bei Jelinek als immer schon von Bildern beherrscht angezeigt,
der Mensch ist bei ihr absolut von Medienphantasmagorien und Trivialmythen
abhängig, deren Dominanz in der Pornographie am deutlichsten zutage tritt”
(“Sexualität,” 106-07). 33 To cite just two examples of the way in which

“Sexual desire is always portrayed by Jelinek as determined by images; her characters
are entirely dependent upon media fantasies and mythologies, whose dominance can currently
most clearly be found in pornography” (my translation).
33
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pornographic and other images from mass culture determine the sexuality of
Jelinek’s figures in Lust:
In saftiger Ruhe schiebt der Mann das Bild seiner Frau in den
Schlitz des Betrachters. Schauernd greifen die Wälder nach
dem Haus, in dem die Bilder der Videos, eine bepackte Herde
von Zeugungsfähigen, vor den Augenzeugen über den
Schirm ziehen. An ihren Fesseln werden die Frauen ins Bild
gezerrt, nur ihre tägl. Gewohnheiten sind erbarmungsloser (L,
53). 34
Doch jetzt schon schreit diese Frau nach dem Götterbild
Michael, der ihr auf Fotos, die ihm ähnlich sehen, verheißen
worden ist . . . Wie ist es mit den Damen? Das unvergängliche
Abbild ihrer Vergnügungen gilt ihnen mehr als das
vergängliche Original, das sie früher oder später der
Konkurrenz des Lebens aussetzen müssen . . . Jedes Bild ruht
besser im Gedächtnis als das Leben selbst (L, 118-19). 35
What these two examples demonstrate is the way in which the desires produced
by mass-produced images differ according to gender: while the men in Lust
receive their image of woman as sexual object from pornography, the women

“Juicily, calmly, the man inserts the image of his wife into the slit of the viewer. With a
shudder the woods reach out for the house, where the video images, a herd of creatures capable
of reproduction, are moving across the screen in front of eye witnesses. The women are dragged
into the pictures by their fetters. Only their daily routine is more merciless” (Lust, 45).
34

“But the woman is crying out loud for her idol Michael, long promised her in
photographs that look like him . . . You know how it is with the ladies: the immortal image of
their pleasures means more to them than the mortal original, which sooner or later they will have
to expose to life. To competition . . . Every one of these images is better accommodated in
memory than life itself” (Lust, 98-99).
35
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view the men as the idealized image of men found in romance novels and
magazines.
It is, however, in the sex scenes in Lust where we can most clearly see the
way in which Jelinek’s text both resembles and differs from filmic pornography.
While she does take over certain pornographic conventions such as the cliché of
the man as constantly potent and ready for sex, describing Hermann as “Der
Mann ist immer bereit und freut sich auf sich” (L, 16), 36 her text does not
participate in hard core’s main organizing fantasy of the “assurance that it is
witnessing not the voluntary performance of female pleasure, but its involuntary
confession” (L. Williams, 50). Rather, female pleasure is depicted as a void, as
something that does not exist; instead of the compatibility of male and female
pleasure that Deep Throat offers, Lust contains sex scene after sex scene in which
phallic jouissance is shown as incapable of satisfying women. One of the sex
scenes between Gerti and Michael demonstrates this incompatibility quite
clearly:
Gerti spricht von ihren Gefühlen und bis wohin sie ihnen
folgen möchte. Michael staunt, langsam erwachen, was für
eine Hand ihm da ins Geschoß gefallen ist. Sofort möchte er
wieder herumknallen, schiebt die Hand weg and zeigt seinen
36

“The Man is perpetually ready to go. Greedy for his pleasure. To pleasure himself”

(Lust, 15).
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fesselnden Riemen. Er zerrt die Frau an den Haaren herüber,
bis sie wie ein Vogerl darüber flattert. Gleich will die Frau,
aus der Geschlechtsnarkose erwacht, wieder zügellos den
Mund zum Sprechen benutzen. Sie muß sich statt dessen
aufsperren und den Schwanz Michaels in das Kabinett ihres
Mundes einlassen (L, 120). 37
What we see in this passage is how Michael’s jouissance is a phallic one
insofar as he relates to Gerti as that which Lacan “refers to as object a, that partial
object that serves as the cause of desire: our partner’s voice or gaze that turns us
on, or that body part [in this case, Gerti’s mouth—BB] we enjoy in our partner”
(Fink, Letter, 159). Gerti, on the other hand, attempts to speak, which is
simultaneously an attempt to achieve feminine or Other jouissance, as the
“satisfaction of speech” (S20, 64) is part of the ineffable feminine jouissance that is
opposed to phallic jouissance. Lacan goes so far as to claim that “to speak of love
is in itself a jouissance” (S20, 83); it is precisely this feminine jouissance of speech,
however, that Gerti is denied through Michael’s act of inserting his penis into her
mouth at precisely the moment she wishes to speak. We can thus see how in Lust

“Gerti speaks of her feelings and how far she’d like to follow them. Michael gapes as he
realizes what he’s landed. Time to get out the rod and go fishing again. He hauls the woman
round by the hair till she’s flapping above him like a great bird. The woman, awoken from the
sedation of sex, is about to use her gob for uninhibited talking, but while it’s open Michael can
think of better things to do with it and shoves his corncob in, amazing” (Lust, 99-100).
37
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the act of fellatio functions, in contradistinction to Deep Throat, to suppress rather
than enhance woman’s pleasure.
This refusal to portray feminine pleasure or jouissance, along with the
unmasking of pornography’s failure in regard to female sexuality, is what makes
Jelinek’s text pessimistic pornography, at least in regard to its views on female
sexuality for what her text demonstrates is that it is women’s sexuality that
pornography as a genre does not symbolize. What Lust instead portrays is the
material effects of the inability to symbolize women and their pleasure.
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CHAPTER 3
PORTRAIT OF THE ARTIST AS A (NOT-SO-)YOUNG PERVERT: PIANOS,
PERVERSION, SUBLIMATION, AND THE KÜNSTERLERROMAN IN DIE
KLAVIERSPIELERIN
Sie hat Kenntnis von der Sonatenform und dem Fugenbau. Sie ist Lehrerin in
diesem Fach. Und doch: ihre Pfoten zucken dem letzten, endgültigen Gehorsam
sehnsüchtig entgegen.
(Elfriede Jelinek, Die Klavierspielerin, 106)1
Introduction
Die Klavierspielerin (English title: The Piano Teacher [1983]) relates the story
of Erika Kohut, piano teacher at the Vienna Conservatory, her development as a
(perverse) sexual subject, and her ultimate failure to achieve a stable sexual
position. In Lacanian terms, a sexual position as “male” or “female” is not related
to biology or identification with the mother or father (as it was for Freud); rather,
it is the “relationship with the phallus which determines sexual position” (Evans,
Dictionary, 178). Developing a stable sexual identity is difficult for both sexes, but
especially so for women, since, as Lacan notes, women face a “detour”
(identification with the father) in their path through the Oedipal complex (see

“She knows about the form of the sonata and the structure of the fugue. That’s her job,
she’s a teacher. And yet, her paws ardently grope toward ultimate obedience” (PT, 102).
1
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Evans, Dictionary, 179, and Lacan, S3, especially chapters XII and XIII on the
hysteric’s question. I discuss this in more detail below in this chapter).
In other words, for Lacan, as for Jelinek, becoming a “woman” is no easy
process. Indeed, Die Klavierspielerin (and the later novel Lust; see chapter 2 for
more on Lust) can in some respects be read, as Allyson Fiddler has noted, as a
“putting-into-practice or fictional working-through and problematising of
psychoanalytic theories of gender and subjectivity” (Rewriting, 160). That Die
Klavierspielerin dramatizes Erika’s failure to achieve a stable “feminine” sexual
identity has been frequently commented upon. 2
What has been less commented on in Jelinek scholarship, however, is
Erika’s training as a pianist as a possible causal factor of her perversions and lack
of sexual identity. 3 Indeed, at first glance, the fact that Erika is a pianist seems to
be unrelated to her lack of a stable sexual position and her perverse sexuality,
which manifests itself in various ways, including voyeurism, fetishism, and
masochism. Discussions of the novel have instead tended to focus on the mother-

See Mahler-Bungers’ article, where she writes: “Es gelingt ihr [Erika] nicht, eine
weibliche Identität zu finden” (80) [“Erika is unable to achieve a feminine identity” (my
translation)]. Others who also make this point are Hedwig Appelt (118-21), Allyson Fiddler
(Rewriting, 135ff) and Marlies Janz (72ff).
2

3

For an exception, see Appelt (119-20).
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daughter relationship as the primary determinant of Erika’s perversion and
unstable sexual position. 4
In this chapter, however, I argue that Erika’s training as a pianist, the
piano’s role as a “symbol of social behavior and social distinction” (Parakilas, 5),
the history of its central role in the education of girls, and the use of pianos to
represent female sexuality in literature are all inseparable from Jelinek’s

See, for example: Critchfield, Fiddler, Rewriting, Janz, Kecht, Klages, Kosta, “Inscribing,”
and Kosta, “Muttertrauma”). Many of these discussions employ psychoanalytic feminist object
relations theory (for example, the work of Jessica Benjamin and Nancy Chodorow) as their
theoretical framework and thus focus on the pre-Oedipal mother-daughter bond and Jelinek’s
critique of the institution of mother hood. Thus Barbara Kosta concludes that “Jelinek breaks into
the sacrosanct territory of motherhood and critically exposes its cultural standing” (Kosta,
“Inscribing,” 231) While I agree with many of the conclusions regarding motherhood that Kosta
and others employing a feminist object relations framework draw, I find a Freudian/Lacanian
framework ultimately more convincing as Jelinek’s figures can be viewed as also “exposing the
fiction of subjectivity upon which a patriarchal social order is founded,” as Richard Allen (50)
describes Lacan’s project. Conversely, feminist object relations relies on a conception of the
subject as one possessing a coherent ego, a fiction that Jelinek (like Lacan) rejects.
4

For discussions of Die Klavierspielerin from a Freudian/Lacanian perspective, see: Appelt,
Lücke, Wright, “Aesthetics,” and Wright, Speaking Desires. Also, Mahler-Bungers offers a reading
of Die Klavierspielerin that views mourning for the lost father as one of the central structuring
elements of the text, while Jelinek offers an autobiographical psychoanalytic reading in her
interview with Adolf-Ernst Meyer (Jelinek, Heinrich, and Meyer, 51-52). In addition to
psychoanalysis, other perspectives used by scholars to read Die Klavierspielerin include film
theory (Wilke and Maltzan); Marxist (DeMeritt and Young); Deleuzian (Berka, Fiddler, Rewriting,
and Kosta, “Inscribing”); autobiographical (Barthofer, Critchfield, Meyer, and Swales); and as
demythification in the Barthian sense (Brunner, Doll, Hanssen, and Janz). Another popular
approach is the discussion of musical discourse and intertexts (see, for example, Doll, 86-99; Janz,
and Solibakke). Ma , Riemer , Wigmore (“Sex”), and Wood also discuss the role of music in
Haneke’s film. For discussions of the role of music in general in Jelinek’s works, see Fuchs and
Janke, “Elfriede Jelinek und die Musik.”
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representation of Erika as a perverse subject and her failure to achieve a stable
sexual position.
My analysis of the relationship between Erika’s perversion and her piano
playing thus also makes it possible to read Die Klavierspielerin in generic terms as
an anti-Künstlerroman. For if Erika’s story is on the one hand the story of the
“failings of feminine desire,” it is simultaneously the story of her inability to
sublimate, to use the piano as an “artistic outlet beyond perverted obsessions
and behaviors” (Sjöholm, 151). In this way, Erika’s story deviates from the
traditional Künstlerroman by demonstrating the similarities (and differences)
between the artist and the pervert.
By addressing the role of the piano and the generic aspects of Die
Klavierspielerin, this chapter fills an important gap in Jelinek scholarship. To my
knowledge, the only scholar to discuss the piano’s role in Erika’s development as
a perverse subject is Hedwig Appelt, and her treatment of the subject is relatively
short (118-21). Similarly, while many scholars (see footnote 4 in this chapter)
stress the importance of a Freudian or Lacanian psychoanalytic reading for
Jelinek’s text, few engage Lacan’s work in a significant way (for exceptions, see
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Appelt, Lücke, Wright, “Aesthetics,” and Wright, Speaking Desires) 5 and none
discuss the structural similarities between perversion and sublimation. Finally,
while a few scholars (Bandhauer, Fiddler, Rewriting, Hanssen, and Wigmore,
“Power”) mention Die Klavierspielerin’s status as an anti-Künstler or –
Bildungsroman, no scholar offers a sustained reading of the text in generic terms.
My hope for this chapter is that it advances scholarly discussion of Die
Klavierspielerin by tying together the seemingly disparate threads of the novel.
The Androgynous Piano: Women’s Piano Playing as Feminine and Masculine
Piano historians date the invention of the pianoforte to 1700, with the first
such instrument built in Italy by Bartolomeo Cristofori. Scholarship on the
history of the piano generally falls into three areas: the technological
development of pianos; performance, pedagogy, and repertoire; and the social
history of the piano. 6 In this section, I will focus on social histories of the piano,

For this reason I have found the scholarship on Michael Haneke’s film adaptation of
Jelinek’s novel generally more useful than the scholarship on the novel. Scholars whose work has
been particularly influential in my reading of Die Klavierspielerin are Champagne, Restuccia,
Wyatt, and Wrye. None of these scholars address the question of sublimation, however, and only
one briefly discusses Erika’s role as a pianist (see Champagne), while another notes the film’s
connection to an “ever-expanding cycle of piano films,” that use the piano “as a locus of the
thwarted, muted, and repressed desires of female pianists” (Ma, 297).
5

For the history of the technological development of the piano, see the following: Cole,
Dolge, Ehrlich, Good, Harding, Parakilas (especially chapter two), Pollens, Rowland (chapters 13), and J.-P. Williams.
6
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in particular the following four elements that that social history emphasizes:
music as a female accomplishment and its role in the domestic life of the
bourgeois family; the importance of piano playing in the development of a
certain type of middle-class femininity; the piano’s role in courtship (focusing
especially on upward mobility through marriage and female visual display); and
the “masculine” nature of female concert pianists (e.g., those whose playing took
place in the public sphere versus the private). Another important topic for the
social history of the piano and one that this chapter shall only briefly touch on is
the history of visual and literary representations of the piano and its (female)
players. 7

For histories of performance, pedagogy, and repertoire, see: Citron, Dahlhaus, Gramit,
Czerny, Grover, Letňanová, Reich, “European Composers,” Rowland (chapters 7-12), Todd
(chapters 2-11), and Weitzmann. Note that this list focuses primarily on the nineteenth-century as
that is the century during which the piano, became, in Leon Plantinga’s term “the instrument of
the century” (1, Laura Vorachek also borrows this term for the title of her article on pianos and
female sexuality). For a feminist perspective on music pedagogy in Germany, see Rieger .
The literature on the social history of the piano and/or music is vast, but some of the
more important sources are: Burgan, Davis, Ellis, Gramit, Cultivating Music, Green, Hanson,
Hildebrandt, Hoffmann, Laing, Leppert, Music and Image, Leppert, Sight of Sound, Loesser,
Parakilas, Post, Ritchie, Sabin, Smith, Solie, and Vorachek.
See, for example: Mary Burgan, whose article on women and music in nineteenthcentury fiction is still considered the standard work on the topic of literary representations ; and
Parakilas (75-80). Other scholars who investigate literary, visual, and filmic representations of
female piano players include Laing, who discusses the representation of female musicians in the
“woman’s film” (chapter 4), Leppert, whose work focuses almost exclusively on visual
representation (Music and Image; and Sight of Sound), Sabin (chapter 3), and Vorachek .
7
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While pianos were still not widespread by the late 1760s, piano historians
credit the dramatic rise in the popularity of pianos in the years between 1770 and
1830 to Muzio Clementi and his “Piano Revolution” (Ehrlich, 13-20, and
Parakilas, 64-109). Clementi, unlike child prodigies such as Mozart, was a
virtuoso to whom the public could relate as he demonstrated what James
Parakilas terms “what an ordinary mortal could achieve by hard work” (66). He
also anticipated the split between public and private piano-playing that would
become especially important for female players (see below) and significantly
influenced the expansion of the market for pianos (Parakilas, 66-70).
One of the earliest histories of the piano was published in 1897 by C. F.
Weitzmann. This history focused primarily on the public nature of pianos and
piano-playing, looking at the instrument’s development and different styles of
piano-playing, primarily focusing on male composers and virtuosi (Beethoven,
Chopin, Liszt, R. Schumann, etc.; see Weitzmann). Rosamund Harding’s detailed
history of the piano and its technical development, published in 1933, similarly
had little to say about the piano’s domestic nature and its social history. These
piano histories tended, as Cyril Ehrlich notes, “to distort our view of the piano’s
development . . . In its golden age [the piano] became the centre of domestic
entertainment, of musical education and achievement and, not least, a coveted
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possession, symbolic of social emulation and achievement” (9). This limited view
of the piano’s history began to change, however, with Max Weber’s short work
“The History of the Piano,” first published in 1921, and in which Weber describes
the piano’s “musical nature” as that of a “bourgeois domestic instrument”
(Selections, 382). 8
The piano’s “musical nature” was not only class-based, however, but was
also gendered female. The first piano historian to systematically look at the
relationship between women and pianos was Arthur Loesser, who notes in his
Men, Women and Pianos, published in 1954, that “the history of the pianoforte and
the history of the social status of women can be interpreted in terms of one
another” (267). Loesser’s work formed the basis for future social histories of the
piano focusing on what Richard Leppert terms the “multiple and complex”
connections between women and the piano in the nineteenth century (Sight of
Sound, 119), connections that feminist scholars in particular have emphasized
and elaborated.
It was feminine piano playing that led to the piano’s rise in prominence in
late eighteenth-century musical life, as playing the piano became a necessary
Similarly, Weber describes the piano’s “peculiar nature” as a “middle-class home
instrument” The Rational and Social Foundations of Music, written between 1910-11 and published
in 1921 (Music, 124).
8
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accomplishment for white, middle- and upper-class women in Western Europe.
Women’s piano playing served a variety of purposes from attracting a husband
and demonstrating economic status, to functioning as a site onto which the
desire of middle-class women could be displaced (cf. Vorachek, 27ff; also see
Solie, chapter three, “ ‘Girling’ at the Parlor Piano,” for a useful overview of the
various purposes the piano served in women’s lives). 9
For the middle-class, learning to play the piano became an essential skill
for girls, as it was believed to “provide discipline, diversion, and a skill that
would help her attract a husband” (Vorachek, 26; see also Ritchie, chapter one,
“Discipline, Pleasure, and Practice,” for more on the role of discipline in piano
playing). Further, the piano was viewed as an appropriate instrument for women
(unlike, say, the flute or cello) due to its association with the “motionlessness”
considered to be the proper position for women’s bodies (Hoffmann, 42-43, and
Sabin, 31-35). As Arthur Loesser points out:
A girl could finger a . . . pianoforte with her feet demurely
together, her face arranged into a polite smile . . . and be an
outward symbol of her family’s ability to pay for her
education and decorativeness, of its striving for culture and
the graces of life, of its pride in the fact that she did not have
to work and that she did not “run after” men (65).

9

For further details, see Hoffmann, Sabin, Parakilas, and Vorachek.
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Playing the piano was thus a way of signaling a certain type of middleclass femininity, one that demonstrated the family’s wealth and its daughters’
virtuousness. This display could also lead to social mobility as young women’s
piano-playing skills could be used to improve her status by marrying well
(Burgan, 56, and 60-61, Parakilas, 178, and Sabin, 43-45).
The quest for upward mobility through marriage meant that women’s
accomplishment at music became an important part of courtship, a time during
which a young woman was “simultaneously and continuously under the
scrutiny of both suitor and parents” (Parakilas, 79). The piano served a mediating
function between the worlds of suitor and parents since the “domestic piano,
although it was one of her means of seduction, was firmly planted in the center
of her parents’ house or some other home where members of the older
generation could supervise her seducing” (Parakilas, 79; see also Sabin, Solie, and
Vorachek).
In the safety of the salon, young women could flirt without danger while
playing the piano. One scholar of the history of women and pianos, Stefana
Sabin, describes the interaction of male suitor and female piano player as the
“primal situation” of bourgeois heterosexual interaction, one with the ultimate
goal of finding a husband for the daughter of the family. As she notes:
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Eine junge Frau am Klavier, den Blick auf den Tasten gesenkt
. . . daneben stehend ein junger Mann, der sie bewundernd
anschaute . . . – das war sozusagen die bürgerliche Ursituation
der Geschlechterinteraktion. Der Salon war ein geschützter
Ort, in dem die höhere Tochter – und ihre Eltern – sich nach
einem Ehemann umsehen konnten (43). 10
Importantly, it is the piano that is the symbol of both the daughter’s desire for
courtship and the quest for a husband.
Other scholars stress the importance of Jane Austen’s work for
representing the role of the piano in courtship (see, for example, Burgan, Salwey,
and Vorachek; also see Leppert, Music and Image, for a discussion of the
importance of the representation of female piano players and their male suitors
in eighteenth-century painting). Yet another piano historian, James Parakilas,
cites a scene from Jane Austen’s novel Pride and Prejudice as an example of just
such supervised seduction. During a visit to Lady Catherine’s home, Elizabeth
plays the piano for Darcy and his relative Colonel Fitzwilliam; as her playing
progresses, she and Darcy become so engrossed in conversation that Elizabeth
ceases to play, with the following result: “Here they were interrupted by Lady

“A young woman sitting at the piano, with her gaze directed to the keyboard and a
young man by her side, gazing admiringly at her . . . – that was the primal situation for bourgeois
sexual interactions. The salon was a protected place, where middle-class daughters – and their
parents – could search for a husband”(my translation).
10
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Catherine, who called out to know what they were talking of. Elizabeth
immediately began playing again” (Austen, 157).
Despite (or perhaps because of) such supervision, the piano became, as
Laura Vorachek notes, “a sexual symbol at almost the same moment it became a
symbol of middle-class domesticity” (31). What piano playing enabled for
middle-class women was an acceptable means of visual display in the privacy of
their homes, as well as a suitable way for their suitors to indulge in voyeurism,
something that is also made clear in the Austen scene cited above:
[Darcy] walked away from [Lady Catherine], and moving
with his usual deliberation towards the piano forte, stationed
himself so as to command a full view of the fair performer’s
countenance. Elizabeth saw what he was doing, and at the
first convenient pause, turned to him with an arch smile
(Austen, 155).
That such visual display and voyeurism were intended outcomes of
women’s domestic 11 piano playing has also been commented on by piano
historians who note changes in piano design over the course of the nineteenth
century, including pianos decorated with hunting scenes (clearly intended for
men), as well as the development of the small, upright piano, which enabled the

The expected outcomes and connotations of visual display for female professional
pianists differed significantly from those associated with domestic playing, as we shall see below.
11
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performer to be seen more easily than the tall upright did (see Leppert, Sight of
Sound, 119-51, and Vorachek, 31).
There was, however, a contradiction at the heart of the history of
femininity and piano playing. For if the piano in the nineteenth century was a
symbol of middle-class femininity, it simultaneously represented gender
ambiguity through its connection to the public sphere and virtuosi, as many
scholars have argued. While the majority of amateur pianists were female and
confined to the private sphere of domesticity, the piano was, as Laura Vorachek
and other scholars have argued, “also a public instrument during the nineteenth
century, most notably used by the increasingly popular international concert
virtuosi” (Vorachek, 29; see also Ellis, Green, Parakilas, and Post).
While these public virtuosi were (mostly) male, 12 changes in pedagogical
practice over the course of the nineteenth century encouraged young girls
learning the piano to nonetheless identify with them, as James Parakilas has
pointed out. Parakilas uses the term “domestic virtuosi” to refer to female
amateurs for whom the amount of practice time recommended matched that
undertaken by male pupils preparing for a public career as a pianist. In the late
Famous exceptions to the rule of male virtuosi were Marie Pleyel, Sophie Bohrer, and,
of course, Clara Schumann. For more on both female professional pianists and Clara Schumann,
see below.
12
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eighteenth century, piano teachers recommended a few hours per week of
practice time for those learning the piano for pleasure, as opposed to three to
four hours per day (in addition to a daily one hour lesson) for those preparing to
be professional pianists. Over the course of the nineteenth century, however, this
distinction all but disappeared (Parakilas, 115), thereby creating gender
instability by teaching girls to be virtuosi, despite their being simultaneously
discouraging them from becoming so.
This discouragement was given by the same people encouraging girls to
spend long hours practicing, namely piano masters themselves (Parakilas, 11922). Parakilas uses Carl Czerny 13 as an example of such a piano master, pointing
out that Czerny, in his Letters to a Young Lady, on the Art of Playing the Pianoforte
writes: “Many pupils . . . who ought to practise for years studies and easy and
appropriate pieces, have the presumption to attempt Hummel’s concertos or
Thalberg’s fantasias!” (Czerny, 48; see also Parakilas, 119-21). As Parakilas goes on
to state, Czerny’s concern here is to uphold “artificial gender distinctions to
maintain the power of men in a field that otherwise would have soon been

Czerny (1791-1857) was an Austrian piano player and teacher. A child prodigy, he
studied with Clementi and Beethoven and in turn, he became Lizst’s teacher. He composed over
1,000 pieces, but is best known for his etudes and drill pieces, which are still used for piano
teaching. For more on Czerny, see (Gramit, Czerny, and Wehmeyer).
13
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dominated by women” (Parakilas, 121). 14 In other words, while it may have been
in Czerny’s and other piano teachers’ (financial) interest to encourage girls to
undertake a time-consuming course of lessons and practice, their need to
maintain male superiority led them to attempt to prevent women and girls from
becoming too skilled or encroaching on male turf by playing virtuosic pieces.
As scholars such as Mary Burgan and Katherine Ellis have made clear, one
result of the above was that the female pianist was viewed by her (male) critics as
ambiguously gendered should she gain too much skill (see Burgan, Ellis, Green,
and Post). Burgan discusses the ways Victorian literature depicts female pianists
with a high skill level, noting that “those women who are depicted as conscious
artists tend to be ‘performers’ through and through, seeking an unseemly
domination over their masculine audiences” (Burgan, 63). Further, female
concert pianists were evaluated according to notions of what constituted
“proper” feminine display and skill and were often judged harshly if their
playing was too “masculine” due to its disruption of gendered mores. As
Katharine Ellis explains, “a woman pianist performing operatic fantasies and

It should be noted here that there were other reasons for encouraging girls to spend
long hours practicing, one of the most popular being the belief that such practice would result in
moral discipline. See below in this chapter for more on the role of discipline in women’s piano
playing.
14
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other virtuoso pieces in Paris’s concert halls provided a direct challenge to such
behavioral codes by making a spectacle of herself . . . any public performance by
a woman raised questions about her personal conduct” (361).
As noted above, feminine visual display as part of a courtship ritual was
an accepted part of domestic piano playing, while the display associated with a
female professional pianist was viewed more skeptically. As Lucy Green has
argued, female performers are always “to some extent close to being thrown into
a world of feminine sexual display,” resulting in an affirmative of the female
performer’s “discursive position as feminine” (26). In other words, what female
performers (whether in the domestic or public realms) cannot escape is their
femaleness. The ways in which that femininity is interpreted vary, however,
according to whether we are viewing a private or public performance, and
whether an instrument is involved in the performance.
Thus Green argues that female singers are received as “affirmative of
femininity” (28), whereas the presence of an instrument means that women
instrumental soloists are viewed as interrupting femininity (52ff). 15 As she goes
on to point out:

Note, however, that Green views women pianists in domestic settings as affirming
their femininity: “in an early nineteenth-century domestic setting . . . a woman pianist would
15
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the act of instrumental performance by women threatens a
disintegration of some of the fundamental characteristics of
femininity . . . The display she enacts, rather than that of a
playful or alluring singing bird, is that of a more controlled
and rational being who appears capable of using technology
to take control over a situation . . . women’s instrumental
performance threatens to break out of patriarchal definitions
and offer a femininity which controls, a femininity which
alienates itself in an object and impinges on the world (54).
The result of this interruption of femininity is that the women enacting it are
viewed as masculine women (see Ellis, 362). 16
Excursus: Clara S.
The most famous female professional pianist of the nineteenth century
was, of course, Clara Schumann. In regard to Jelinek, Clara Schumann is also the
title character of Jelinek’s play Clara S. First performed in 1982, Clara S. can, in
many ways, be viewed as an étude for Die Klavierspielerin, treating similar themes

have given rise to display-delineations that were to all intents and purposes just as affirmative as
those of a woman singer” (52).
Such masculinizing of female musicians was commonplace. For other discussions of
the phenomenon, see Jennifer Post, who points out that “Until recently, women involved in
public performance were regarded by others and viewed themselves as unique. Their
performances were seen as exceptional. In fact, women were sometimes not identified as
women” (45). Similarly, Heather Laing’s study looks at the treatment of female musicians in
classic Hollywood film, and she also finds that “The difficulty of characterizing the female
musician, particularly in the face of her performance, therefore often leads to representations that
deny the woman as a musician and/or as a ‘woman’ . . . In The Great Lie, renowned concert pianist
Sandra (Mary Astor) is characterized as monstrously selfish and unfeminine, devoid of humility,
sympathy and, most heinous of all, the maternal instinct” (107).
16
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such as the difficulties faced by women artists, the (over)identification with a
parent (in Clara’s case, the father; in Erika’s, the mother), the “love triangle”
(Clara/Schumann/Wieck; Erika/Klemmer/Mother), and the unstable gendering
caused by success in the “male” profession of professional pianism. 17 In this
section, I will extend the discussion begun above regarding the ambiguous
gendering of female professional pianists (including Clara), turning then to
Jelinek’s portrayal of Clara Schumann in her play, before moving on to a
discussion of the piano and sexual difference in Die Klavierspielerin.
The gender ambiguity found in portrayals of female professional pianists
took place not only in contemporary descriptions of Clara Schumann, but is also
present in the scholarship on her life and work. All biographies of Clara
Schumann published prior to Nancy Reich’s book Clara Schumann: The Artist and
the Woman (first edition, 1985) were based on one source: Berthold Litzmann’s
Clara Schumann: Ein Künstlerleben, which was authorized by the family and
published between 1902 and 1908 (for details on Litzmann’s book and his
That Jelinek was also drawing on Clara Schumann’s life story when writing Die
Klavierspielerin seems clear, given the similarities between Wieck’s domination of Clara and
Mother Kohut’s domination of Erika. Jelinek’s Clara explicitly links the two: “Meine Intensität als
deutsche Pianist kommt ausschließlich aus einer heftigen anfänglichen Kindheitsdissonanz!”
(“CS,” 93) [“I owe my intensity as a German pianist to violent dissonance in childhood!” (Clara,
410)].
17
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sources, see Reich, “Clara Schumann,” Reich, Clara Schumann, and Reich and
Burton). 18 According to Reich, Litzmann’s biography and the subsequent
scholarship based on it portrayed Clara as
(1) a devoted wife and mother, (2) a “consecrated, loyal
priestess,” (3) a figure in a great romance with Robert
Schumann, or (4) a party to a “passionate friendship” with
Brahms (Reich, “Clara Schumann,” 252).
At the same time, however, as both Jennifer Caines and Reich have
demonstrated, Clara was viewed by contemporaries as an artist who transcended
the female roles described by Litzmann.
In her article on representations of Clara in nineteenth-century concert
reviews, Caines looks at Eduard Hanslick’s review of Clara’s Viennese concerts
held in 1856. She points out that Hanslick “unquestionably associates Clara with
masculinity, rather than femininity,” citing several examples from his review
(Caines, 40-44). Indeed, Hanslick goes so far as to explicitly compare Clara to
other male pianists of the time, declaring her superior: “she rather shames the
brilliant virtuosi of our time, by the masculinity of her playing” (Qtd. in Caines,
40). In her feminist biography of Clara, Nancy Reich cites Clara’s contemporaries
to support her claim that Clara may well have been able to transcend her sex in

18

For a “post-Reich” biography of Clara Schumann, see Kühn.
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some ways: “to male musicians of her own age or older . . . she was a
professional colleague above gender” (Clara Schumann, 190). She also notes,
however, that Clara herself often found her roles as artist and woman conflicting,
writing that “Always accepted by her male colleagues as one of them, Clara
Schumann nevertheless remained sensitive to prevailing attitudes toward
women” (Reich, “Clara Schumann,” 275). Robert Schumann also had, according
to Peter Ostwald, a “highly ambivalent attitude toward her femininity” (26) 19
The contrast between Clara Schumann’s status as “honorary man” in her
public career and woman in her private life is also explored in Reich’s biography.
Raised and educated like a boy by her father, Friedrich Wieck (Caines, 34-35; see
also Reich, Clara Schumann, 15 and 21), Clara experienced something of a crisis as
her marriage to Robert drew near, and Reich notes that Robert began to press her
to abandon her role of artist for that of wife, as indicated in his letters to her:
I have just read in your letter, “If I stay in Dresden for a year,
I’ll be forgotten as a musician” – Klärchen, you’re not really
serious – and if you were forgotten as musician, won’t be
loved as a wife? . . . you should forget the musician the first
year of our marriage; you should live for no one but yourself
and your house and your husband, and just wait and see how
I make you forget the musician – no, the wife is more
As evidence of this ambivalence, Ostwald cites the following quote from one of
Robert’s letters to Clara: “I often think of you, not as brother [might think] of sister, or as a boy of
his girlfriend, but as a pilgrim at a distant shrine” (Qtd. in: Ostwald, 26).
19
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important than the musician, and my fondest wish will have
been fulfilled if I can get you to have nothing more to do with
the public (Schumann, 2: 246, emphasis in original; see also
Reich, Clara Schumann, 67-69).
Robert Schumann, it seems, understood that the “feminine” role of wife might
well require Clara’s sacrifice of her “masculine” public role. 20 It is precisely this
tension between Clara’s roles as artist and woman, as well as the myth of Clara
created by Litzmann and other biographers that Jelinek’s play addresses.
In her play, Jelinek takes on the gender confusion caused by Clara’s
multiple roles, when she has her Clara state:
Wenn sich die Fähigkeiten der Frau über die Norm der Zeit
hinaus entwickeln, dann entsteht eine Monstrosität. Sie ist ein
Verstoß gegen die Eigentumsrechte dessen, dem sich das
Weibstier zur Verfügung zu halten hat. Der Geist der Frau
gehört . . . der Erfindung von Neuspeisen und der
Abfallentfernung (CS, 118). 21
Jelinek’s Clara also points out the roles that her father and Robert played in
helping to create the “monstrosity” of a female artist: “Mein Vater hat die

This tension between a woman artist’s artistic ambitions and love or duty is a common
theme in the Künstlerinroman and one that Jelinek picks up on in both Clara S. and Die
Klavierspielerin. See Varsamopoulou, Heller, and Huf for more on the Künstlerinroman.
20

“If a woman’s abilities develop beyond the usual norms, a monstrosity results. It’s an
offense against a man’s rights of ownership which any female animal has to obey. A woman’s
mind . . . should be permanently focused on creating new dishes and disposing of human waste”
(Clara, 425).
21
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männliche Vorstellung vom Genie in mich hineingehämmert und mein Gatte hat
sie mir gleich wieder weggenommen, weil er sie für sich selber gebraucht hat”
(CS, 82). 22 She blames her marriage to Robert for her failure to achieve greatness
as a composer: “Ich bin im sakralen Raum deiner Genialität geopfert worden,
Robert! . . . Diese grausige Ehe mit dir! Immer wenn ich zum Klavier und an eine
Komposition schritt, fand ich den Apparat bereits besetzt: von dir!” (CS, 117). 23
Jelinek’s Robert agrees with Clara in finding her status as a “monstrosity”
offensive, and describes her as incompetent as a composer as well as sexually
unattractive:
[es] fiel mir plötzlich ein, wie unfähig meine Frau Clara für
das selbstständige Komponieren mit Tönen immer gewesen
ist. Für das Magische der Kunst . . . Der einzige Effekt ihrer
Kompositionsversuche was das sukzessive Absterben ihres
weiblichen Geschlechtsreizes für mich (CS, 115). 24
What these excerpts from Clara S. demonstrate is the way that Jelinek shows us
through the figures of Clara and Robert how there is a “double standard”
“My father dinned the male idea of genius into me, but my husband snatched it back
because he wanted it all for himself” (Clara, 405).
22

“Sadly, Robert, I was a sacrificial victim of your genius! . . . It was such a nightmare
being married to you! Every time I went to the piano to compose something, the piano-seat
would be already occupied—by you!” (Clara, 424).
23

“. . . it suddenly struck me how incapable my wife Clara has always been of composing
her own music. Of any artistic magic, in fact . . . The only thing her attempts at composition
achieved was a gradual weakening of her sexual attractiveness for me” (Clara, 423).
24
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applied to women artists, as Caitlin Gannon has noted: “Whereas a man can
write poetry or compose music and win the affection of a woman through his art,
a woman attempting the same is viewed as threatening and unfeminine. Her
production of art negatively affects her attractiveness” (150). 25 In this respect,
Jelinek’s Clara figure foreshadows the dilemma of the female pianist that she
develops more fully in Die Klavierspielerin, to which I now turn.
The Piano and Erika’s Sexual Position in Die Klavierspielerin
In this section, I look at how Jelinek’s novel works with the traditions of
both feminine display and the masculine nature of professional pianists, thus
illustrating the same contradictions at the heart of piano playing that the social
history of the piano and Clara S demonstrate.
The format of this section follows the format of the “Androgynous Piano”
section above. I will thus look at the four elements from the piano’s social history
outlined in that section (music as a female accomplishment and its role in the
domestic life of the bourgeois family; the importance of piano playing in the
development of a certain type of middle-class femininity; the piano’s role in
courtship; and the “masculine” nature of female concert pianists) as they

For other readings of Clara S, see Erdle, Heinemann, Janz (53-62), and Thomas,
“Subjectivity.”
25
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influence Jelinek’s text, concluding with a discussion of Jelinek’s portrayal of a
pianist lacking a stable sexual position. I also argue that Jelinek’s portrayal of this
ambivalently gendered history can be related to Lacan’s claim that becoming a
woman is always precarious and incomplete.
Jelinek’s text is, obviously, a novel and not a historical text. Nonetheless, it
is clear that the history of ambiguously gendered pianos and pianists is reflected
in Jelinek’s history of one piano player, albeit always in an ironic fashion.
Turning first to the domestic life of the bourgeois family, the reader sees Jelinek’s
trademark use of irony in her description of the role of art in comforting Erika for
her domestic life with her mother:
SIE [wird] in ein paar Minuten unter der heißen Flamme des
mütterlichen Scheidbrenners zu einem Häufchen Asche
verbrennen, weil sie spät nach Hause gekommen ist. Dabei
wird die ganze Kunst SIE nicht trösten können, obwohl der
Kunst vieles nachgesagt wird, vor allem, daß sie eine
Trösterin sei. Manchmal schafft sie allerdings das Leid erst
herbei (KS, 27). 26
With this passage, Jelinek turns on its head not only the notion that art offers
solace (indeed, here it actually causes the suffering), but also the notion that

“a few minutes from now, SHE will feel the hot flame of her mother’s blowtorch and
SHE will be burned on to a pile of ashes because SHE is late in getting home. No art can possibly
comfort HER then, even though art is credited with many things, especially an ability to offer
solace. Sometimes, of course, art creates the suffering in the first place” (PT, 23).
26
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daughters would use art (e.g., their piano-playing) as a means of giving solace to
the domestic life of the bourgeois family, which was one of the main functions of
salon music, as musicologist Ruth Solie has noted. She cites an example from a
nineteenth-century German advice manual:
Father comes home in a bad temper, having had a hard day in
the hostile world outside; his daughter opens the piano,
touches the keys and sings her father his favorite song. Isn’t it
wonderful to see the sunshine return to his face, and the ugly
shadows disappear? (Qtd. in Solie, 96).
Erika, hurrying home to a mother in a bad temper, will neither offer nor receive
any solace from her piano-playing.
Looking at the importance of piano playing in the development of a
certain type of middle-class femininity, we see that Jelinek portrays Erika as
understanding that piano playing can be used as a means of displaying a certain
type of femininity: “Um von ihm [the first violinist to whom she is attracted –
BB] als Frau anerkannt zu werden, um im Notizbuch seines Geistes einen Eintrag
als weiblich zu erhalten, spielt sie in den Pausen ganz allein solo auf dem
Klavier, für ihn allein” (KS, 88). 27

“In order to have him recognize her as a woman and register her as ‘female’ in his
mental notebook, she plays the piano for him alone during breaks” (PT, 84). It is also important to
note here that this attempt fails, for reasons I shall outline later in this section.
27
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This type of femininity is, of course, related to the piano’s role in courtship
discussed above. Once again, Jelinek’s novel links ironically to the tradition of
feminine display and male voyeurism described above in the scene depicting
Walter’s thoughts on Erika’s performance at a private concert:
[Klemmer] bewundert uneigennützig die Technik Erikas und
wie sich ihr Rücken rhythmisch mitbewegt. Er betrachtet, wie
sich ihr Kopf wiegt . . . Er sieht das Muskelspiel ihrer
Oberarme, was ihn aufgrund des Zusammenpralls von
Fleisch und Bewegung aufgeregt macht. Das Fleisch gehorcht
der inneren Bewegung durch Musik, und Klemmer fleht, daß
seine Lehrerin dereinst ihm gehorchen möge. Er wetzt im Sitz.
Eine seiner Hände zuckt unwillkürlich an die gräßliche Waffe
seines Geschlechts (KS, 66-67). 28
Given the domestic setting of the performance and the presence of Erika’s
mother, we can safely place desire for Erika within the literary and historical
traditions of domestic piano playing as a “source of visual pleasure for men”
(Vorachek, 31). With a twist, however; by informing the reader that Klemmer is
masturbating and wishing for Erika’s eventual obedience while watching her
play, Jelinek demonstrates for the reader in a less genteel fashion just what Mr.
Darcy and Walter’s other literary predecessors may really have been thinking in
“[Klemmer] unselfishly admires Erika’s technique, he admires the way her back moves
to the beat, the way her head sways . . . He sees the play of muscles in her upper arm, he is
excited by the collision of flesh and motion. The flesh obeys an inner motion that has been
triggered by the music, and Klemmer beseeches his teacher to obey him some day. He
masturbates in his seat. One of his hands involuntarily twitches on the dreadful weapon of his
genital” (PT, 62-63).
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the respectable middle-class salon. In doing so, Jelinek demonstrates once again
her belief that male-female relations are always marked by a violent
undercurrent, 29 even in the seemingly innocent pursuit of music-making and
viewing. 30
While Jelinek portrays Erika and Klemmer as willing participants in
courtship rituals centered around the piano, she has Erika’s mother reject one of
the most important motives that formerly drove parents to have their daughters
learn piano, namely, the obtaining of a skill that would prove useful in attracting
a husband. Indeed, the mother prefers to keep Erika single so that she (and not a
husband) can enjoy the fruits of Erika’s labor (See KS, 8-9, and PT, 4-5) To
achieve this goal, Erika’s mother uses Erika’s training as a pianist as a means of
keeping her away from men and of de-sexing Erika’s body:
Die Pubertärin lebt in dem Reservat der Dauerschonzeit. Sie
wird vor Einflüssen bewahrt und Versuchungen nicht
ausgesetzt. Die Schonzeit gilt nicht für die Arbeit, nur für das
Vergnügen. Mutter und Oma, die Frauenbrigade, steht

For more on Jelinek’s depiction of male-female relations as always marked by violence,
see Beard (especially 344-47), and Hanssen (chapter 7).
29

In this, Jelinek is once again true to the historical record in that connections between
music and violence were routinely made in the nineteenth-century, if in a more subtle form (on
this, see Leppert, Sight of Sound, chapter 6, “Sexual Identity, Death, and the Family Piano in the
Nineteenth Century”).
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Gewehr bei Fuß, um sie vor den männlichen Jäger, der
draußen lauert, abzuschirmen (KS, 37). 31
The primary way through which Erika’s mother attempts to keep Erika free from
male influence is the discipline of piano practicing. The mother also views
Erika’s practicing as a way to keep her daughter from achieving sexual
attractiveness:
Kritik braucht SIE [Erika] nicht zu fürchten, die Hauptsache
ist, daß etwas erklingt, denn das ist das Zeichen dafür, daß
das Kind über die Tonleiter in höhere Sphären aufgestiegen
und der Körper als tote Hülle untengeblieben ist. Die
abgestreifte Körper der Tochter wird sorgfältig nach den
Spuren männlicher Benützung abgeklopft und dann
energisch ausgeschüttelt. Frisch kann sie nach dem Spiel
wieder übergestreift werden, schön trocken und raschelnd
steif gestärkt. Fühllos und keinem zum Fühlen preisgegeben
(KS, 38). 32
Despite her mother’s attempts at keeping her unsexed and away from men,
however, it is music and piano-playing that brings Erika into contact with male

“The adolescent girl lives in a sanctuary, where no one is allowed to bother her. She is
shielded from influences, and never exposed to temptations. This hands-off policy applies only to
pleasure, not work. Mother and grandmother, the female brigade, stand guard, rifle in hand, to
protect Erika against the male hunter lurking outside” (PT, 33).
31

“SHE [Erika] does not need to fear criticism, so long as something can be heard, for the
sounds indicate that the child has ascended the scale, to reach loftier spheres, while leaving her
body down below as a dead frame. The daughter’s physical remains, sloughed off in her ascent,
are combed for any traces of male use and then thoroughly shaken. After completing the music,
she can slip back into her mortal coils, which have been nicely dried and starched stiff and crisp.
Her frame is now unfeeling, and no one has the right to feel it” (PT, 35).
32

160

musicians and awakens a yearning for sexual experience in her: “Die
angehenden Männer und derzeitigen Nachwuchsmusiker, mit denen zusammen
sie

kammermusiziert

und

zwangsorchestriert,

erwecken

eine

ziehende

Sehnsucht, die immer schon tief in ihr zu lauern schien . . . Ihr Docht strahlt
heller als tausend Sonnen auf diese ranzige Ratte hinab, die sich ihr Geschlecht
nennt” (KS, 87-88). 33 Here we see that the activity of piano playing leads, for
Erika, to a desire for sex as opposed to being an experience of sublimated desire
(for more on sublimation, see below). In this way, Erika’s project differs from her
mother’s, as she flirts with the idea of attracting a mate: “Sie wartet still, immer
stiller, daß einer sich für sie entscheidet, und sie wird sich daraufhin sofort
glücklich für ihn entscheiden” (KS, 89). Ultimately, however, Erika is portrayed
as being ambivalent regarding her desire for a mate: “Sind Sie noch nicht
verheiratet, Fräulein Erika, fragt die Milchfrau and fragt auch der Fleischhauer.
Sie wissen ja, mir gefällt niemals einer, antwortet Erika . . . Sie hat noch ein
Mütterlein und braucht daher keinen Mann zu frei’n” (KS, 17). 34 Erika’s

“The future men and present music pupils with whom she performs chamber music
and is forced to play in orchestras arouse an ache in her, a yearning, which has always seemed to
lurk in her . . . Her wick burns brighter than a thousand suns, focusing on the rancid rat known as
her genital” (PT, 83).
33

“You still aren’t married, Fräulein Erika? the dairy woman asks, and so does the
butcher. You know I can never find a man I like, Erika replies . . . She’s still got her mom, she
don’t need no Tom” (PT, 13).
34
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vacillation between these two positions is mirrored by the text’s multiple shifts in
narrative perspective, and is also, I would argue, connected to the piano’s nature
as “both masculine and feminine,” (as pianist Kevin Kopelson puts it [98]), as
well as its potential for blurring sexual difference, to which I now turn.
As noted above, a contradiction existed at the heart of the history of
femininity and piano playing thanks to the piano’s dual nature as private
(feminine) and public (male) instrument. Jelinek’s piano player is one who
demonstrates this dual nature through her inability to be successful in either role
– for Erika does not achieve greatness as a concert pianist, nor is she one whose
feminine display as a performer attracts men, as the novel demonstrates in its
portrayal of her attempt to attract male attention through her piano-playing
(cited above; see KS, 88; and PT, 84). This attempt fails since her feminine skills at
piano-playing cannot make up for her lack of femininity in other matters: “Auf
dem Klavier ist sie sehr gewandt, doch nur nach ihrer schrecklichen Plumpheit
im

täglichen

Gebrauchsleben

wird

sie

von

ihm

beurteilt.

Diese

Ungeschicklichkeiten, mit denen sie sich nicht in sein Herz trampeln kann” (KS,
88). 35

“She is very skillful on the keyboard, but he judges her purely by her terrible
ungainliness in daily practical life—the clumsiness with which she cannot trample into his heart”
(PT, 84).
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Erika’s failure to register as “female,” despite her attempted display of
femininity as a pianist can thus be related both to the history of female pianists
(and their ambiguous gendering), and also to her failure to achieve a sexual
position. As discussed earlier in this chapter, many scholars have noted that Die
Klavierspielerin stages Erika’s failure to achieve a stable “feminine” sexual
identity.
Before looking at how that failure is portrayed in Die Klavierspielerin, I
would first like to give a brief summary of Lacan’s account of the difficulty for
women in assuming a sexual position. While Lacan, like Freud, sees the Oedipus
complex as significant in determining a subject’s sexual position, his formulation
of the Oedipus complex differs from that of Freud. As Dylan Evans points out:
For Freud, the subject’s sexual position is determined by the
sex of the parent with whom the subject identifies in the
Oedipus complex (if the subject identifies with the father, he
takes up a masculine position; identification with the mother
entails the assumption of a feminine position). For Lacan,
however, the Oedipus complex always involves symbolic
identification with the Father, and hence Oedipal
identification cannot determine sexual position (Evans,
Dictionary, 178).
Identification with the father thus causes women to experience the Oedipus
complex in a way both similar to and different from men, as Lacan noted in
Seminar 3:
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For the woman, the realization of her sex is not accomplished
in the Oedipus complex in a way symmetrical to that of the
man’s, not by identification with the mother, but on the
contrary by identification with the paternal object, which
assigns her an extra detour (S3, 172).
It is precisely that detour that makes “the subject’s sexual identity . . . always a
rather precarious matter” (Evans, Dictionary, 179) especially for women, since, as
Lacan puts it: “The metaphysics of the woman’s position is the detour imposed
upon her subjective realization. Her position is essentially problematic, and up to
a certain point it’s unassimilable” (S3, 178). For Lacan, a sexual position is
determined by the relationship a subject has with the phallus, 36 a relationship
that can best be summed up as “having” (masculine) or “being” (feminine) (see
Evans, Dictionary, 178, Grosz, especially chapter 3, and Levy-Stokes, “Phallus”).
That Erika, in Lacanian terms, and like the piano and its players, is also
ambiguously gendered, is made clear on the first page of the novel, when the
reader is informed that Erika serves her mother as a replacement for the father:
“Nach vielen harten Ehejahren erst kam Erika damals auf die Welt. Sofort gab
der Vater den Stab an seine Tochter weiter und trat ab. Erika trat auf, der Vater

It is important here to note that the phallus is not the same as the penis. Indeed, “the
possession of a penis does not guarantee possession of the phallus. A biological male may be
completely identified with not having the phallus” (Levy-Stokes, “Phallus,” 138)
36
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ab” (KS, 7). 37 By replacing the father, Erika fulfills two roles for her mother, that
of child and husband. In other words, she both is the phallus for the mother (as
child) and has the phallus (as father replacement). One way in which Erika
attempts to replace the missing phallus of the father for her mother is through
her piano playing: “So situiert sie sich mit Hilfe des Klaviers . . . als Künstlerin
der Phallus zu sein, den die Mutter begehrt.” (Appelt, 119-20). 38
It is important that one of the ways that Erika attempts to have the phallus
is through her piano playing, as the piano also functions in history and Jelinek’s
text as a signifier of sexual difference, but one that is as unstable as women’s
difficult journey through the Oedipus complex with its detours. In structural
terms, I would argue that the piano functions in a manner similar to phallus in
that it is the player’s relation to the piano that determines her or his sexual
position. In other words, the masculine position of concert pianist could be seen
as a subject who possesses the phallus, while the feminine display associated
with amateur piano-playing relates to being the phallus. That Erika cannot be

“The baby was born after long and difficult years of marriage. Her father promptly left,
passing the torch to his daughter. Erika entered, her father exited” (PT, 3).
37

As artist, she positions herself, with the help of the piano, as the phallus that the
mother desires” (my translation).
38
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firmly fixed as a masculine or feminine player can thus also be related to her
dual position as having and being the phallus for her mother.
Sublimation and Perversion: Die Klavierspielerin as Anti-Künstlerroman
Erika’s lack of a sexual position is therefore very much overdetermined, as
simultaneously cultural and individual: it can be linked both to the history of the
piano and female piano players, and to her relationships with her mother and
her missing father. As Erika’s failure to achieve a sexual position is most clearly
demonstrated through her perversions, the following will discuss perversion as a
structure, the portrayal of Erika’s development as a perverse subject, and the
ways in which Die Klavierspielerin, through its portrayal of perversion instead of
sublimation, can be read as an anti-Künstlerroman.
Erika’s lack of a sexual position is related to perversion as both are formed
during the Oedipus complex, as Julia Kristeva has noted (158). The perverse
subject fails to acknowledge the mother’s castration as part of going through the
Oedipus complex and is instead characterized by disavowal, or the refusal to
give up one’s mother and the pleasure one receives as the object of her desire
(Fink, A Clinical Introduction, 170; see also Gurewich). Thus, Erika’s perversion,
especially in regard to her relationship with Klemmer, can be understood as an
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attempt to break free from her mother and to cease being a stand-in for the
father. 39
At the same time, however, perversion ends up only reinforcing those
unfree “bonds of love” it seeks to escape because inability to give up the mother
means that the pervert’s subject position is actually that of object. As Lacan puts
it: “the whole problem of the perversions consists in conceiving how the child, in
his relation to the mother . . . identifies himself with the imaginary object of [the
mother’s] desire in so far as the mother herself symbolizes it in the phallus” (E,
197-98). What that means is that the pervert (in this case, Erika) “plays the role of
object: the object that fills the void in the mOther” (Fink, A Clinical Introduction,
175).
Additionally, perversion is characterized by disavowal (denial of the
mother’s castration) and is also related to “the father’s desire, the father’s name,
and the father’s law” (Fink, A Clinical Introduction, 170). As Fink goes on to note:
From a Lacanian perspective, the apparent contradiction
inherent in disavowal can . . . be described as follows: “I know
full well that my father hasn’t forced me to give up my
mother and the jouissance I take in her presence . . . hasn’t
exacted the ‘pound of flesh,’ but I’m going to stage such an
exaction or forcing with someone who stands in for him; I’ll
For discussions of how this failure to break free from the mother is portrayed in
Haneke’s film version of Die Klavierspielerin, see Champagne, and Wyatt.
39
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make that person pronounce the law” (A Clinical Introduction,
170).
Perversion, then, is not to be understood as a “form of sexual aberration,” but
rather as a “specific mode of desiring and making sense of the world”
(Gurewich, 192).
Both of these characteristics of perverse subjects (the attempt to break free
of the mother and to find a substitute for the father) are present in Die
Klavierspielerin. In the first case, Jelinek portrays Erika’s mother as understanding
Erika’s relationship with Klemmer as an attempt to get away from her:
Die Mutter hat einen kurzen Verdacht, daß Herr Klemmer
vom längst vergangenen Hausmusikabend versucht, sich
zwischen Mutter und Kind zu zwängen. Dieser junge Mann
ist recht nett, doch er ersetzt keine Mutter (KS, 157). 40
In regard to the father, Erika’s relationship with Klemmer can also be understood
as her search for someone to pronounce the father’s law, or as the narrator puts it
in describing the scene in which Erika gives Klemmer a letter outlining the
masochistic contract she would like to enter into with him: “Erika Kohut

“Mother briefly suspects that Herr Klemmer, from that long-past home recital, is
forcing his way between mother and child. That young man is very nice, but he can’t replace a
mother” (PT, 155).
40
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versteigt sich dahin, daß sie ein Versäumnis begehen wird, wofür sie sofort
bestraft zu werden wünscht” (KS, 225). 41
Finally, I would like now to relate perversion to sublimation in order to
discuss Die Klavierspielerin in generic terms as an anti-Künstlerroman. For Erika, as
a perverse subject, proves unable to (consistently) sublimate or to express herself
through her art, despite its being, as pianist Kevin Kopelson notes, an
“ideological given” that “pianists express themselves” (10) when they play. This
leads him to claim that “by playing Beethoven, Romantic Beethoven, I sense
myself—my authentic, essential self . . Or, rather, we both sense my authentic,
essential, sexual self” (11, emphasis in original). Erika also subscribes to this
“ideological given,” explaining to her students: “die Koreaner sollen fühlen,
nicht eine Schallplatte von Alfred Brendel stumpf imitieren” (KS, 116). 42 Jelinek,
however, in her deliberate ironizing of this Romantic ideal, depicts Erika as
unable to display an “authentic” self through her playing: “Sie hat Kenntnis von
der Sonatenform und dem Fugenbau. Sie ist Lehrerin in diesem Fach. Und doch:
ihre Pfoten zucken dem letzten, endgültigen Gehorsam sehnsüchtig entgegen”
“Erika is presumptuous: She wants to be naughty so she can be punished on the spot”
(PT, 221-22).
41

“The Koreans should feel, they should not stolidly imitate a recording by Alfred
Brendel” (PT, 114).
42
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(KS, 106). 43 In other words, what Jelinek shows Erika expressing through her
piano playing is not her “essential, sexual self” but a longing for obedience,
which can also be understood as perversion (i.e., masochism).
What we also see in this passage is that Erika’s perversions can be related
to her music-making via sublimation. According to Lacan, the pleasure achieved
by the pervert (through her or his perversions) and the artist (through
sublimation) are closely related, as Jacques-Alain Miller has pointed out:
There is a question in psychoanalysis as to the connection
between sublimation and perversion . . . The point is . . . to see
that [perversion and sublimation] stem from the same
question: satisfaction from activities other than fucking (312).
To put it in other terms: both the artist and the pervert desire in a similar fashion,
insofar as both wish to go “beyond” the pleasure principle. Die Klavierspielerin
constantly unmasks this linkage between music and sexuality as the dirty secret
of German Culture, as the following discussion demonstrates. 44

“She knows about the form of the sonata and the structure of the fugue. That’s her job,
she’s a teacher. And yet, her paws ardently grope toward ultimate obedience” (PT, 102).
43

This can, of course, also be related to Freud’s argument in Civilization and its Discontents
that “An dieser Stelle mußte uns die Ähnlichkeit des Kulturprozesses mit der Libidoentwicklung
des Einzelnen zuerst aufdrängen” (GW, 14: 457) [“we cannot fail to be struck by the similarity
between the process of civilization and the libidinal development of the individual” (SE, 21: 91)].
44
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It is precisely perversion’s similarity to sublimation that allows us to read
Die Klavierspielerin’s status as an anti-Künstlerroman. The Künstlerroman has, of
course, a long and distinguished history in both German literature and
modernism. As scholar Evy Varsamopoulou points out, beginning with Ludwig
Tieck’s Franz Sternbalds Wanderungen (1798), German authors have used the
genre of the Künstlerroman to offer a “narrative account of the formation,
development, psychology of an artist, as a special type of individual” (xi).
Jelinek’s portrayal of Erika as an artist is then not new, but what is new in Jelinek
is a female subject who is unable to sublimate, but instead remains simply and
unredeemably perverse. I should now like to offer a brief outline of the
Künstlerroman’s generic conventions before turning to a discussion of the ways in
which Die Klavierspielerin both conforms to and disrupts these conventions.
To do so, I have drawn on the scholarship on the Künstlerroman to compile
a list of four thematic similarities shared by Künstlerrommane. Despite the fact
that there is a fairly large body of work on Künstlerromane, I have chosen to focus
on the work of only a few scholars for this list due to the fact that most studies
tend to focus on individual works (accepting the genre as something already
given) as opposed to setting out definitions of generic conventions. One of the
few works to attempt to define the Künstlerroman is Maurice Beebe’s Ivory Towers
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and Sacred Founts, which, despite its age (it was published in 1964) 45 remains one
of the definitive scholarly works on the Künstlerroman.
Looking at their work, one can thus conclude that four of the most
important thematic traits that make a text a Künstlerroman in generic terms are: 1)
the artist protagonist; 2) depiction of the artist as a genius or “special” individual;
3) a geographical or metaphorical voyage made by the artist “in search of new
experiences or situations” (Seret, 4), experiences and situations that he 46 will then
use to create art; and 4) portrayal of what Maurice Beebe terms the conflict
between “sexual love and artistic creation” (Beebe, 97), which, I argue below, is
resolved by the artist’s learning how to sublimate. 47
Turning first to characteristics one and two, while having an artist as
protagonist is obviously a requirement needed to classify a text as a
Künstlerroman, it is also important that it not just be any artist. The artist

One reason that Beebe’s work is still a relevant source may well be the fact that, as
Varsamopoulou points out, “the Künstler(in)roman is not a fashionable critical object” (xvii). In
addition to Beebe’s work, I also used Varsamopoulou’s, Roberta Seret’s, and P.M. Pasinetti’s
books to formulate the list of conventions discussed in this chapter.
45

I use the pronoun “he” here quite deliberately as the majority of Künstlerromane have
male protagonists. See note 19 for references to scholars who discuss the Künstlerinroman.
46

For more on the elements (thematic and formal) that comprise Künstlerromane, see
Beebe, Seret, Varsamopoulou, and Pasinetti).
47
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protagonist of the Künstlerroman, and indeed the genre itself, both have their
roots in the German Romantic movement.
While it is possible to view the Künstlerroman as a subgenre of the
Bildungsroman, the Romantic Künstlerroman differentiated itself from the
Bildungsroman by “[rejecting] the priorities and principles informing the
Bildungsroman” (Varsamopoulou, x) in favor of a text that featured an artist (or
aspiring artist) as the central character, an artist who conformed to the Romantic
notion of “the artist [as] a human being inhabited by a special power or genius
that singles him out and estranges him from others” (Pasinetti, 4), as well the
view of the artist “as a genius endowed with the talents to originate beauty and
reveal truth (Seret, 3).
Jelinek’s novel conforms to one of these characteristics insofar as Erika, as
a pianist, can be viewed as a type of artist. Where Die Klavierspielerin departs
from the Künstlerroman’s generic conventions, however, is in its relationship to
the view of the artist as genius or special. Indeed, she pokes ironic fun at such a
notion in passages such as the following:
Erikas Beruf ist gleich Erikas Liebhaberei: die Himmelsmacht
Musik.
Sie blicken die Schülerin an und denken, die Musik habe ihr
Gemüt schon früh erhoben, dabei erhebt es ihr nur die Faust.
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Für Erika wählt die Mutter früh einen in irgendeiner Form
künstlerischen Beruf, damit sich aus der mühevoll errungen
Feinheit
Geld
herauspressen
läßt,
während
die
Durchschnittsmenschen bewundernd um die Künstlerin
herumstehen, applaudieren(KS, 10, 20, 26). 48
What we see here is that while the narrator early on informs us that Erika’s love
is music, thus leading the reader to believe that the novel may go on to be a
portrait of the artist as a female genius, the reader instead soon learns that Erika’s
status as an artist has not come about due to an irrepressible desire to create or to
be a genius, but rather because her mother chose an artistic career for her in
order to make money and to separate Erika from the masses. This is certainly a
far cry from Stephen Dedalus’s desire to “discover the mode of life or of art
whereby [his] spirit could express itself in unfettered freedom” (Joyce, 267). As
Andrea Bandhauer has noted:
Erika’s artistic existence does by no means reflect the cliché of
the artist’s freedom and the bourgeois myth of the “artist as
genius” . . . Rather, it is a tortured existence based on force
and disciplinary measures generated by a mother motivated
by petty-bourgeois materialistic ambitions (5).

“Erika’s vocation is her avocation: the celestial power know as music” / “They look at
the music student and imagine that music has raised her spirits; but the only thing that’s raised is
her fist” / “Mother chose a career for Erika when her daughter was still young. It had to be an
artistic profession, so she could squeeze money out of the arduously achieved perfection, while
average types would stand around the artist, admiring her, applauding her” (PT, 6, 16, 24).
48
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The motivation behind Erika’s career choice brings us to the third generic
characteristic listed above (the artist’s search for new experiences or situations
that he can use to create art). To return to the comparison with Joyce’s Portrait,
while Stephen will use the “reality of experience” to “forge in the smithy of [his]
the uncreated conscience of [his] race” (Joyce, 275-76), Erika’s experiences are
used in large part to satisfy her mother’s ambition:
Eine weltbekannte Pianistin, das wäre Mutters Ideal . . . An
keiner Stufe, die Erika erreicht, ist es ihr gestattet auszuruhen,
sie darf sich nicht schnaufend auf ihren Eispickel stützen,
denn es geht sofort weiter. Zur nächsten Stufe . . . Am Gipfel
herrscht Weltberühmtheit . . . Solange die Mutter noch lebt
und Erikas Zukunkft webt, kommt für das Kind nur eins in
Frage: die absolute Weltspitze (KS, 28). 49
Unfortunately for Frau Kohut, Erika is destined to fail as an artist: “Dann versagt
Erika einmal bei einem wichtigen Abschlußkonzert der Musikakademie völlig . .
. Was bleibt ihr anders übrig, als in das Lehrfach überzuwechseln. Ein harter
Schritt für den Meisterpianisten” (KS, 30-31). 50 Erika’s failure at art is also

“A world-famous pianist – that is Mother’s ideal . . . Erika is never allowed to rest at
any level she reaches, never allowed to catch her breath and lean on her icepick . . . The peak
offers international fame, which is never reached by most climbers . . . So long as Mother lives
and continues planning Erika’s future, there is only one possibility for the child: the top of the
world” (PT, 24).
49

“Then, one day, at an important concert at the Academy of Music, Erika fails totally . . .
What else can she do but become a teacher? A difficult step for a master pianist” (PT, 26-27).
50
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reflected in her failure at developing and experiencing as a human being, as
Carlotta van Maltzan has noted:
At the end of the novel, all the events described turn out to
have been non-events for Erika in the sense that they have
had no effect on her. The fact that her life situation remains
the same is highlighted by the connection of the first and last
sentences of the novel 51 . . . In its constant repetition her
life/story remains the same (101).
If Die Klavierspielerin were truly a Künstlerroman, as opposed to an antiKünstlerroman, the events of the novel would instead add up to experiences that
result in “a journey of the mind and soul, a movement away from the
materialistic toward the abstract.” (Seret, 2).
Furthermore, Erika’s non-experience brings us to the fourth generic trait
outlined above, namely that of the conflict between “sexual love and artistic
creation” (Beebe, 97), which I see as being at least partially resolved by the
artist’s learning how to sublimate (here it is important to bear in mind that
genital sexuality can also be viewed as a form of sublimation, as noted above). In
this respect, it is significant that not only is Erika doing the same thing at the end

Both of these sentences describe Erika as on her way to her mother: “Die
Klavierlehrerin Erika Kohut stürtzt wie ein Wirbelsturm in die Wohnung, die sie mit ihrer Mutter
teilt” / “Erika weiß die Richtung, in die sie gehen muß. Sie geht nach Hause. Sie geht und
beschleunigt langsam ihren Schritt (KS, 7 and 285). [“The piano teacher, Erika Kohut, bursts like a
whirlwind into the apartment she shares with her mother” / “Erika knows the direction she has
to take. She heads home, gradually quickening her step” (PT, 3 and 280).]
51
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of the novel as at the beginning, but that that same thing is going home to mom.
For if Erika fails to sublimate (as I argue below that she does), it is her failure to
separate from her mother that prevents her from achieving sublimation.
And giving up mom and learning how to sublimate are, I would argue,
the primary tasks that male artist-protagonists of Künstlerromane have to achieve
in order to become artists. 52 As Maurice Beebe notes in his study of
Künstlerromane:
In the artist-novels [of] the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, the artist is often forced to choose between woman
and vocation, and only rarely does he achieve fulfillment as
both artist and lover . . . most portraits of the artist assume
that sexual love and artistic creation are in conflict (97).
Thus, at the end of Portrait of the Artist of a Young Man, Stephen takes leave not
only of Ireland, but of his mother and the young woman whose sexual
attractiveness had inspired his writing of a villanelle, separating both from
sexual activity and desire for the mother. The reader is left to assume that the
energy that Stephen would otherwise have used in those relationships will
instead go towards the creation of art. 53

Obviously this is also true of all male subjects. My point here simply is that the
Künstlerroman thematizes this more directly than some other genres.
52

This redirection corresponds to Freud’s definition of sublimation: “Die Sublimierung
ist ein Prozeß an der Objektlibido und besteht darin, daß sich der Trieb auf ein anderes, von der
53
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This is not to argue that all artists sublimate all of their sexual desire all
the time (and indeed many artists, including Joyce, did and do enjoy active
sexual lives). As interpreters of Freud and Lacan have noted, Freud himself
never “presented sublimation as equivalent to sexual abstinence . . . Sublimation
simply gives another aim to the drive, another satisfaction” (Kaltenbeck, 105).
Jean LaPlanche also notes that “sometimes, indeed, sublimation does work in
opposition to sexuality, but sometimes, on the contrary, the two complement
each other, work together” (24).
Jelinek makes reference to the popular understanding of sublimation as
equivalent to sexual abstinence in Die Klavierspielerin, when she has Erika’s
mother express her belief that the artist must give up sex in order to achieve
artistic greatness:
Lieber den Gipfel der Kunst als die Niederungen des
Geschlechts. Dieses Geschlecht hat der Künstler dagegen
landläufiger Meinung von seiner Zügellosigkeit zu vergessen,
glaubt die Mutter . . . Leider wimmeln die
Künstlerbiographien, welche überhaupt das Wichtigste an

sexuellen Befriedigung entferntes Ziel wirft” (GW, 10: 161) [“Sublimation is a process that
concerns object-libido and consists in the instinct’s directing itself towards an aim other than, and
remote from, that of sexual satisfaction” (SE, 14: 94)].
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den Künstlern sind, all zuoft von geschlechtlichen Lüsten und
Listen ihrer Protagonisten (KS, 199-200). 54
Jelinek’s tongue-in-cheek reference to “Künstlerbiographien” serves to remind
the reader of Klavierspielerin that while this novel can be read as an artist’s
biography, it is one that also foregrounds the sexual exploits of its artist, but in a
way that differs from the usual Künstlerroman. 55
For example: while watching a porn film, Erika mentally compares the
work of the actors to the work of musicians: “Erika ist darauf geeicht, Menschen
zuzusehen, die sich hart bemühen, weil sie ein Ergebnis wünschen. In dieser
Hinsicht ist der sonst große Unterschied zwischen Musik und Lust eher
geringfügig” (KS, 110). 56 Here Jelinek makes for the reader a connection between
music and sex as both performance, almost sport. Similarly, Erika feels sexual

“Better the peak of art than the slough of sex. Contrary to the popular notion of his
wantonness, the artist, Mother believes, must forget about sex . . . Unfortunately, biographies of
artists, which are the most important things about artists, teem all too often with the sexual ruses
and abuses of their protagonists” (PT, 197).
54

Here we need to remember that sublimation can also be related to “normal”
heterosexual genital sexuality as Tim Dean has noted: “if we take satisfaction of the drive without
repression as our definition of sublimation . . . . then we’re led to the counterintuitive conclusion
that heterosexual copulation itself constitutes a kind of sublimation” (Beyond Sexuality, 276,
emphasis in original). In this respect, Erika’s failure to achieve “normal” sexual relations with
Klemmer can also be seen as a failure to sublimate.
55

“Erika is geared to watching people who work hard because they want results. In this
respect, the normally large difference between music and sexual pleasure is quite tiny” (PT, 106).
56
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pleasure when talking about music to one of her students: “Erika erhebt . . .
Bachs Werk in Sternenhöhe . . . Erika spürt das Prickeln zwischen den Beinen,
das nur der von Kunst und für Kunst Ausgewählte fühlt, wenn er über Kunst
spricht” (KS, 104). 57
There is, however, one important difference between perversion and
sublimation and that is, that while the pervert retains a subject position as object
(of the mother’s desire), the artist is able to maintain an active position as a
desiring subject (on this, see Lacan, S7, 112). Since Erika does not achieve a
subject position, but remains instead the object of her mother’s desire, she is
unable to sublimate through art, which would require her to take that active
position. 58
To conclude, I would like to return to the discussion of Julia Kristeva’s
work that appears in the introduction to this dissertation. For if Kristeva is
correct in arguing that sublimation creates a subject “who lacks nothing, in fact,
except that he lacks a lack,” (161), and if Jean Wyatt is correct in her contention

“Erika praises Bach’s work to the skies . . . Erika feel the tingling between her legs,
something felt only by those chosen by and for art when they talk about art” (PT, 101).
57

Thus Renate Schneider has written of Die Klavierspielerin: “Der gesamte Text ist ein
Hohn auf die These der Sublimierung des Eros durch die Kunst” (363) [“The whole text is a
mockery of the thesis of the sublimation of Eros through art” (my translation)].
58
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that Erika is a subject (child) who “need never confront lack, either in the mother
or in herself” (460), then we can see how music and perverse sexuality are
intertwined for Erika—her failure to become a concert pianist is simultaneously a
failure to achieve sublimation, a failure which manifests itself in perversion as a
means of obtaining the jouissance denied to her by art. What Jelinek demonstrates
with her perverse piano teacher, then, is not just the similarity between the
pervert and the artist, but she also offers us an anti-Künstlerroman that stretches
generic boundaries through its portrait of the artist as pervert rather than genius.
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CONCLUSION
During the 2002 fall semester, I taught an honors seminar, titled “Love,
Sex & Domesticity in Women’s Writing,” for first-year students in the College of
Liberal Arts at Texas A&M University. One of the texts we read over the course
of the semester was Die Liebhaberinnen. My students had a mixed reaction to
Jelinek’s novel, with one of them explaining that while she found it an interesting
and funny, she was dismayed that Jelinek’s novel had “ruined” her future
reading of romance novels due to the way Die Liebhaberinnen laid bare for her the
manner in which romance novels function.
In other words, my students recognized that, as noted in the introduction,
genres are indeed “social contracts between a writer and a specific public, whose
function is to specify the proper use of a particular cultural artifact” (Jameson,
The Political Unconscious, 106). They also realized that Jelinek’s reworking of
genres results in what Anne Cranny-Francis views as a “fundamental
intervention in the relationship between reader and text, a disruption of the
reader’s conventionalized understanding of the contract, the literary institution
of a particular genre” (18).
This disruption of genres is one of Jelinek’s most significant literary
contributions and one of the reasons I chose to focus on sustained readings of
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these three Jelinek texts in generic terms in this dissertation. As I argued in the
introduction, it is through Jelinek’s use of generic forms where we can locate the
politics of the texts examined in this dissertation. For if genres are political and
ideological as many have argued,1 then the rewriting of generic forms is also
political. In Jelinek’s case, however, the politics of rewriting do not necessarily
conform to an expected Marxist or feminist form. For that reason, one can argue
that these works function to create a “negative aesthetics,” as opposed to a
positive reworking of generic forms. It is this lack of positivity that explains the
often fraught reception of Jelinek’s work by both Marxists and feminists, 2 and is
also where Jelinek’s affinities to figures such as Ingeborg Bachmann and Theodor
Adorno can be seen.
In regard to Bachmann, Sara Lennox has argued that:
Bachmann’s analysis of her period and of the situation of
women within it is enabled by her profound appropriation of
a Frankfurt School analysis, whose leading theorist, Theodor
W. Adorno, declared: “There’s no right way to live when the
world is wrong” (Cemetery, 15). 3

1

See, for example, Jameson, The Political Unconscious, Cranny-Francis, and Beebee.

For more on Jelinek’s reception by Marxists and feminists, see DeMeritt, Fiddler,
Rewriting (Chapter 1, “Jelinek in Context”), Haines and Littler, and Mayer and Koberg.
2

3

“Es gibt kein richiges Leben im falschen” (Adorno, GS, 4: 42, Lennox’s translation).
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Similarly, Jelinek’s analysis of Austria and gender relations conforms both to
Adorno’s aphorism cited above, as well as his view that “[das Kunstwerk]
kritisiert . . . die Realität. Es ist deren negative Erkenntnis” (GS, 11: 261). 4
Through her use of what Allyson Fiddler has termed a “super-reality” (Rewriting,
31), Jelinek creates texts that, due to their affinity with Adorno’s idea of a
negative aesthetic, reject earlier feminist theories of aesthetics. Rita Felski defines
those earlier theories as fostering “literature as a form of self-expression,
identification between reader and author” (30). As I have demonstrated in this
dissertation, Jelinek rejects this identificatory mode of writing and refuses to
create “positive” subjects, preferring instead, through her generic perversions, to
produce art that is a “Kritik von Praxis als der Herrschaft brutaler
Selbsterhaltung inmitten des Bestehenden” (Adorno, GS, 7: 26). 5

4

‘Art is the negative knowledge of the actual world” (Adorno, “Reconciliation,” 160).

“critique of praxis as the rule of brutal self-preservation at the heart of the status quo”
(Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 12).
5
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APPENDIX
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Works by Sigmund Freud
GW

Gesammelte Werke

SE

The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud
Works by Elfriede Jelinek

A

Die Ausgesperrten

Clara

Clara S. A Musical Tragedy

CS

Clara S. musikalische Tragödie

KS

Die Klavierspielerin

LH

Die Liebhaberinnen

L

Lust (German)

Lust

Lust (English)

PT

The Piano Teacher

women

women as lovers

Wonderful

Wonderful, Wonderful Times
Works by Jacques Lacan

E

Écrits. A Selection

S1

The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book I: Freud’s Papers on Technique 1953-1954
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S2

The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book II: The Ego in Freud’s Theory and in the
Techniques of Psychoanalysis 1954-1955

S3

The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book III: The Psychoses 1955-1956

S7

The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book VII: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 1959-1960

S11

The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of
Psychoanalysis

S20

The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book XX: Encore. On Feminine Sexuality: The
Limits of Love and Knowledge
Works by Karl Marx

C

Capital: A Critique of Political Economy

EW

Early Writings

GR

Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy (Rough Draft)

Full details on the editions used can be found in the Works Cited.
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